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ABSTRACT

STRUCTURE OR KNOT: WHAT PHENOMENOLOGY AND ASPERGER’S SYNDROME
CAN TEACH LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS ABOUT SUBJECTIVE CONSTITUTION

By
Shannon D. Kelly
August 2017

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Jessie Goicoechea
This research project examines Asperger’s Syndrome (now, with the DSM 5, Autism
Spectrum Disorder) through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis and speaks to current debates in
the field regarding the structural diagnosis of autism. Framed by critiques of Lacanian
psychoanalysis, the project takes up autism and treatments for the disorder from within
mainstream psychological approaches, from the viewpoint of neurodiversity and autistic selfadvocates, and from within Lacanian psychoanalysis, with specific attention paid to the
diagnostic approach in Lacanian thinking and the assumed relationship between autism and
psychosis. Four published autobiographies written by autistic adults were subjected to two types
of qualitative analysis in order to elucidate the experience of autistic adults, as described by
them, to consider where autism fits within the Lacanian structural system, and to determine
potential treatment needs for autistic adults. In order to strike a balance between autistic and
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clinical perspectives, the first examination utilized interpretive phenomenological analysis to
gain a deeper understanding of the experience of autism and the potential issues at stake as they
are presented by individuals on the spectrum. Following that, the second analysis compared the
autobiographical material to the conceptual elements of Lacanian structural theory. The results
of the analyses show that autism does not fit within the Lacanian structural definition of
psychosis and also does not comprise its own, unique structural category. Using findings
generated from both analyses, commonalities and divergences in lived experience as described
by the authors are explored, and the potential impact of those findings on how autism is
conceptualized and treated within Lacanian psychoanalysis and mainstream treatments is
discussed, with special attention paid to questions of power, identity, and politics within both
approaches.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Perhaps we all lose our sense of reality to the precise degree to
which we are engrossed in our own work, and perhaps that is why
we see in the increasing complexity of our mental constructs a
means for greater understanding, even while intuitively we know
that we shall never be able to fathom the imponderables that
govern our course through life.
-W.G. Sebald, The Rings of Saturn
Causation
In 2012 I sat down across from a man who had come to therapy for help with “typical male”
problems. On that first meeting, I noticed that he was different. Something about the way he
didn’t look directly at me, something about the matter-of-fact way that he described how his
girlfriend pushed him to seek treatment and his own assessment of his problems, something
about his way of taking up the intersubjective space was different than anything I had
experienced before. I couldn’t read him, I wasn’t able to intuit how he was feeling or what he
wanted, and I couldn’t tell how he experienced me. For almost three years that never changed.
At some point along the way, after entertaining various diagnoses, including psychosis, I realized
that he was autistic. It was a very high-functioning autism, and at the time, I diagnosed him with
Asperger’s Syndrome.
After the diagnosis, came the question: now what? What does a psychodynamically
oriented clinician do with an adult with Asperger’s Syndrome who is depressed, having
relationship problems, and who desperately wants help? I was skeptical of what I knew to be the
typical treatments for autism – Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) and Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT). Although I want to be clear that ABA and CBT both offer helpful skills to
address social functioning and mood/anxiety problems associated with ASD, both seemed to
overtly focus on teaching autistic individuals to become more “normal,” a position that I feel
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uncomfortable taking as a clinician. Further, knowing information about his genetic makeup or
possible exposure to neurotoxins in childhood, areas where much of the current clinical research
is focused, was less helpful to me in the immediacy of the clinical space. And, my training in
psychoanalysis was impractical insofar as it either required me to work with a kind of language
and metaphor that he did not seem to employ or to treat him as psychotic. Also, although we
together arrived at a diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome, the problems for which he sought
treatment were not problems of autism. They were, perhaps, influenced and shaped by his
autism, but they were separate. They were the problems of being human – the same ones that
prompted the rest of my clients to seek treatment. And he was suffering.
In that clinical space, it felt often as though we were on our own – trying, and often
failing, to make use of an array of research and treatment tools that didn’t quite fit. I will forever
be grateful to him, to his generosity of spirit, and to his willingness to engage with me on a
journey towards the unknown – one that involved constant missteps, at least one computer
model, and a few surprises. Together we created something in the clinical space that required
both of us to adapt, to relate differently, and to sit with true difference, in all of its strange
discomfort and exciting possibility. He was an inspiration and I will always appreciate his
willingness to sit with me as we blundered toward a workable path.
The following pages present my research and thoughts on Asperger’s Syndrome, now
with the DSM-5 called high-functioning autism spectrum disorder. Inspired by this case, I was
challenged to consider the ways that my theoretical background and clinical skills were
insufficient to treat the person in front of me. I was also challenged to look deeper into and be
open towards other ways of theorizing and treating AS and to realize that, even those treatments
considered “best practices” often failed. I was introduced to the interesting world of “Aspergia”
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(Asperger Life, n.d.), where Asperger’s is the norm and everyone else is abnormal. And I was
forced to consider what I most value as a clinician and how to create a space of transformation
for the individuals who ask me for help. In short, I was prompted to think about what it means to
be human, to be different, to craft a satisfying life, and to be in relation with others. The
following pages represent one of the ways that I have chosen to grapple with this material – by
turning to lived experience and exploring the space of difference.
Theories of (my) Mind
It is important for any researcher to acknowledge their own subjective position and stakes in the
research – presuppositions, blind spots, hopes, etc. – as a way of noting the ways that power and
intention, unconscious or not, can shape the direction and results of research in important ways.
The convolutions and contortions of my project will, in many ways, give away my desire as well
as my affiliations with phenomenology, critical theory, and, Lacanian psychoanalysis. However,
I would like to address up front a number of personal and cultural factors that I believe are
relevant, that have shaped the trajectory of this project, and that inform that way that I am taking
up and interpreting information.
Perhaps most importantly, I am not autistic, or I am what is sometimes called
neurotypical (NT). Although it is important to deeply consider how we assume and articulate
difference, it is likely that my lived experience is in many ways different from the lived
experience of the individuals I am studying. As a researcher, the divergence between my
subjective position and the ones of the individuals I am studying is important to consider. First, it
brings up questions of power and the dominance of neurotypical discourses and ways of life.
This is particularly true as I am contributing yet another volume of research about autistic
individuals by a non-autistic author. This non-autistic perspective is important to consider as it
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positions me within category of “neurotypical” or “normal” – against which the perceived
deficits in autism are measured. The problem of neurotypical perspective showed up for me
throughout the research in the form of a kind of automatic tendency to categorize differences as
deficits and to locate those deficits within the autistic person. Although I have gone through this
text multiple times in order to try to identify and correct this tendency, I think it is important to
point out the ways that my non-specialist, everyday perspective always already puts me in the
position to make certain types of interpretations. My situated perspective limits the field and
scope of my knowledge of others and, precisely because I am situated in a non-autistic
perspective, it may be difficult for me to fully know that experience. Yet, in this project, I am
attempting to produce knowledge about autism and about the experience of autism as it is lived.
Although there are many ways that my perspective may allow certain insights, it will necessarily
exclude others.
Another thing worth noting at the start is that my personal and cultural experience with
and exposure to autistic individuals prior to this clinical case was slim. I had heard about and
read parts of Temple Grandin’s second autobiography and read the case study of her included in
Oliver Sack’s book, An Anthropologist on Mars. I had spent a few years working with
developmentally disabled adults in my early twenties. Some of those individuals had autism
diagnoses, however the autism was secondary to severe cognitive impairment or Down’s
Syndrome, and was never considered as a separate and unique thing. In that setting, everyone
was moderately to severely disabled and the name of their disability, or its specific attributes,
was irrelevant. Looking back on my life and relationships, I cannot even say that I had friends
on the spectrum and there are no autistic individuals in my family of origin that I am aware of.
My minimal exposure to autism, both personally and culturally, is both a limit and a strength of
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this research, in my mind. On the one hand, I lack the important interpersonal and contextual
information that comes from day-to-day relationships; information that is different from the type
acquired in the therapy room. On the other hand, I had few preconceptions about what autistic
individuals should be like. In that way, I would like to believe that I was able to be attuned to
what was presented rather than to what I expected to see.
Although I did not come to this project with much experience with autism, I did come in
with a small amount of information about how autism was viewed in the clinical literature, both
historically and currently, and with some strong opinions about how it should be taken up. I had
heard the term “refrigerator mother” and I knew that psychoanalysis had historically blamed
autism on a failure in the parenting role. I also knew that the current literature, like so much of
current literature on disorders in the DSM, was interested in the question of causation as located
in the brain. As a researcher, I began from the position, and firm belief, that both explanations
are more than a little naïve and, in different ways, harmful. Both are extremes aimed at locating
cause - one in the body and one in the environment. Further, although I came to this project
with a firm belief that both biology and environment are at play, I also came with a belief that the
question of biological cause, as it relates to psychological treatment, is useless. This does not
mean that I deny biological explanations for autism, it merely means that I consider them
unhelpful when thinking about questions of identity or treatment. I have struggled over the
course of this project to acknowledge and challenge this bias and allow space for biological
explanations and to consider the ways that they provide valuable insights into autism treatments
and also offer individuals on the spectrum an important path for identity construction and
political engagement.

5

While I am in many ways biased against biological explanations, I am biased towards
environmental ones. I believe that environmental factors are extremely relevant to treatment,
and are often given short shrift in current clinical and research literature on autism. That said, it
is also my opinion that trying to identify one environmental cause for every case of autism
misses the point. Environment – family, peers, school, media, nation, etc. is everything outside
of biology. What influences people towards who they become is largely a constellation of chance
intersections and encounters. What profoundly influences one person may not influence another
and the way that people make sense of their experience is often utterly unique – in other words,
every individual is particular and comes with a particular history that is meaningful to them. In
this project, I am working to uncover commonalities, to identify areas of experience that are
shared by autistic adults, but I am also working to note the ways that there remain individual
differences that are important to consider. In terms of this research, this bias towards the shaping
influence of environment on the individual is foundational and apparent in my lack of attention
to questions of cause.
Following from that, I also come to this research as an individual with a particular set of
theoretical allegiances and presuppositions – some of which intersect and/or prompt issues of
bias and perspective discussed above. Although I sometimes don’t want to be, I am a Lacanian at
heart. Because of that affiliation, I come to this project with a lot of ideas about how people
come into being in a complicated matrix of desire, language, and culture, regardless of the
individual biological factors that may be at play. Autistic individuals, like all individuals, have
histories, live in the world in relation to others, and bear some relationship, however
complicated, to language. As such, I come to this project with a belief that autistic adults speak
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(whether that be through words, gestures, silence, or the frantic flapping of hands) and that in
their speech lies entry to their particular ways of desiring, enjoying, loving, and relating.
In addition to shaping my theoretical perspective on autism, being a Lacanian also shapes
my perspective on treatment and how I understand the tools and purpose of clinical intervention.
As a clinician, I believe it is my job to listen and allow space for the transformation of suffering,
but it is not my job to force social learning or behavioral changes that are not requested or
wanted. I come to this project skeptical of treatments aimed at creating more “acceptable”
people, and concerned about the possibility of treatment becoming a form of social control. As a
result of my theoretical and clinical perspective, this project is in no way oriented towards curing
autism or even finding ways to increase social performance.
There is no avoiding the fact that I am a psychologist and a clinician, however, and that
there are many ways in which being a clinician forces a position of healer and also forces a
reciprocal position of sickness on the part of the patient. This shows up repeatedly throughout
this text as I work to manage the transitions between psychological and psychoanalytic
perspectives on autism and those of autistic self-advocates. In some cases, as a psychologist or
psychoanalyst, I may see areas of individual deficit or difficulty where, from another perspective
I may see instead failures in the environment or, merely, differences in style. This shifting
between different perspectives shows up in a constant tension in this text between explorations
and interpretations of deficit vs. ability, acceptance vs. change, and difference vs. sameness.
Although I have tried to mark these shifts and to be as explicit as possible about my intentions
and interpretations within the various perspectives, it is likely that there remain places where the
tension appears and remains unresolved.
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I think it is important to state from the outset that I do have some questions about what it
means to provide effective treatment in cases of autism, despite the fact that I believe some
autistic adults neither want nor need treatment. My question about treatment however, is less
about treating autism and more about treating human suffering in cases where the subject is
autistic. My project is framed primarily around questions about subjectivity in autism and how
different subjects may require different approaches to treatment. Although I will discuss some of
the pros and cons of treatments for autism, per se, this text is aimed to explore the ways that
autistic subjects bring a unique subjectivity to bear on the clinical space and to ask neurotypical
clinicians and researchers – how do we accommodate that difference in a way that is
humanizing? This is my starting point.
Language Problems
Language is both powerful and imperfect. When it comes to autism, language is a problem on
many fronts – how we talk about autism shapes how autism is understood culturally, which
impacts how autistic individuals are treated, how many resources are allocated for individuals on
the spectrum and even, some would argue, how autism is able to be expressed and lived by the
people who are diagnosed with it.
One of the most important debates about language in autism research and studies is the
debate between person-first and identity-first language. Rooted in an understanding that how we
talk about people shapes how we think about and treat them, proponents of both person-first and
identity-first language are interested in reducing stigma, valuing individuals, and producing a
culture of respect. As Dunn and Andrews (2015) point out in their recent article about disability
language, both person-first and identity-first language arose out of disability constructs aimed at
addressing problems inherent in the medical model of disability. The medical model largely
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defined individuals according to their disability and produced a language that often reduced the
individual to status of his or her impairment (e.g. retarded, crippled, etc.).
Person-first language sought to undo this reduction and offer a linguistic separation of the
disability from the person. Thus we say that a person “has cognitive decline” rather than “is
demented.” As explained by The Arc (n.d.), an advocate organization for persons with
intellectual and cognitive disabilities:
By placing the person first, the disability is no longer the primary, defining characteristic
of an individual, but one of several aspects of the whole person. People-First Language is
an objective way of acknowledging, communicating, and reporting on disabilities. It
eliminates generalizations and stereotypes, by focusing on the person rather than the
disability. (para. 3)
Although rooted in respect for individuals with disabilities, person-first language has
been criticized by autism self-advocates and other disability rights activists as ignoring the
cultural and identity factors at stake in disability. For example, Jim Sinclair (1999) makes three
points in his article, “Why I dislike “person-first” language”:
1) Saying “person with autism” suggests that the autism can be separated from the
person. I can be separated from things that are not part of me, and I am still be the same
person… But autism is part of me. Autism is hard-wired into the ways my brain works. I
am autistic because I cannot be separated from how my brain works… 2) Saying “person
with autism” suggests that even if autism is part of the person, it isn’t a very important
part. Characteristics that are recognized as central to a person’s identity are appropriately
stated as adjectives, and may even be used as nouns to describe people: We talk about
“male” and “female” people, and even about “men” and “women” and “boys” and
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“girls,” not about “people with maleness” and “people with femaleness”… If I did not
have an autistic brain, the person that I am would not exist. I am autistic because autism
is an essential feature of me as a person… 3) Saying “person with autism” suggests that
autism is something bad–so bad that is isn’t even consistent with being a person. Nobody
objects to using adjectives to refer to characteristics of a person that are considered
positive or neutral… It is only when someone has decided that the characteristic being
referred to is negative that suddenly people want to separate it from the person. I know
that autism is not a terrible thing, and that it does not make me any less a person… I am
autistic because I accept and value myself the way I am. (para. 2-4)
As Dunn and Andrews (2015) note, identity-first language is based on the idea that “disability is
a distinct diverse cultural and sociopolitical experience” (p. 259) that is inextricably woven
through the fabric of identity and shapes the lived experience of the person.
Debates regarding person-first and identity-first language capture something important
about issues of respect, visibility, community, identity, and politics within the discourses on
disability. With respect to this project, I have chosen to use both methods of description, and try
to remain faithful to the linguistic choices of the author or scholar who I am discussing. In this
project I am making use of autobiographical texts, and for all of those authors, identity-first
language was the linguistic choice most often made and so, in that context, I have tried to stay
with that linguistic choice. For many of the professionals and clinicians whose research I
reviewed, person-first language is more frequently used and I have, similarly, tried to mirror
those choices in my own writing. In places where the intention is unclear or where I am
discussing my own ideas or opinions, I have chosen to make use of identity-first language almost
exclusively. Although there are valid arguments both for and against this choice, it is rooted in
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my desire to acknowledge and consider autism as one way of being human and I think identityfirst language better captures that position.
The debate regarding the problems and merits of person-first vs. identity-first language in
disability and autism research is one example of a deeper issue with language and meaning that I
believe is at the heart of all human subject research. It is difficult to speak about, describe, or
interpret any human behavior or experience without drawing on a language that is laden with
potentially problematic and historical meanings. Language is produced, whether in spoken or
written form, by individuals situated within a particular perspective. Even when attempting to
take a more critical and compassionate approach, as was the case with the introduction of personfirst language, there is always a potential critique, a hidden connotation, that exists alongside the
intended meaning and has the potential to alter the significance of the text in profound ways.
Although I have tried to carefully consider my language choices throughout this text and,
specifically, to challenge deficit-laden language, I have found that there are many ways in which
those attempts have necessarily failed. Part of this failure is particular to me, my being as a NT
psychologist and the ways that my linguistic choices reflect the implicit ways that I make sense
of my world. Another part is related to language itself, the ways it carries history, politics, and
perspective and thus slides, sometimes problematically, constantly missing the mark.
In this dissertation, I am shifting constantly between various perspectives – Lacanian,
phenomenological, critical – and am attempting to take up each from within its own history and
conceptual language. These different perspectives inform my use of language in ways that may
conflict with my explicit trajectory or challenge my intended interpretation. Through these
movements within and between positions, I have become aware of the struggle to carefully and
thoroughly describe and interpret without lapsing into the language of lack or deficit and without
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lapsing into the unreflective position that assumes language can be employed with singular
meaning. These various perspectives point to the ways that conceptual language has the capacity
to do violence to experience – I find that this is often particularly true of psychological and
psychoanalytic language. And, yet, despite the potential for violence, there is not yet another
way to contend with these issues other than through the very language that attempts to erase
them. As Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre (2007) writes:
...we must learn to live in the middle of things, in the tension of conflict and confusion
and possibility; and we must become adept at making do with the messiness of that
condition and at finding agency within rather than assuming it in advance of the
ambiguity of language and cultural practice. In addition, we must be on the lookout for
each other as we negotiate meaning and create new descriptions of the world. We can
never get off the hook by appealing to a transcendental Ethics. We are always on the
hook, responsible, everywhere, all the time. (p. 176-177)
Special Interests, Inflexible Adherence, and Self-Stimulation
At the same time that I was meeting with my patient for the first time in 2012, Lacanian
psychoanalysis came under fire for its conceptualization and treatment of autistic individuals in
France. Sophie Robert, in her documentary, The Wall, pits Lacanian psychoanalysis against
Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) in the treatment of autistic children. Her film is a clear and
pointed attack on Lacanian psychoanalysis and on what she sees as the futility of psychoanalytic
treatment for autistic subjects. Robert’s critique is cutting and goes beyond merely suggesting
that psychoanalysis is not as useful as other forms of treatment to a critique of what she sees as a
regime of psychoanalytic thinking in France – an entrenched establishment that is blind to its
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own ignorance. She paints the picture of the psychoanalyst as the perverse and narcissistic ruler,
holding onto antiquated ideas, and preventing children from getting the help that they need.
Her accusations against psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts are myriad, some nuanced
and relevant, others surprisingly misinformed. What is most striking, however, is the way she
stages the scene of psychoanalysis for her viewers – almost as a parody rather than as a true
critique. She treats psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts as naïve worshippers of old and fallen
gods. She advocates for French clinicians to disregard the power that psychoanalysis has had on
the therapeutic community in France and move towards what is, in her view, a more relevant
scientific approach common in the US and other parts of Europe. Her rhetoric, the construction
of her discourse about psychoanalysis, is compelling – it pulls the viewer into a particular
perspective and makes it nearly impossible to disagree with her moral position: psychoanalysis
hurts autistic children, ABA saves them. In this interesting theoretical-turned-moral critique,
Robert exposes the complex underbelly of autism treatment and research, which has always been
inextricably bound up with values – first the values of family and, now, the values of
professionals.
The critique that Robert levels at psychoanalysis is one that could, of course, be applied
to other psychological schools of thought. Robert’s critique of psychoanalysis as ideologically
dogmatic echoes critiques of cognitive behavioral and neurobiological approaches made by
psychoanalysts, humanists, and critical psychologists. But, it is important to consider that her
critique may point to some ways that psychoanalysis has become rigid and adherent to a theory
that resists change. And, further, her need to resort to a moral, rather than logical, argument
about treatment approaches, points to some ways that her preferred “scientific approaches” may,
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too, suffer from areas of rigidity or a sense of God-like omnipotence. It is here, in this strange
mixture of politics, theory, science, and religion that autism is situated.
This introduces questions about how to take up autism in the clinical space, while
acknowledging that the discourses about autism are complex, multifaceted, and irreversibly
complicate any research or theories about autistic subjectivity, the causes of autism, or how we
may choose to think about and/or apply treatments. The complexity and variability in the
research and in the discourses on autism leads me to be skeptical of any treatment or theory that
appears to have found an answer, including psychoanalysis. Also, I am curious about the ways
that theory is transformed into clinical practice and I wonder if it is not too often the case that
theory determines practice, rather than practice and theory mutually informing each other. In an
article on Lacanian practice, analyst Colette Chouraqui-Sepel (2004) noted, “Psychoanalysis
results from a permanent journeying from clinic to theory and back to clinic again. Otherwise, it
would be pure delusion” (p. 115). Sophie Robert, in her film, is pointing to the ways that
psychoanalysis has the potential to become (or perhaps already has become) something like a
shared delusion. This is also the case for many of the other theories and/or treatments for autism
– in this field of inquiry there seems to be, in an irony that is too often missed, an “apparently
inflexible adherence to” and an “encompassing preoccupation with one or more…restricted
patterns of interest.” From vaccines, to heavy metals, to gut bacteria, to lesions, to genetic
coding, to scientist fathers, to refrigerator mothers – the fixations abound.
Although it is fascinating the ways that shifting discourses about autism have shaped
research, practice, and the politics of the self over several decades, in this project I am interested
in looking at lived experience and how starting from lived experience can inform and potentially
change clinical practice. As a Lacanian, I am intrigued by Sophie Robert’s critique and think it
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is worth exploring the perhaps delusional, perhaps rigid, perhaps perverse Lacanian approach to
autism treatment. As a Lacanian, I am also interested in exploring the possibility of a non-rigid,
more flexible psychoanalysis that can facilitate transformation for autistic subjects as it does for
others. As a phenomenologist, I am interested in the lived experience of autistic individuals as a
starting place for any theory of autism. And, as a critical psychologist, I am interested in better
understanding the ways that power is situated within debates on autism and how power dynamics
influence the lives of autistic individuals and the treatments available to them.
As such, my project looks at autism through the lens of published autobiographies by
adults diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome in order to consider how a more grounded
understanding of the experience of autism as it is lived may impact clinical practice. I had
several goals in this project. Taking Sophie Robert’s critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis as a
starting point, I first explored the ways that autism is taken up from the points of view of
mainstream psychology, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and autism self-advocacy/neurodiversity
activists. I also further elucidated the theory of autism in Lacanian thinking, with specific
attention to the diagnostic approach in Lacanian thinking and the assumed relationship between
autism and psychosis. I then subjected the autobiographical material to two types of qualitative
analysis. In order to avoid the trap discussed above where theory takes precedence over case
material, I have avoided taking the traditional psychoanalytic approach to case studies, where
one describes only the formulation after the fact and where the reader is only given access to the
interpretation of the analyst. In order to strike a balance between autistic and clinical
perspectives, I first made use of a phenomenological analysis to gain a deeper understanding of
the experience of autism and the potential issues at stake as they are presented by individuals on
the spectrum. Following that, I compared the autobiographical material to the tenets of Lacanian
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structural theory, and showed that the formulation of autism as a psychotic position doesn’t hold
up. Using findings generated from both analyses, I explored commonalities and divergences in
lived experience described by the authors and discussed the impact of those findings on how
autism is conceptualized and treated within Lacanian psychoanalysis and mainstream treatments,
paying special attention to questions of power, identity, and politics within both approaches.
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CHAPTER TWO: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF AUTISM IN MAINSTREAM
PSYCHOLOGY
Like so much of the research and treatment for psychological illness in the United States, autism
is largely understood in the mainstream literature as caused by genetic or biological error leading
to impairments in functioning (e.g. Hahamy, Behrmann, & Malach, 2015; Sander, et al., 2015;
Joseph, Soorya, & Thurm, 2015). Treatments are concerned with improving function or teaching
compensatory strategies that improve coping (e.g. Joseph, Soorya, & Thurm, 2015; Kasari, et al.,
2016; Zwaigenbaum, et al., 2015). In the following paragraphs, I will outline current standards
of diagnosis and treatment as well as notable research trends within mainstream psychology.
Diagnosis
The diagnosis of autism has recently changed with the publication of the DSM-5 (2013).
Whereas previously Autistic Disorder and Asperger’s Syndrome were classed in the category of
Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD) along with Childhood Disintegrative Disorder,
Rhett’s disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder NOS (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000), all five have been subsumed under the umbrella of Autism Spectrum
Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The DSM-5 defines diagnostic criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) as,
“persistent impairment in reciprocal social communication and social interaction (Criterion A),
and restricted repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (Criterion B). These
symptoms are present from early childhood and limit or impair everyday functioning (Criteria C
and D)” (p. 53). Further, the impairments cannot be better explained by an intellectual disability
(Criterion E) (p. 54). According to the DSM-5, individuals on the autism spectrum show
symptoms that can include language impairment, disturbed motor ability, inability to use social
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cues, failures in verbal and nonverbal communication, difficulty establishing “normal”
interpersonal relationships, hyper or hyposensitivity to sensory stimuli, and preoccupations with
what appear to others as inconsequential objects (pp. 50-51). All of the symptoms described
involve or impact the interpersonal realm of functioning down to the most basic level – for some
manifesting as an inability to speak and/or make eye contact or engage in typical social
interaction. In terms of functioning, autistic individuals span the spectrum between extremely
capable with only minor impairments in social functioning to profoundly dysfunctional – unable
to use speech to communicate and with severe motor disturbances and acute tendencies to fixate
on objects in the environment. Per the DSM-5 diagnostic instructions, clinicians diagnosing
ASD should specify whether there is an associated cognitive or language impairment, an
additional associated neurodevelopmental, mental or behavioral disorder, a medical, genetic, or
environment factor involved, or if catatonia is present. Further, clinicians are asked to specify
the severity of communication and behavioral impairments using a numbered system that
indicates the level of support the individual is expected to need.
Asperger’s Syndrome vs. “High-functioning” Autism Spectrum Disorder
Based on research indicating that the real-world diagnosis of Autistic Disorder or Asperger’s
Syndrome was somewhat arbitrary and/or based on the availability of resources rather than
strictly clinical presentation (Volkmar & Reichow, 2013), researchers began to question the
wisdom of maintaining separate categories of PDD. The primary distinction between Asperger’s
and Autistic Disorder in the DSM-IV-TR was the absence of language impairment in Asperger’s
and the requirement that those diagnosed with Asperger’s have no significant delays in cognitive
development, self-help skills, or adaptive behavior (p. 84). For Autistic Disorder, it was
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expected that “in most cases, there is an associated diagnosis of Mental Retardation” (p. 71) and
moderate to severe communication issues or language delays (p.75).
The removal of Asperger’s Syndrome from the DSM-5 did not come without
controversy. Many professionals as well as many individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s
disorder disagreed with the changes. For many there was fear about the possibility of losing
access to services, while for others there was concern that the changes elided an important
distinction between the two groups. As Volkmar and Reichow (2013) explain:
While a case clearly could have been made for refining the Asperger’s label, the work
group elected to eliminate it as a category along with childhood disintegrative disorder. In
some respects both moves are controversial, particularly given the inconsistency with
which the Asperger’s diagnosis has been utilized (itself a problem but potentially one
obscuring a potentially important clinical distinction). (p. 3)
John Elder Robison (2013), one of the authors in my study, shared his response to the change in
an article for Vulture Magazine:
Just like that, Asperger’s was gone. You can do things like that when you publish the
rules. Like corrupt referees at a rigged college football game, the APA removed
Asperger’s from the field of play and banished the term to the locker room of psychiatric
oblivion. Their new and improved DSM went on sale two months ago, and shrinks
everywhere lined up to buy it. (para. 7)
For Robison, as for many other self-advocates, it was not only the diagnosis that was erased, but
the community and culture of the individuals holding that label. The “Aspie” culture arose from
within the confines of the diagnostic border and the change prompted some uncertainty about
how that culture may be transformed or eliminated as a result.
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While there remains uproar about the change, many see it as an improvement as well as
an important and inclusive political move. In a 2014 article for The Atlantic, Hanna Rosin sums
up the change as one of fairness, “After much debate, the APA decided to simplify the diagnostic
process, or perhaps more accurately, to complicate it in a democratic way” (para. 5). For many,
the diagnostic move marks the beginning of a recognition of the spectrum of human possibility,
rather than only a spectrum of autism. In this way, for many self-advocates especially, the move
from Asperger’s to Autism Spectrum Disorder was politically important.
In terms of this project, I remain on the fence with regard to the diagnostic change. It
seems particularly problematic to me, from a clinical perspective, that there is little attention paid
to the differing cognitive profiles of individuals previously diagnosed with Asperger’s as well as
the marked absence of significant language impairment. These two things seem diagnostically
relevant. That said, it is also the case that cognitive ability is linked directly to developmental
outcomes and it makes intuitive sense that there would be differing degrees of the same type of
impairment in individuals with differing cognitive ability.
For my research, I only studied texts by individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder,
who would now be considered to have Autism Spectrum Disorder, level one, or what is more
often called “high-functioning” ASD. This is partly a result of the fact that I began this project
prior to the change in diagnostic criteria and partly because the majority of autistic
autobiographies are authored by individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder. In terms of the
research, this means I am assuming that there was no evidence of cognitive impairment and no
significant language delays in my sample.
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Research
The Medicalization of Autism
According to the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee’s (IACC) 2013 Strategic Plan
Update on autism research, “over 11,000 journal articles on autism have been published since
January, 2009, more than double the number published in the preceding 5 years. The world of
ASD research has changed profoundly during this period, with increases in United States ASD
prevalence estimates, changes in ASD diagnostic criteria, greater understanding of co-occurring
conditions and services needs, and new insights from genetics, environmental studies, and
neuroimaging into the biology and etiology of ASD” (IACC, 2013, p. vi). The IACC is a
committee established by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Autism Research
Coordination. The remainder of the IACC’s Strategic Plan Update as well as its publication on
advances in autism research (IACC, 2015) are clearly devoted to detailing biomedical research
aimed at early identification or at locating biological or genetic links to explain the development
of autism. What is explicit in the approach is the assumption that autism is the behavioral
expression of a largely biological problem. What is absent from the literature, both of the IACC
as well as from the literatures of other NIH funded programs, is the effect of autism on the
autistic individual, or, in other words, the experience of suffering that we are trying to explain
and treat. Although the IACC’s literature points to some research looking into treatment and
support needs, the primary emphasis of contemporary research into autism appears largely
interested in questions related to biology and to cause.
The assumption that autism has its roots in biology has propelled the research in the
direction of locating cause in the brain, a move that is part of a larger trend to explain
psychological disorders in terms of neurobiological mechanisms. Although biomedical research
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can certainly be valuable, it seems important to point out the way in which the trend towards
medical understandings of autism effaces research that facilitates a better understanding of the
experienced suffering of the individual who struggles with the condition. In doing so it limits
our understanding of how best to intervene and support individuals on the spectrum. As Majia
Holmer Nadesan (2013) nicely summarizes:
Despite its popularity and institutional support, the genetic brain-based approach has
failed to deliver on its promises to explicate the “causes” of autism and has failed to lead
to new autism treatments. Genes believed to increase susceptibility in one population are
difficult to find in other populations. Penetration is typically uneven, as identical twins
with autism do not uniformly share the disorder (Bruder et al. 2008). Unknown
environmental factors and other independent variables, such as father’s age, may
contribute to genetic mutations linked to the disorder as susceptibilities. The relationship
between phenotypic autistic traits (such as behavioral and cognitive traits) and specific
genes remains very unclear, although researchers suspect that genotype-phenotype
relationships may exist (Thompson, Cannon, and Toga 2002). (p. 122)
Nadeson goes on to discuss the political aspects of genetic and biological autism research and to
consider what underlies the push towards understanding causation. She goes even further to
discuss the ways in which this type of research may easily align its self with a type of eugenics,
particularly as it is involved in the development of “autism susceptibility” testing.
When Autistic Children Grow Up
There is a remarkable amount of research in the medical/psychological field addressing issues of
genetics and biology in autism. Although not as prolific, there is also a fair amount of research
into diagnostic questions (IACC, 2015). All of this research, however, is largely addressing
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autism as it appears in childhood. Even in the popular media, autism is most often taken up as a
childhood disorder. From medical journals to parenting magazines, autism is examined through
the lens of childhood functioning and the effects on the educational system, the family system,
and the mental health system. There is, however, very little scientific literature on adult autism.
What is readily available tends to look at adult outcomes in order to identify prognostic
indicators in childhood (Howlin, Goode, Huton, & Rutter, 2004) or at medications that may be
effective in treating some of the behavioral and sensory integration problems associated with
adult autism (Hollander, et.al, 2012; Hertzman, 2003). Also available are popular media articles
that address rising concerns about the potential burden on the mental health system to provide
needed care to adult autistics whose families are no longer able to support them (Chen, 2011).
What is not as readily available is research that explores the struggles of adult autistics as they
describe them or their needs and wants for treatment. While some research has been done
exploring issues of identity and community in adult autism (e.g. Bagatell, 2010; Robertson &
Ne’eman, 2008; Jaarsma & Welin, 2012) much more work is needed in this area.
Additionally, although the research on the needs of autistic adults is minimal, there are
several organizations either promoting or pursuing research on autism in adults. For example,
The Organization for Autism Research and the Autistic Self-Advocacy Network, are both
working to increase research into the needs of autistic adults and both publish an online
handbook aimed at addressing transitional difficulties that autistic individuals face when entering
adulthood (Organization for Autism Research, 2006; Crane, 2013). Additionally, the Academic
Autism Spectrum Partnership in Research and Education is currently pursuing research on the
healthcare needs of autistic adults as well as research on identity, well-being, and social support
(Academic Autism Spectrum Partnership in Research and Education, 2014). While these
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organizations, and others like them, are currently and actively pursuing research on autism in
adulthood, there remains a shocking lack of research in this area.
Treatments
Popular treatments for autism are largely aimed at children and focus on controlling symptoms or
teaching compensatory skills. There is some research on the possibility of medical interventions
(Hertzman, 2003; Hollander, et al., 2012), and while some autistic children are given medication
to manage specific symptoms, there is currently no standard pharmacological treatment for
autism. Consequently, the majority of treatment approaches use a behavioral model to teach
skills that would help the child learn to manage social situations, increase communication
abilities, or reduce repetitive behaviors (Wang & Kwan, 2010; Whalen, Schreibman, & Ingersoll,
2006). There is little research available on the applicability of these treatment models to adult
populations (Organization for Autism Research, 2006), although the past few years have seen
large increases in research funding applicable to adult populations.
The most popular and most researched approach to autism treatment is Applied Behavior
Analysis (ABA). This approach encompasses a large array of behavioral techniques aimed at
increasing verbal and social behavior in children diagnosed with autism. First documented by
Lovaas in 1987, most ABA methods are intensive and pair tenets of behavioral conditioning,
particularly positive reinforcement, with skills training and psycho-education (Rosenwasser &
Axelrad, 2001). ABA’s popularity was initially gained through research that illustrated the
effects of early interventions treatment on educational integration as well as the importance of
language acquisition to later functioning (p. 673). Current research in ABA is largely focused
on new language acquisition techniques, the development of earlier intervention strategies, and
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the benefits of classroom integration to overall learning outcomes (Rosenwasser & Axelrad,
2002).
Another popular approach in autism treatment is the TEACCH method, which stands for
Teaching and Education of Autistic and Related Communication Handicapped Children. This
method was developed by researchers at the University of North Carolina in the 1960s and aims
to integrate a structured teaching environment that focuses on visual images with a collaborative
approach involving parents, teachers, and community members (Probst, Jung, Micheel, &, Glen,
2010, p. 135). The TEACCH method focuses on the need of autistic individuals to have a stable
and consistent environment while accounting for the tendencies of autistic individuals to struggle
with auditory stimuli. The resulting treatment aims to create a structured approach that utilizes
the relative strength of autistic children’s ability to process visual images in the service of
improving functional outcomes.
One other, lesser researched, approach to autism treatment, Floortime, utilizes a
relationship-based approach to treatment. It works by educating parents and caregivers on how
to meet the child where s/he is in order to facilitate the development of strong relationships.
Floortime allows for a wider range of communication types and allows the child to take the lead
during play, with the intention of fostering increased social development (Joseph, Soorya, &
Thurm, 2015).
Finally, some treatments for autistic disorders involve utilization of cross-disciplinary
interventions to address specific problems. For example, some autistic children suffer from
motor disturbances and may benefit from physical therapy as a means to build coordination,
balance, and muscle tone. Often, autistic individuals suffer from acute sensitivity to sensory
stimuli and may benefit from occupational therapy that aims at sensory integration (Baranek,
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2002). Autistic children and adults may also benefit from speech therapy and/or other forms of
occupational therapy in order to address specific needs (Organization for Autism Research,
2010).
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORY AND TREATMENT OF AUTISM IN LACANIAN
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Autism is a problem for psychoanalysis, and for many reasons. First, of course, is the shameful
history of parent blaming which, although echoed in mainstream psychological approaches of the
time, found a home in psychoanalysis. Codified in the phrase, “refrigerator mother,”
psychoanalysis’ public position as a viable treatment for autism died a slow death as analysts
defended the parental explanation and defensively critiqued mainstream research. Sadly,
although I think most analysts would explicitly deny any belief in parental causation, there
remains a thread of blame in some of the clinical literature that serves to reinforce this critique of
psychoanalytic approaches.
Second is contemporary psychoanalysis’ apparent lack of interest in discussing autism or
offering theoretical or clinical thoughts about the course, trajectory, or treatment in cases of
autism. Given the “epidemic” of autism in the US and Europe, it seems unlikely that
psychoanalysts aren’t seeing autistic individuals in the consulting room, however it seems that no
one is writing about it. The literature on autism from within various psychoanalytic communities
is sparse and, when narrowing the search to literature about working with autistic adults, is
practically non-existent.
Finally, in a move that I still find strange, psychoanalysts that do discuss autism make use
of the DSM diagnostic criteria to describe the condition while also making use of the term
“autistic” in its historical context as a stage within psychoanalytic developmental descriptions
(which I will discuss below). While some schools of psychoanalysis have a more reciprocal
relationship to the DSM nosology, psychoanalysis has historically relied on its own diagnostic
system and language to describe and theorize different presentations. This is particularly true for
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Lacanians who outrightly refuse to make use of the DSM and instead rely on a small set of
structural categories and descriptions. However, even within the Lacanian frame, autism is
different and there is a sliding between DSM descriptions and understandings of autism as a
developmental concept.
All of this, the history of blame, the silence, and the lack of workable diagnostic theory
contributes to the absence of psychoanalysis in the conversations about autism and about
treatment – except insofar as it is constantly held up by mainstream approaches as an example of
moral failure. In the following paragraphs, I will explore some of the historical trends in
psychoanalytic autism theory and practice and the current issues with diagnosis and
conceptualization in contemporary psychoanalytic theory. I will then introduce Lacanian
diagnostic theory and practice more broadly and discuss some of the particular issues with
Lacanian understandings of autism.
Autism and Psychoanalysis
Margaret Mahler’s (1958) work on autism is some of the first psychoanalytic thinking
devoted to autistic states. Mahler was interested in autistic phenomena both as part of normal
childhood development and as potentially pathogenic. For Mahler, early infancy necessitated a
normal autistic phase – a symbiosis between mother and child that ensured the survival of the
child past infancy. According to Mahler, fixations at this early stage of development could lead
to the formation of an “autistic type” of child psychoses later in life, however the initial lack of
differentiation between mother and infant was considered both normal and necessary.
Following Mahler, psychoanalysis largely focused on autistic states as pathological and
representative of an abnormal developmental trajectory and psychoanalytic thinking about
autism largely looked to the family to understand the array of symptoms and developmental
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delays characteristic of autistic children. This focus on the family constellations of the autistic
child is complicated, but has historically been taken up both inside and outside of the discipline
as a discourse of blame. Additionally, psychoanalytic theory has often treated autism as a type
of psychosis, marking the difficulties with self and other as indicative of a psychotic
organization. I will address each of these critiques in the following paragraphs.
Bruno Bettelheim is often cited as the most malevolent of the psychoanalysts for his
assertion that autism resulted from damage done by poor parenting. He is credited with
advancing the theory, initially hinted at by Kanner (1943) of the “refrigerator mother” as
contributing to the development of autism (see Rhode, 2004). This theory largely understood
autism as an effect of an avoidable set of practices on the part of the parents, and had a
tremendous negative effect on the acceptance of psychoanalytic thinking about autism. As
Rhode puts it, “It was a great misfortune that, like Kanner’s, Bettleheim’s statement was wrongly
generalized by himself and others to all parents of children with autism, and in this way did an
incalculable amount of harm…Parents whose children have any kind of serious problem are only
too ready to blame themselves for it: the last thing they need is to feel – or to be – blamed by
professionals” (p. 4).
Despite an acceptance of neurological causation in some of the psychoanalytic literature,
much of psychoanalytic thought in regards to autism continues to look to the relationships with
primary caregivers to explain the constellation of symptoms and behaviors typical of autism.
Although a patient’s history as context will always be important in a psychoanalytic treatment,
discussion of a patient’s difficulty with separation from the Other as indicative of an autistic
presentation is at times presented as causative. For example, in her book on child
psychoanalysis, Catherine Mathelin (1999), summarizing Frances Tustin, states, “In cases of
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autism, fusion with the mother entails a lack of influence on the part of the father; since these
children do not have the experience of sharing the mother with the father, their omnipotence is
unchecked, and under their passive appearance they can be willful and dictatorial” (p. 126).
Although I think many analysts would argue that Mathelin is referring to the child’s experience
and internalization of the mother rather than the mother herself, psychoanalytic writing about
autism does at times easily lend itself to an interpretation of parental blame. Although not the
focus of the proposed study, psychoanalytic research could benefit from a clear exploration of
the ways that parental influence is taken up in psychoanalytic thinking about autism, in what
ways it is relevant to treatment, and how parental influence can be discussed without situating
blame.
Despite some remaining implicit biases, explicit focus on parenting as causative is no
longer accepted by most schools of psychoanalysis. It is true, however, that even though there
are not explicit attempts to blame parents, there is an interest in the complex relationship
between autism as a psychopathology and client/child-parent relationships. In Kleinian circles,
analysts talk about the supplemental object that the autistic subject sticks to him or herself in
order to manage the fear of disintegration that arises in moments of separation from the primary
caregiver (see for example, Meltzer, 2008; Rhode 2004, 2011). In more relational circles,
analysts talk about the ways that there is a mismatch between the needs of autistic children and
their parents that results in primary problems with attachment (e.g. Cohler & Weiner, 2011;
Gould, 2011). And in Lacanian circles analysts talk about the dis-regulation of jouissance in the
body that comes from a failure in the paternal function (e.g. Perrin, 2011; Berenguer & Roizner,
2011; Redmond, 2004). All of these hypotheses are extremely theoretically laden and not
necessarily intended to place accountability with the parents. For example, in most forms of
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psychoanalysis there is a distinction made between the actual parent and the parent in the child’s
mind or fantasy. However, in general, psychoanalytic theories seem to implicate the importance
of family context in profound ways.
Psychoanalysts maintain the importance of the child’s relation to his/her primary
caregiver(s). The analyst is curious about the quality of the relationships – did the child feel
loved, smothered, or abandoned? How did the child cope with, or defend against, anxiety around
separation or engulfment? How did the child respond interpersonally to demands from others or
limits placed on his or her body? All of these questions center on the child’s responses – and his
or her defensive reactions - to the interpersonal environment and the possible meanings that can
be attributed to those responses. The attunement by the psychoanalyst to the familial and
relationship context of the child’s development is not in itself problematic. In fact, it is fairly
commonplace when dealing with any other type of mental illness or disorder. Familial context
and history is a rich source of material about the ways that the individual patient takes up the
environment. As clinicians, we do not want to go so far as to suggest that a person’s history has
no impact on his or her development, but we need to consider the ways that such a focus can be
limiting and also how it can appear to locate cause in the family system.
What gets lost in the (justified) critiques of psychoanalysis as parent-blaming is the
potential of psychoanalysis to offer something different to the treatment of autism, something
that addresses the question of the person in autism – his or her particularity – rather than his or
her deficits. Psychoanalysis, unlike mainstream psychological approaches, at its best is focused
on individual experience rather than on the minimization of perceived deficits. When we think
only in terms of biological cause or even in more politically neutral forms of environmental
stress (e.g. diet), we reduce autistic individuals to the realm of non-human – as though they are
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somehow removed from the impact of relational context to which all other humans are subjected.
We know that family and social history affects people and can ether lead to or exacerbate
psychological, emotional, or relational issues later in life, regardless of the presence or absence
of biological or genetic problems. What psychoanalysis has the capacity to offer is precisely the
ability to see autistic adults as in the context of their lived experience and to find a way to
acknowledge biology and history and context in a way that is respectful of autistic individuals
and their families.
Although it is certainly the case that some analysts take up psychoanalytic approaches in
a technically and theoretically rigid way, it is also the case that some analysts look to the
particularity of their patients’ speech and articulated experiences rather than relying on an
understanding of universal types. This latter approach is what provides the discipline with the
capacity to constantly reevaluate and redefine its theoretical assumptions. In terms of its
theoretical approach to understanding the formation of individual human subjectivity, it seems to
me that psychoanalysis has a lot to offer in terms of an ability to conceptualize the experience of
the autistic individual. And, through that conceptualization, psychoanalytic treatment might
provide a means to imagine working at a more psychologically transformative level, rather than
at a level aimed only at “coping.”
Autism and Lacanian Psychoanalysis
It is not only in search of explanations for psychopathology that psychoanalysis concerns itself
with development and with personality, and this is particularly true for Lacanian psychoanalysts.
Within that paradigm, psychoanalysis is theorizing not only how an infant perhaps turns into a
neurotic or psychotic individual, but precisely how s/he becomes an individual, or subject, in the
first place – an individual who is able to “own” his or her body, speak and communicate to
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others, and achieve the ability to love and work. What is at stake in psychoanalytic thinking is
precisely how a person comes to be who he or she is or, in other words, how an infant comes to
be a unique speaking human subject and what we can learn about development from that process.
While Freud looked to history to understand symptoms, Lacan looked at history to understand
the creation of subjects in language.
Diagnosis in the Lacanian Tradition
Although it can be difficult to truly capture the meaning of any of Lacan’s concepts, diagnosis
within the Lacanian field is by far one of the most complicated areas of his work. Many people
talk about Lacan as promoting “structural diagnosis” and most people who are even slightly
familiar with Lacanian thinking are aware of the various structures Lacan elaborated during the
early stages of his work. But Lacan did not stop with his initial elaboration of neurotic, perverse,
and psychotic structures, anymore than he stopped at his elaboration of other conceptual
categories. We see in Lacan’s oeuvre the development and transformation of many of his
concepts over time. For example, the object a, jouissance, symptom, and paternal metaphor all
move through various incarnations over the course of his work. Lacan abhorred final definitions,
at least in my reading of him, and he continually rethought and reformulated his diagnostic and
conceptual thinking over the course of his life.
Towards the end of his career, Lacan’s “structural” clinic was subsumed by an
elaboration of what is commonly called the “Borromean clinic” or the “clinic of knots.” It was
during this time in his thinking that he had begun to re-consider the primacy of the signifier and
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to explore more deeply the functions of jouissance1 and the Real in relation to the subject and to
the treatment. Lacan made use of the Borromean knot, as a string knotted around a series of
constitutive spaces, to explore issues related to materiality, rather than only meaning and symbol,
which had previously occupied his work. In my reading of Lacan’s elaboration of the clinic of
knots, he is moving from a conceptualization of treatment as localized in the Symbolic to a
conceptualization of treatment that, while acknowledging the importance of the Symbolic,
locates the curative function in the Real.
Both Lacan’s elaboration of the structural clinic and the clinic of knots are important to
the conceptualization of diagnosis and treatment within the Lacanian field and, particularly, to
the articulation of treatment with respect to autism. In order to draw this out, the following
paragraphs elucidate Lacan’s earlier structural conceptualizations, the movement from the purely
structural to the Borromean clinic, and the implications of both for the treatment of autism.
Subjective structures2 vs. diagnostic categories. In order to understand Lacanian
diagnosis, it is important to first, situate it with respect to the most used diagnostic system (at

Lacan’s notion of jouissance refers to the singular enjoyment of the subject and is most often
linked by Lacan to the Real. The word jouissance in French refers to both to pleasure and to the
displeasure that one experiences at the point when pleasure reaches the limit of pain.
2 Although the following is an attempt to briefly lay out some of the main concepts at play in
Lacan’s theory of subjective constitution, this is, by necessity, an incomplete account that gives
short shrift to the complexity of many of these concepts. Interestingly, although subjective
constitution and the various subjective structures and their “operations” are a key to Lacanian
clinical work, Lacan himself does not ever lay out a comprehensive illustration of his thinking
with regard to these concepts. He spends the most time working out his theory of psychosis in his
seminar of 1955-1956, however his theories of neurosis, perversion, alienation, separation,
paternal function, castration, etc. are not localized in only one text, nor are they static. Rather
they are spread throughout his work, often implicit, and always changing. Jacques-Alain Miller
(1996), borrowing a metaphor from a colleague, notes that Lacan’s “grid” of mental structures is
similar to wallpaper: “it is so much a part of the general background that no one even sees it
anymore” (p. 241). I would argue that it is not just that no one sees it, but that it is difficult to
discern and even more difficult to fully describe.
1
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least in the US), the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) published by the American
Psychiatric Association. In the US, the fifth edition of the DSM (DSM-5) is used by the vast
majority of clinicians in the mental health fields and is considered the authority on diagnosis
both for practicing clinicians and within the broader medical and popular media discourses. The
DSM is a classification system organized according to symptom lists. It circumscribes the
constitutive elements of a problem, names it, and, especially in the most recent edition, links it to
physiological processes. In the DSM system, the problem is dissociated from the person who
suffers from it, the idea being that the disorders are outside of a person’s control. Treatments are
organized around reducing symptoms in whatever way is deemed most effective at the time
(pills, behavioral training, etc.).
Unlike the DSM method of diagnosis, which leads to a treatment approach largely
oriented to the eradication of symptoms, Lacan’s structural approach to diagnosis asks a question
about subjectivity rather than a question about symptomology. For Lacan, a person coming into
treatment has, of course, a “symptom” or a set of “symptoms,” however what is important to the
diagnosis is the function of that symptom in the context of the subject’s orientation to the world,
rather than the symptom itself. For Lacan, taking a symptom on its own, separated from the
subject who suffers with it, is to miss the opportunity for a true intervention – one that eases
suffering through a change in the subject’s relation to the Other and to his own enjoyment. For
Lacan, treating the symptom alters nothing at the level of the individual and, in many ways,
erases the subject’s own stake in the symptom – which is effectively to erase that which makes
each subject unique. Thus for Lacan, diagnosis at the structural level becomes both a clinical
and an ethical concern.
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In Lacanian terms, what is important in terms of structural diagnosis is the subject’s
relation to the Other, which is complicated by issues of lack, desire, and jouissance (not to
mention, other people). During this period of his thinking, Lacan was largely focused on the
primacy of the Symbolic, thus when he refers to the Other in his diagnostic schema, he is often
referring to language and the subject’s position with regard to it, although he is also occasionally
referring to the Other as represented by the primary caregiver. For Lacan, the subject comes into
being in and through Language, which is understood as the circulating of meaning and
knowledge. Language is also what mediates our relationships with others and even with our own
bodies. When Lacan says that the subject comes into being via language, he means precisely
that, in order to be a human subject, one must be a speaking-being – one must exist in the realm
of Language in order to be counted. Even for those who do not speak, whether by choice or not,
their being is situated in the context of a linguistic body. They are named and, if they do not
speak, they are spoken for.
Coming into being via language is complicated and, for Lacan during this time, is largely
a series of developmental events, although not associated with a timeline or set of milestones, but
rather associated with the particular temporality of the unconscious. For Lacan, subjective
constitution is the result of an alienating encounter with language, one that provokes a forced
choice with respect to language, an encounter with the desire of the Other, and a change in the
experience of the body. Through these encounters, the unconscious appears and the subject
comes into being in language as split. In order to further elaborate these moments, the following
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paragraphs will explore Lacan’s theorization of the moments3 of alienation and separation as
well the function of what he calls the Name-of-the-Father.
Alienation. In his eleventh Seminar, The Four Fundamental Concepts of PsychoAnalysis (Lacan, 1973/1981), Lacan lays out a theory of subjective constitution. In this text,
Lacan is trying to articulate the advent of the subject4 in the field of the Other via two moments
in subjective constitution, alienation and separation, which will ultimately frame the subject’s
desire as well as his or her determination by the Other. These concepts are of immense
importance to Lacan’s overall project insofar as they seek to explain how the subject comes into
being in language and, to a certain extent, how the unconscious is formed around these moments
via a particular structure.
Alienation, according to Lacan, is the first moment of subjective constitution. It is the
initial emergence of the subject in language and involves the construction of the subject of the
unconscious via its incarnation in a chain of signifiers. According to Patricia Gherovici’s (2010)
reading of Lacan in Seminar 11, “Alienation derives from the structural division of the speaking
subject. As “speaking beings” subjected to language, we are split by our entry to the symbolic

Although a lengthy discussion of time or temporality in the Lacanian frame is outside the scope
of this project, it is important to understand that Lacan’s formulation of subjective constitution
relies on a non-linear conception of time, which he refers to as logical time. For Lacan, this is
understood as a kind of dialectic of past and present and future such that each is defined and
redefined according in a synchronous movement of the unconscious. It is through this
movement, which has the ability to redefine the past and change anticipation of the future, that
psychoanalytic practice has its effect. This is important to note in Lacanian diagnostic
discussions as Lacan is explicitly avoiding a theory that relies on a series of developmental or
sequential stages.
4 It is important to note the use of the term ‘subject’ in Lacanian terminology. For Lacan, subject
does not equate with person or with being per se, but refers to the subject of the unconscious,
which could simply be considered as a subject who is determined by the unconscious. Because
Lacan understands that the subject only comes into being via language, it is not until his/her
entrance into language that Lacan will consider him/her a subject.
3
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register. This splitting concerns a choice between meaning that is produced by the signifier and
is found in the Other and the being of the subject” (p. 197). What Lacan terms alienation is
precisely the impossible choice the subject has to make between being and meaning insofar as
s/he is forced to choose as a result of language.
For Lacan, the moment of alienation occurs when the subject is forced to take a position
in language. In order to understand how this moment functions in relation to subjective
constitution, Lacan refers back to the structure of language itself. He is making the argument
that the subject comes into being in language via the gap that exists between signifiers and that
those signifiers always belong to the field of the Other. Lacan (1973/1981) says:
…what must be stressed at the outset is that a signifier is that which represents a subject
for another signifier. The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, makes
manifest the subject of its signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the
subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same
movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject. There, strictly
speaking, is the temporal pulsation in which is established that which is the characteristic
of the departure of the unconscious as such – the closing.” (p. 207)
If we think of this more concretely, we may say that for example my name, Shannon, functions
as a signifier that represents a subject for another signifier. “Shannon” is the signifier that is a
representation of me, the subject, for any signifier that would come after my name. What Lacan
is highlighting here is that this particular signifier, in the example a proper name, is in itself
meaningless. It is representation only and the very fact of its non-meaning is what Lacan points
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to as alienating.5 But, it is also what Lacan points to as foundational in the construction of a
speaking being, a subject who must find himself located within a system of representations that
comes to him from the Other.
Separation. In Lacan’s theorization of alienation the subject is split by the entrance into
language as that entry introduces a loss at the level of the subject’s being (Lacan would later talk
about this as a loss at the level of the Real and of jouissance) and an orientation toward the
Other. In an attempt to locate himself in the field of the Other, the subject is then confronted
with the Other’s desire. Lacan says:
A lack is encountered by the subject in the Other, in the very intimation that the Other
makes to him by his discourse. In the intervals of the discourse of the Other, there
emerges in the experience of the child something that is radically mappable, namely, He
is saying this to me, but what does he want?
…It is there that what we call desire crawls, slips, escapes, like the ferret. The desire of
the Other is apprehended by the subject in that which does not work, in the lacks of the
discourse of the Other, and all the child’s whys reveal not so much an avidity for the
reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me this? ever-resuscitated
from its base, which is the enigma of the adult’s desire. (p. 214)
According to Lacan, the subject attempts to answer the desire of the Other, by offering himself
or, as Lacan puts it, offering his own lack to fill the lack of the Other (p. 214-219). Were this
first solution to work, of course, the subject would disappear. According to Lacan, then, the
subject is faced with the realization that the Other’s desire exceeds his ability to fulfill it, thus
Lacan also talks about alienation in terms of the body in his work with the Mirror Stage (Lacan,
1966/2006a), which invokes the imaginary relation in a way that is absent via his articulation of
alienation via the symbolic.
5
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redirecting the subject back to his own lack. It is here that Lacan identifies the institution of the
subject’s desire, localized around an object that organizes the subject’s desire, but that comes
from the Other. Paul Verhaeghe describes this process:
Thus confronted with the nameless desire of the Other, the subject will produce a very
typical answer: ‘Does the Other desire me?,’ ‘Am I the one who can fulfill his desire?’.
This implies that the subject answers the lack of the Other by presenting his or her own
disappearance: ‘Can the Other afford to lose me?’. The lack of the Other, within the
signifying chain, is answered by a presentation of the lack at the anterior level. i.e. death
as a real loss. Hence, the non-reciprocity and dissymmetry, by which the process topples
over into the direction of alienation again…With separation, the effect is the installation
of a void between subject and Other, in which the object a makes its appearance.”
(Verhaeghe, 1998, pp. 180-181)
For Lacan, the object a represents the lack in the Other and offers the subject an identification
that both motors the fantasy (that one can be the object for the Other) and organizes the subject’s
own desire around his lack.
The name-of-the-father. Although the object a comes to represent the object around
which the subject organizes her desire (and, in later Lacan her jouissance), the Name-of-theFather is the signifier that bars the Other, or that prevents the Other from taking the subject as
object. For Lacan, the Name-of-the-Father serves as a guarantee for the subject of a place within
the symbolic order as subject. Lacan talks about the Name-of-the-Father as representing the law,
or giving authority to the law – in that way it serves a protective function for the subject. When
faced with the Other’s desire and asking the question can I fill it, the Name-of-the-Father
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signifies this impossibility for the subject, because it places a limit on the Other. Lacan
(1966/2006c) says:
Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from need, this
margin being the one that demand – whose appeal can be unconditional only with respect
to the Other – opens up in the guise of the possible gap need may give rise to here,
because it has no universal satisfaction (this is called “anxiety”). A margin which, as
linear as it may be, allows its vertiginous character to appear, provided it is not trampled
by the elephantine feet of the Other’s whimsy. Nevertheless, it is this whimsy that
introduces the phantom of Omnipotence – not of the subject, but of the Other in which
the subject’s demand is instated... – and with this phantom, the necessity that the Other be
bridled by the Law. (p. 689)
The function of the Name-of-the-Father also has important implication for the regulation of the
subject’s jouissance. The No! of the father and the guarantee of a place in the Symbolic
organizes jouissance and the subject’s method of access to jouissance, as we will see in the
explanation of clinical structures below.
The Name-of-the-Father goes through a number of revisions in Lacan’s work, starting as
a more traditional psychoanalytic reading of the function of the literal father’s “no,” through an
articulation of it as a signifier that guarantees the subject’s place in the symbolic, and, later,
through a reformulation as representative of the oedipal solution - only one of the possible
guarantees of the subject’s being (see Verhaeghe, 2009). In terms of Lacan’s structural diagnosis
however, the Name-of-the-Father is understood as the signifier that guarantees the Symbolic and
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bars the Other. His articulation of subjective structures focus on how the subject handles6 the
Name-of-the-Father.
Clinical structures. For Lacan, the question of subjective structure is a fundamental
question about the orientation of the subject with respect to the Other and the consequences of
that orientation for the subject in terms of the regulation of jouissance.7 As we can see from the
previous discussion, the subject’s coming into being necessarily entails a confrontation with his
or her own lack and with the desire of the Other. For Lacan, subjective structures are determined
by the functioning of the Name-of-the-Father, also called the paternal function. He identifies
three subjective structures that relate to the three methods of handling the paternal function:
Structure

Paternal Function

Neurotic

Repressed

Psychotic

Foreclosed

Perverse

Disavowed

In the following paragraphs, I will explore each structure.
Neurosis. For Lacan, neurosis is the subjective structure that results from the subject’s
instantiation in the Symbolic via the paternal function. He says:

One of the many things I find helpful about Lacan’s thinking is his tendency to frame
subjective constitution as dependent on a kind of choice made by the subject, albeit one with a
limited set of options. Although Lacan most certainly frames this choice as contextual and
limited in terms of the environment in which the child finds himself, Lacan still seems to regard
it as a choosing, rather than a determination that comes from the outside. I have tried to illustrate
this distinction in my writing here.
7 It is important to note that Lacan believes these structures to be both constitutive and permanent
– one cannot move from being a psychotic to being a neurotic, etc. For Lacan, the aim of the
treatment was to make movements within the structure that would allow the patient the least
amount of suffering and the largest amount of freedom.
6
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There is indeed a relationship between meaning and signifier, it is what the structure of
discourse supplies. Discourse, which is what you hear when you listen to me, and it does
exist – the proof is that sometimes you don’t understand it –, is a signifying temporal
chain. But at the level of neurosis, which brought about the discovery of the realm of the
Freudian unconscious qua register of memory, our good fellow, instead of using words,
uses everything at his disposal – he empties his pockets, he turns his trousers inside out,
he puts his functions, his inhibitions inside, he gets completely inside himself, with the
signifier, it’s he who becomes the signifier. His real, or his imaginary, enters into the
discourse. (Lacan, 1981/1993, p. 155)
Repression, for Lacan, in the case of neurosis, refers to the function by which the subject
relegates a signifier to the unconscious. In the neurotic case, what is repressed is the No!
inscribed by the paternal function, in other words, castration. Through repression, the neurotic is
able to imagine a solution to the Other’s desire as implicated in his or her being, which is why
Lacan points out that the neurotic structure appears as a question. He says, “What is at issue for
our subject is the question – What am I?, or Am I?, a relation of being, a fundamental signifier”
(p. 170). For neurotics, the repression of castration allows a fantasy of recapturing the jouissance
that castration forbids. For neurotic subjects, whatever the fantasy, jouissance is forever
mediated by the Symbolic through the desire opened by the subject’s lack.
Psychosis. For Lacan, psychosis occurs when the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed, or
ejected from the symbolic. The result is what we may think of as alienation without any
separation – the symbolic Other is absent. In this scenario, the subject does not have protection
of place or the movement of meaning that one locates in the Symbolic. In psychosis, the Other
appears in the Imaginary as persecutor. Speaking of the psychotic subject Lacan says, “We get
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the impression that it’s insofar as he hasn’t acquired or has lost this Other that he encounters the
purely imaginary other, the fallen and meager other with whom he is not able to have any
relations except relations of frustration – this other negates him, literally kills him. This other is
that which is most radical in imaginary alienation” (p. 209).
For psychotic subjects, the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father removes the possibility
of the symbolic mediation of jouissance and forces the subject into an imaginary relationship
wherein jouissance returns to him from the outside. As Fink (1997) notes, “The body, which
has been for the most part rid of jouissance, is suddenly inundated with it, invaded by it. It
comes back with a vengeance, we might say, for the psychotic may well experience it as an
attack, an invasion, or forcible entry” (p. 97).
Perversion. Lacan speaks the least about perversion during his career, but notes on
several occasions that perversion is characterized by disavowal, or denial, of the paternal
function. In this case, we have a subject whose separation from the Other is in question – which
also puts into question the function of the Law. As Fink notes, “Whereas we see an utter and
complete absence of the law in psychosis, and a definitive instatement of the law in neurosis
(overcome only in fantasy), in perversion the subject struggles to bring the law into being – in a
word, to make the Other exist” (p. 165). The pervert situates his being as object for the Other,
but only in an attempt to reach a limit that is not guaranteed. Fink goes on, “Lacan plays on the
French term perversion, writing it as père-version, to emphasize the sense in which the pervert
calls upon or appeals to the father, hoping to make the father fulfill the paternal function” (p.
181).
In cases of perversion, jouissance is obtained directly, without the mediation of desire, by
becoming the object of the other’s enjoyment. In an interesting problematic, the pervert only has
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access to enjoyment from the position of object – a position that has the potential to destroy him.
As such, for perverts, the issue is less about obtaining jouissance and more about limiting the
enjoyment of the Other through a forcing of a limit that would allow him to assume a position as
a subject.
Treatment in the structural clinic. For Lacan, identifying different subjective
structures, while partly about understanding the constitution of subjectivity, was ultimately used
as a way of orienting the analyst in the treatment. As Fink (1997) notes:
At the most basic level, Lacanian theory demonstrates that certain aims and techniques
used with neurotics are inapplicable with psychotics. And not only are such techniques
inapplicable – they may even prove dangerous, triggering a psychotic break. Diagnosis,
from a Lacanian standpoint….is crucial in determining the therapist’s general approach to
treating an individual patient, in correctly situating him- or herself in the transference,
and in making specific types of interventions. (p. 75)
For Lacan, both the goals of treatment and its process varied based on clinical position.

In

treatment with neurotics, the analyst is meant to assume the position of the object a, the cause of
the subject’s desire. From this position, the analyst is able to facilitate the subject’s interrogation
of his or her own desire, and the fantasies that prop up that desire, via history, dreams,
parapraxes, etc. – symbolic manifestations of the unconscious. The aim was to force the subject
into a confrontation with what the object a covers – the subject’s lack, or the non-sense of the
subject’s being, and a kind of radical acceptance of castration.
As Dany Nobus (2000) points out, Lacan devoted an entire seminar to exploring
psychotic phenomena and to articulating the structural aspects of psychosis, but, although he
advocated treating psychotic subjects, he said little about the specifics of clinical practice.
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According to Nobus, however, other Lacanian clinicians have filled in these gaps using Lacan’s
outline of psychotic subjectivity. According to Lacan, the psychotic subject is lacking a
symbolic space and, as such, is subjected to an invasive jouissance from imaginary and
persecutory others. As such, the goal of treatment with a psychotic patient is to “epitomize a
semblance of castration, which is meant to be conducive to the creation of an artificial space of
desire and a socially adapted lifestyle” (p. 142). In order to accomplish this, the analyst takes the
position of witness to the psychotic’s suffering while simultaneously imposing limits on
jouissance via rules in the Symbolic.
In terms of perversion, again, Lacan offers little direction with regards to the specifics of
clinical treatment and even less than in the case of psychosis. There is also little in the way of
specifics from Lacanian analysts, themselves, likely because cases of perversion in the clinic are
relatively rare. In her dissertation on perversion, Swales (2011) suggests that the treatment of
perversion will eventually proceed along similar lines as with neurosis, but that the initial stages
of treatment require some diligence on the part of the analyst in terms of positioning. Swales
suggests that the pervert will attempt to locate the analyst in the position of Other for whom s/he
can make herself an object – a position in keeping with the perverts overall structure. Swales
notes that it, like neurosis, the position of the analyst is as cause of desire (rather than cause of
jouissance), but that unlike in neurosis, the analyst must work to locate the space of
dissatisfaction in the subject, a place of lacking, in order to propel the subject from the realm of
jouissance to the realm of desire (see pp.318-349).8

Swales seems to characterize the initial parts of treatment with perverse subjects as a kind of
battle between the subject and the analyst over who will take the place of the object a.
8
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Although the specifics for each treatment vary by structure, it is clear that Lacan’s
“structural clinic” operated largely with respect to the subject’s relationship to the Symbolic. He
is largely advocating a treatment that makes use of symbol and meaning in order to make sense
of the subject’s suffering. Although Lacan attended to imaginary phenomena and to jouissance,
which implicates the Real, both the understanding of the subject and the goals of the analysis
were oriented along the lines of the Symbolic. Whether to find some freedom within the
signifying chain, to solidify separation and set desire in motion, or to create even an imaginary
symbolic space, the Symbolic order remained at the fore of Lacan’s thinking about the subject
and about the clinic that treats him.
Structure vs. knot.9 Over the course of his teaching, Lacan’s initial elaborations with
respect to the structural clinic shifted into an elaboration of the Borromean clinic. In his earlier
work, Lacan was focused on understanding and explaining his conceptualization of the three
clinical structures, and, to some extent, the roles of the other registers – Imaginary and Real – in
the formation of symptoms.10 In his later work, he begins to articulate the linking of the three
registers through the topology of the Borromean Knot. This shift marked a move for Lacan from

Portions of this section were published previously: Kelly, S. (2014). Psychoanalysis as an art
of madness. Metaxu, 1(1). Retrieved from http://metaxujournal.com/
10 Lacan described the three registers of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary as three registers of
the subject’s being. For Lacan, put simply, the Real refers to the materiality of the body, the
enjoyment, pain, fragmentation, etc. that is experienced but not completely caught by language.
The Symbolic refers the world of language and symbols – it is the realm in which we locate
meaning. Lacan notes that the Symbolic also refers to structures that exist outside of the subject,
but which the subject is subjected to – e.g. law, culture, religion, etc. The Imaginary is the realm
of the specular image and of fantasy. It functions in the Lacanian paradigm as that which allows
us to cover over and manage the gaps between the Real and the Symbolic. For a good
introduction to Lacan’s conceptualizations of the registers, see D. Nobus (2000). Jacques Lacan
and the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge.
9
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a treatment largely situated with respect to the function of the Symbolic register to a treatment
situated with respect to the function of the relationship between the registers.
From meaning to jouissance. Lacan’s conceptualization of the Borromean knot was a
way of articulating the manner in which the three registers are linked and interdependent in the
subject’s functioning. The topography of the knot – three rings linked together such that a cut or
breaking of any ring would dissolve the knot completely – allowed him to show how the
registers work together, but also allowed him to provide a conceptualization of the Real that
could not be accommodated through his earlier schemas. To make use of a knot, rather than a
drawing or other two dimensional schema, is a way of bringing to the fore both the complexity of
the relations between the registers as well as the materiality of the knot itself – one can
understand how a knot is formed, but that is a different thing than to create a knot or to change
one that is already constructed.
Lacan used knots to show how understanding alone, at least in psychoanalysis, isn’t
enough to make changes at the level of the Real. What he wanted to illuminate is the failure of a
treatment that stops at meaning-making or that utilizes only symbolic interventions. In
psychoanalysis, one cannot get to Truth via meaning because that requires a belief in an Other
that has the answer. (And, perhaps the one thing that has remained constant throughout Lacan’s
teaching is that there is no Other who has the answer!). If the belief in a knowing Other is a
fantasy that psychoanalysis rejects, as Lacan believes it should, than the question becomes about
finding a way to access particular truth rather than shared meaning. For Lacan, accessing a truth
that is particular, or unique, to the subject means to work beyond the machinations of the
Symbolic and Imaginary to the jouissance of the body in the Real. His question was – how do
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we get there? And the answer that he proposed was to work through language rather than work
in meaning.
In his 21st Seminar (1973-1974), Lacan begins to address what he sees as the difference
between working through language and working in meaning with a discussion of the distinction
between the dimension of meaning and the dimension of happening. What he is pointing to is
how the dimension of meaning, in an elucidation of the Borromean knot, manages to make a
system of knowledge of the registers that make up the knot rather than attend to the saying of the
knot. For Lacan, who makes very clear in this Seminar that we “get to” the Real via the modes of
the Symbolic and Imaginary in saying and imagining the knot, the saying of the knot implicates
the Real insofar as it is a happening or an event that points to a spatial relationship between the
nodes of the knot. In order to understand how Lacan elaborates this point, it is important to
consider his articulation of the difference between the conceptualization of the knot – what it
means – and the materiality of the knot – how it works.
In the beginning sections of the seminar, Lacan refers to Freud’s work in The
Interpretation of Dreams and his distinction between material and psychical reality. In this
discussion, Lacan is articulating how the borders of interpretation function in such a way as to
point to the material or spatial dimension of the Real rather than to the Symbolic or Imaginary
meanings that one may make via the interpretation. In particular, he looks to Freud’s method of
interpreting the dream – his insistence that there is no one-to-one correlation between the dream
and waking life – to point out that the deciphering of the dream also points to what the dream
pulls in addition to its possible meaning. Lacan relates this to the jouissance contained within
the dream, which he suggests is part of the structure of the dream itself. He suggests that the
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dream is a process of encoding jouissance, and that it is the encoding, rather than the deciphering
that should be the focus of the interpretation.
Traditionally, the deciphering of the dream is a working through of meaning(s) and of
course, in one way, the interpretation is aimed at deciphering the meaning contained in the
dream. What Lacan points to, however, is that the interpretation, as a mechanism of deciphering,
has a symbolic limit - it stops. This limit is the limit of meaning –it is the point where meaning
is exhausted. Lacan is interested, then, in what cannot be exhausted, or even touched, by
meaning. He uses this notion of the limit of interpretation to point to what cannot be captured by
meaning – what he calls “that which never stops not being written” – as indicating the Real of
the subject’s enjoyment. He goes on to suggest that the interpretation must also have effects
outside of meaning and that these “incalculable effects”11 are effects on the subject’s enjoyment.
It is these effects, their working so to speak, that he is interested in outlining via a new way of
looking at the topography of the Borromean knot – a way that would not fall prey to
understanding or systemization, but would instead be focused on a happening or an event that
hits the Real and is thus able to impact the jouissance of the subject.
Lacan elaborates his new topological understanding via a painstaking process of laying
out the difference between an understanding of the Borromean knot only in terms of its registers
(i.e. what do we mean when we say Symbolic, Imaginary, Real; how do the registers function
separately and together, etc.) and an understanding of the knot as a material thing that is created
in space and where, strictly speaking, the “strings” of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real that

He calls them incalculable because they are unable to be counted as they fall outside of
symbolic coordinates.
11
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create the knot are equivalent.12 Lacan suggests that masculine knowledge, which he equates
with scientific knowledge, is the string itself, believing itself as One, unaware of the knot around
which it is organized and around which it is able to make its circles. If we think of this in terms
of Lacan’s general criticisms of other schools of psychoanalysis, it is the focus on the meaning of
the strings rather than on the construction around which the meaning is created that gets one into
trouble as an analyst. Instead, Lacan is suggesting that analysts attend to another way of
accessing unconscious knowledge through the jouissance effects of the interpretations rather than
through the meaning that they uncover. Lacan is asserting that what is at stake in a
psychoanalytic interpretation is its ability to serve as an intervention in the Real as that is what
will allow the subject to make a change at the level of enjoyment. Lacan is working here to
locate a different kind of truth, one not linked to a body of knowledge but to a human body – a
body that enjoys. In doing so, he finds himself developing a praxis that is not that of science but
more akin to art, in terms of its process and its ends.
Moving beyond the fantasy. Lacan recognized that there is something that remains after
the meaning of the symptom has been analyzed – the meaning has been exhausted, but that
which required the production of the symptom remains. In Lacanian terms, the S2’s are
exhausted and we begin dealing with S1’s – with letters13 that hold the subject but which, in the

Lacan is not getting rid of his previous conceptualizations of the Imaginary and the Symbolic,
but instead here he is suggesting that the Real itself is not only a supposition to which one can
apply a meaning. Instead it is merely the fact of the knot itself and of its construction. What he
makes clear is that we can only get there through the mediation of the Imaginary and the
Symbolic, both of which bear a relation to the Real and thus to the subject’s enjoyment.
13 Lacan’s notion of the letter is linked to his notion of repetition and of the Real. He
conceptualizes the letter as a logical function rather than as meaningful. Lacan makes this most
clear in his publications on Poe’s The Purloined Letter. In those texts, Lacan is pointing out that
it is the circulation of the letter, rather than its content, that is the motor force in the story. He
says, “the letter was able to have its effects on the inside – on the tale’s actors, including the
12
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symbolic, are meaningless. There are ways that one could imagine an analysis completed at this
point: The symbolic meaning of the symptom has been analyzed, the fundamental fantasy
revealed; however, what Lacan notes is that, structurally, the subject remains the same.
Remaining the same means that the motor of repetition remains in place and the subject will
continue to search for meaning in the Other, albeit in perhaps a way with less misery. For Lacan,
however, the ends of analysis require that we move beyond this point to a place where the
subject is able to cease attempting to locate meaning in the Other and instead locate truth in
jouissance.
In his 6th Seminar (1958-1959) Lacan declared “there is no Other of the Other,”
indicating that there is no Other that can answer for the lack in the primary Other. – there is no
Other who can provide the final answer to the question of the subject’s being. He says,
This is the great secret: there is no Other of the Other. In other words for the subject of
traditional philosophy, this subject subjectivises himself indefinitely. If I am in
everything I think, I am in so far as I think that I am, and so on, this has no reason to stop.
The truth is that analysis teaches us something quite different. The fact is that it has
already been glimpsed that it is not so sure that I am in so far as I think, and that one can
only be sure of one thing, which is that I am in so far as I think that I am. Certainly that.
Only what analysis teaches us is that I am not the one who precisely is in the process of
thinking that I am, for the simple reason that because of the fact that I think that I am, I
think in the locus of the Other; I am different to the one who thinks that I am.

narrator – just as much as one the outside – on us, its readers, and also its author – without
anyone every having had to worry about what it meant. “ (Lacan, 1966/2006b, p. 43).
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But the question is that I have no guarantee of any kind that this Other, through
what there is in his system, can give me if I may express myself in this way, what I gave
him: his being and his essence as truth. There is no, I have told you, Other of the Other.
There is not in the Other, any signifier which is able on this occasion to answer for what I
am. And to say things in a transformed way, this hopeless truth that I spoke to you about
a while ago, this truth which is the one that we encounter at the level of the unconscious,
is a faceless truth, is a closed truth, is a truth which can be bent in every direction. We
only know it too well. It is a truthless truth. (p. 206)
It seems that what Lacan is referring to here, in Seminar Six, is the notion of a truth in the Real –
the truth of the subject’s enjoyment, his or her jouissance -that will occupy his later seminars and
become linked the ends of analysis.
When the signifiers come to a place where their meaning(s) have been exhausted and one
begins to deal only with letters, the lack in the Other becomes exceedingly apparent – and the
subject must make a choice either to continue to fill the lack with more meaning (to sustain the
fantasy that there is an Other for the Other) or accept the lack and find a way to identify with the
symptom rather than with the lack in the Other. More prosaically one comes to terms with one’s
own life as itself not being tethered to anything but the choices one has made. Perhaps choices
made under duress, but choices nonetheless. For Lacan, this means that the subject works to
accept his or her truth insofar as it is the truth of his or her own particular jouissance. In his
formulation, this identification with the symptom produces a new subjective configuration – as
the letters that emerged in the symbolic have been tied up in the real via the sinthome. Paul
Verhaeghe & Declercq (2002) nicely describes this process:
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This neosubject is a creation of the analytic process: it becomes a possibility once the
analysand has reached the point where the interpretations have revealed the final nonsense of his symptoms. The condition for this is that both the analyst and the analysand
“fall” from their belief in the Other. It is this process that Lacan constantly tries to grasp
from Seminar XI onward, with expressions such as “separation,” the “traversal” of the
phantasm, or “subjective destitution.” As a creation, it is indeed a creation ex nihilo, that
is, one not based on any previous identity, which in one way or another would be
tributary to the Other. (p. 11)
It is at this point in his theorizing that Lacan most explicitly addresses the differences between
science and psychoanalysis insofar as he is seeking to show how psychoanalysis, as a praxis,
cannot fail to renounce the fantasy of a transcendent Other and instead must rely on a different
way of knowing. One that would perhaps be linked with this earlier formulation of “truthless
truth.”
Lacan was faced with at least two difficulties in this formulation. The first was a
difficulty in conceptualizing the way that one could articulate the move from producing
understanding via analysis to subjective constitution via non-sense, or perhaps more aptly called
un-sense. The second was the manner in which one could talk about the experience of this
process. In both instances, he relied on metaphors of artistic and creative processes to attempt to
get close to the articulation, not just of an encounter with the Real, but an encounter that creates a
tie or a binding between the registers.
The end of the treatment as a creative act. Whereas previously, the registers were
organized around the object that stood in for the lack in the Other, in his later work Lacan was
forced to reconceptualize how one imagines a move that allows the object to fall without also
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causing the subject to disappear. In other words, he wanted to conceptualize the moment of
movement when the object falls and yet something we may call a “one” of the subject remains
via the sinthome.14 In his elaboration, what is left of the subject as sinthome returns via a
creation, a working of art that moves through the Symbolic to the Real.
In reconceptualizing the ends of analysis in this way, Lacan moves the process of
psychoanalysis away from that of science – as science ultimately aims towards objects – to an art
that treats the Real. For Lacan, it seems, the end of analysis is the moment that a subject
becomes a subject of jouissance rather than a subject who is ultimately fending off and
sublimating his place as object of the drive—or a being subjected to the drive. Although
somewhat imprecise, another way to conceptualize this is to imagine the end of analysis as the
moment that the subject is able to assume responsibility for the particularity of his or her modes
of enjoyment as located in the Real, rather than in the Other. Lacan talks about this end of
analysis as identification with the sinthome—the sinthome being that which organizes the
subject’s jouissance in the Real. For Lacan, the sinthome works as a signifying formation, but
one that is not a formation of meaning but rather a formation of function. In other words, it
“works” as a tie or knotting that binds, but it does not “mean.” It is, to quote Lacan again, “a
supposition [that] undoes with language what is done by language” (1977, p.80)

This is a difficult move to clearly articulate, but what Lacan is trying to understand and
articulate is the difference between a subjective position where one’s sense of identity is located
in the Other via meaning and a position where one’s sense of identity is located in one’s own
access to an enjoyment that cannot be spoken (and so cannot be shared as meaning). Lacan
discusses in other seminars his understanding of the sinthome as both a creative and an ethical
construction.
14
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It is important to note that the sinthome, for Lacan, is always a creation, insofar as it exists outside of Symbolic and Imaginary coordinates, and that it is always particular to the
individual subject. According to Verhaeghe & Declercq (2002):
Lacan specifies that this new signifier, just like the Real, has no sense (sens), which
implies that it cannot be exchanged with other subjects. Not only would it not ‘fit’
another subject, worse still, this new signifier cannot be formalised. It belongs to the field
of the orthodox: it is a particular way of handling a particular jouissance. In our reading,
this explains why Lacan in his last seminars repeatedly returns to the idea of creation and
the act. In this, the accent is not so much on the result of the creation than on the fact that
creation is highly individual, particular (p. 16).
So, the question then arises, how does one conceptualize a treatment, a psychoanalysis, that aims
at artistry rather than science. Lacan took up this question in earnest in his 23rd Seminar on
James Joyce (1975-1976). He says:
In as much as the sinthome makes a false hole with the Symbolic that there is some kind
of praxis. Namely, something which is related to saying, to what I will call moreover on
this occasion the art of saying, indeed which slides toward ardour.
Joyce, to end, did not know that he was making the sinthome. I mean that he
simulated it. He was unconscious of it. And it is by this fact that he is a pure artificer,
that he is a man of know-how. Namely, what is called moreover an artist. (p 44)
Joyce was an artist who produced a sinthome and Lacan was able to trace the creation of his
sinthome through attention to the action of Joyce’s writing rather than through the writing itself.
Rather than attend to its meaning, Lacan attended to its work.
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Lacan notes that Joyce knew what to do with his symptom, which is also how Lacan
formulates the ends of an analysis as well as the formation of an analyst. For Lacan,
psychoanalysis must be a knowing-how rather than a knowing-what. Such an praxis, which
Lacan links with the ability to work in a way that allows the production of a new signifier in the
Real rather than a new chain of signifiers in the Symbolic, is one that affects rather than means.
It is a way of working that suggests an ability to work through rather than to work in.15
Structures and strings. For Lacan the move into the Borromean clinic was important in
that it allowed him to articulate a treatment whose cure aimed beyond meaning, however Lacan
did not completely abandon his earlier structural categories. Brousse (2007) nicely summarizes
the transition:
The Freudian and Lacanian clinic, a structural clinic, rests on the structural opposition
between neurosis, psychosis, and perversion…Yet, in the mid-1970’s Lacan ceases to
take his bearing solely from the differential clinic and introduces the perspective of the
Borromean knots, with the consequent production of new statements on the symptom.
Lacan even reverts to an ancient spelling, that of “sinthome,” to conceptualize what of the
symptom cannot be reduced to a structural determination – that is, to a determination of
language. (p. 83)
While the later Lacan is focused on the creative act of the sinthome, he continues to make use of
the structural categories, referring to them often, but he begins to consider options other than the
Name-of-the-Father as constitutive. In her text on hysteria and the sinthome, Brousse lays out
Lacan showed us this way of knowing-how rather than knowing-what in the working modes of
his seminars. In his seminars, we listen as Lacan works – while he works through the texts of
psychoanalysis, philosophy, and science rather than working in them. There is a way his
seminars were, themselves, moments of an analysis of psychoanalysis that provoked, for some,
an encounter that produced an effect.
15
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the ways that the move from the structural clinic to the Borromean clinic does not destroy the
structural categories, but instead points to a “relativization of the very strict opposition between
foreclosure and repression” and the need to “vary our models to account for certain aspects of the
clinic of neurosis and psychosis” (p. 86). Brousse’s clinical case is interesting as she is pointing
to the potential of a foreclosure of the signifier Woman resulting in “foreclosing effects” that
show up as hallucinations for the subject, managed through an act of writing – a sinthome.
What Brousse’s case shows is a loosening of the understanding of subjective constitution
as linked solely to the paternal function and an opening of the possibility of more than a singular
operation in the constitution of a subject. Although this does not dissolve the structural clinic, it
suggests that the operations that Lacan identified as part of that clinic are perhaps only one part
of a more complex event – one that attends to incarnations across registers. Such a complexity
points to a singularity of subjectivity – a sinthome does not mean and, as such, cannot be shared
with others.
Structure, Sinthome, Autism
In terms of autism, it seems to me that Lacan’s later work offers more possibility for the
theorization and treatment of autism, as it opens the door to the possibility of a more complex
articulation of the work of autistic symptoms. Additionally, it offers the possibility to examine
autism outside of the lens of psychosis, which I will discuss below, and to consider the need, as
Brousse says nicely, to “vary our models” to account for the wide array of autistic phenomena.
This is what I hope my research can contribute.
In order to take up a different approach to autism in Lacanian psychoanalysis, however a
couple of things need to be addressed. First, an exploration is needed of the possibility that the
biological/neurological designation of autism or autistic is perhaps referring to something
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different than the designation of autism within psychoanalysis. Second, of particular importance,
is the question of subjective structure. Does autism constitute its own structure or is it a subset
of psychosis?
In terms of the latter, most Lacanians make a conscious effort to separate biology from
psychology in a way that is sometimes useful and other times questionable. The distinction is
made in order to allow the focus on the intricacies of subjectivity rather than on the brain. The
focus is on what psychoanalysis sees as the complexity of a subject’s coming into being as a
social subject, whether or not they come into being with a body that is considered damaged. As
Eric Laurent (2012), a well-known Lacanian analyst, states:
To proclaim the error of treating autism through psychoanalysis in the name of supposed
genetic determinants is no less erroneous. A subject does not stop being a subject if his
body is “disabled.” It is necessary to adapt psychoanalysis to his case. It is a question of
working with the facts, including eventual biological data, as a tool for the application of
psychoanalysis to the case, and not of considering this to be of no consequence to the
constitution of the subject himself. As Lacan noted, psychoanalysis does not suppose, in
this sense, a psychogenesis of mental illness. It states the dimension of the body for the
subject of the language parasite, which is another matter. (p. 13-14)
Here we see an explicit attempt to separate the question of cause from the question of subjective
constitution. Laurent is pointing out that “mental illness” is not within the purview of Lacanian
psychoanalysis; that instead it is dealing with a more radical question about the creation of
subjectivity. The diagnosis of autism as a neurobiological illness, in this paradigm, is
distinguished from autism as a subjective position. In this explanation, we see a separation of the
question of subjectivity from the question of biology that is characteristic of a Lacanian
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approach.

For Lacanians the question in the treatment is always about the child’s relationship

to the Other, to language, to desire, and to jouissance – not about the child’s brain or underlying
neurobiology. While not denying neurobiology’s potential impact, the treatment is organized
around a structural diagnosis based on the subject’s position in relation to these categories.
This is why, in Lacanian approaches, the question of placing autism within a structural
position becomes necessary. To identify a structure – which, put simply, means to understand a
patient’s position in relation to the Other – is the primary mechanism through which one
conducts a treatment. Within a Lacanian frame, the Other is used to designate the alterity of the
symbolic sphere, which includes language and the law, and also points to the irreducible
differences between individual subjects. With autistic patients, the question is about how they
orient themselves in relation to the Other. Here one can also see some overlap with mainstream
diagnostic categories in autism, which are also pointing to the ways that the subject orients
himself, or does not, in relation to others. Lacanians largely take the position that, regardless of
cause, autistic children all seem to struggle with difficulties at the level of their relation to the
Other, specifically with separating from and establishing a self in relation to the Other.
According to Lacanian theory, this places autism squarely within the structural category
of psychosis. The treatment becomes similar to a treatment for psychotics and largely focuses on
allowing the autistic child to use the analytic space to begin the process of separation and to
begin to master what was previously an overwhelming jouissance. As Myriam Perrin (2012)
explains,
The analyst’s position in the autistic transference takes the position of a non-desiring
double, bearing a certain emptiness, so as to allow the subject to grasp him as a channel
towards his inventions and his Other of supplementation, that is, we suggest, a channel
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from i(a) to I(a): the clinician’s act being oriented by the use (the subject’s use) of the
double towards capital I. The psychoanalytic treatment of infantile autism is therefore
oriented towards the temporization of jouissance so that autistic objects may emerge (if
they are not there at the outset), allowing the subject to treat the drives by moving
towards a mastery of libidinal energy. (p. 99)
Here one can see the ways in which the Lacanian approach is working from a conceptualization
of autism that is structurally linked to psychosis and, most importantly, is suggesting a treatment
trajectory that is about “creating” a subject rather than about curing a symptom.
For some Lacanians, however, the question of subjective structure in autism is taken up
differently. As Jean-Claude Maleval (2012) pointed out in his essay, “Why the hypothesis of an
autistic structure?,” although some psychoanalysts continue to understand autism as a subset of
childhood psychosis, a small group of analysts are beginning to consider autism as a separate and
unique structure. Robert and Rosine Lefort were the first to discuss the possibility of such a
structure in 1992. Since that time, other analysts, including Maleval, have followed suit (Laurent,
2012). Although the conversation about a unique autistic structure is growing in psychoanalytic
communities, it does not have the support of the large body of clinical and theoretical material
available for psychotic states and disorders. For many analysts it is of little value to attempt to
understand the difference, rather it is taken for granted that the underlying issue in autism is the
same as with the other psychotic disorder. In his argument for recognizing autism as a separate
structure, Maleval describes:
Of course, the symptomology of autism presents disorders of language, of identity and of
jouissance belonging to the clinic of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. It is this
that allows one to consider autism as a form of psychosis; however it is so different from
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all the others that it leads one to question the strictness of the link between the foreclosure
of the Name-of-the-Father and psychosis. Rosine and Robert Lefort did not hesitate to
loosen it by making autism a fourth subjective structure. The most important thing
inciting one to extract autism from the field of psychoses resides in a major clinical fact,
too often absent from expositions in the manuals of psychiatry, the existence of a
psychotic structure independent of the clinical pictures that might be associated with it.
A schizophrenic can develop toward paranoia, then fall into a state of melancholia, have a
manic episode, then present a delusional paranoia again, and finally end up in a
paraphrenic appeasement…Subject’s with psychotic structure can get out of clinical
psychosis and report on it, some are capable of providing a critique of their past delusion;
on the other hand, those with the most stable forms of high-functioning autism never
consider themselves to have escaped from their autistic functioning; all insist on the fact
that it persists in attenuated form. (pp. 34-35).
As Maleval goes on to point out, what appears to be the most significant structural difference
between autism and psychosis is the mechanism through which the child deals with the Other,
for example through manipulation of objects in the environment versus the use of delusional
constructs (Maleval 2012). He believes that autistic subjects make use of the object as an
invention (read sinthome) that allows them to prop up their desire by literally creating a barrier to
the Other (pp. 43-48)
Maleval’s explanation of the unique structural determinants of autism are interesting and,
in my opinion, point to some of the critical elements needing additional attention in Lacanian
theory – particularly the possibility of alternative mechanisms to fulfill the paternal function and
the centrality of the sinthome in non-neurotic patients. What Maleval’s description does not
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accomplish, in my opinion, is a separation or explanation of the differences between DSM
autism and psychoanalytic autism. In fact, in a description of the progression of autism, he
notes, “Autism develops from Kanner’s syndrome to Asperger’s” (p. 35). I am curious about
this seemingly unreflective use of a completely foreign diagnostic system and what it may reveal
about some of the issues with both theory and practice in psychoanalysis when it comes to
autism.
In the following chapters, I will address the issues of structure and lack of diagnostic
specificity in the Lacanian sphere. First, making use of the autobiographical work of adults on
the spectrum, I will attempt to discover whether there is evidence of a truly unique structure for
autism. Following this I will discuss the ways that diagnosis of autism in Lacanian could benefit
from specific clarifications and additionally discuss what I see as the potential utility of Lacanian
approaches to autism treatment.
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CHAPTER FOUR: CHALLENGES TO THE MAINSTREAM THROUGH AUTISM SELFADVOCACY, THE NEURODIVERSITY MOVEMENT, AND CRITICAL AUTISM
STUDIES
Outside the world of autism research, questions of cause and cure, and directives about
appropriate treatment interventions are a number of emerging discourses on autism that
challenge mainstream views and open up the worlds of identity and politics as relevant to a fuller
understanding of autism for the people who live it. There are several variations of what we may
call challenges to the mainstream discourses on autism – autism self-advocacy, the
neurodiversity movement, and critical autism studies. Although each is a unique subset of
individuals with particular goals, these groups confront conventional models of autism that
minimize autistic experience in favor of deficit models and a push towards cure or eradication.
Autism self-advocacy grew out of the disability rights movement in the 1990’s in an
attempt by some autistic individuals to increase their representation in conversations about the
rights of and services and supports available to autistic individuals (Autistic Self Advocacy
Network, 2017). At present, there is a nationwide organization, Autism Self-Advocacy Network,
located in Washington DC, working at the national level to increase awareness and promote
policy change to improve the lives of individuals on the spectrum. Autism self-advocacy at the
local level includes autistic individuals who seek to have their voice and opinion heard about
policies, supports, and research on autism. Autism self-advocacy is broad and includes an array
of local and national policy positions, education and advocacy services, and programming to
support individuals on the spectrum. On all levels, however, autistic self-advocates argue against
what has become known as “cure culture” – the focus on research and treatment aimed at
“curing” or eliminating autism. Instead, autism self-advocates focus “on empowering and
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supporting autistic people and all people with disabilities to live the lives we wanted” (Autistic
Self Advocacy Network, 2017).
Arising within and alongside autism self-advocacy is the neurodiversity movement.
Taking “cure culture” on directly, the neurodiversity movement understands autism as one of
many expressions of neurological self-hood, which should be valued and respected for its unique
perspective and gifts. According to Silberman (2015), “Neurodiversity advocates propose that
instead of viewing [autism] as an error of nature – a puzzle to be solved and eliminated with
techniques like prenatal testing and selective abortion – society should regard it as a valuable
part of humanity’s genetic legacy while ameliorating the aspects of autism that can be
profoundly disabling without adequate forms of support. (p. 470). The neurodiversity movement
embraces the biological and brain-based discourse so prevalent in mainstream autism research in
order to promote the recognition of autistic identity or autistic personhood as a different way of
being. As Ortega (2013) writes:
One function of embracing the vocabulary of the brain, what Singer described as
“neurological self-awareness” (1999), is to remove the stigmatizing weight of
psychotherapeutic discourses on autism. Turning to the brain-based explanation as an
alternative, however, does not lead to the adoption of the deficit model underlying the
neurocognitive theories such as “mindblindness” (Baron-Cohen, 1997), “weak central
coherence” (Pellicano et al. 2006), and “executive dysfunction” (Hill 2004). Rather,
autistic self-advocates draw on these theories involving the brain (often imprecisely) to
substantiate the notion of a natural difference instead of evidence for pathology. (pp. 7980)
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Neurodiversity advocates often go one step further to link neurological diversity with the
construction of identity resulting in what Fein (2011) refers to as the neuro-structural self. In
many ways, the neurodiversity movement is situated as a political movement aimed at increasing
acceptance of difference based on immutable biology. But, it is also a discourse on identity and
the self, aimed at creating and maintaining a discourse on personhood that understands the self as
a material production, while simultaneously delimiting the cultural space where the neurostructural self circulates.
Critical autism studies are interested precisely in the issues of power, politics, and
personhood that are brought to the fore by autism self-advocates and the neurodiversity
movements. Largely contained within the academic sphere, critical autism studies draws on
critical theory to examine the multitude of conflicting and power-laden discourses on autism to
ask questions about how autism as a category is constructed and maintained. As Orsini and
Davidson (2013) note, critical autism studies seek to examine power relations within the field of
autism, to challenge dominant deficit models of autism as well as to critically consider
celebratory models, and commit “to develop new analytic frameworks using inclusive and nonreductive methodological and theoretical approaches to study the nature and culture of autism”
(p. 12). Critical autism scholars seek also to better understand autistic experience as it is lived
and to explore the ways that certain models of autism or discourses on autistic identity shape the
possible cultural expressions of autistic selfhood (e.g. Hacking, 2009a, Ortega 2013).
Autism self-advocacy, the neurodiversity movement, and critical autism studies, although
distinct in some ways, all highlight the politics and power dynamics of the field of autism and
seek to express, in varying ways, the impact of these dynamics on the lives of autistic
individuals. The wealth of conversation, theory, personal experience, and critical examination is
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too expansive to explore in detail for this project, however the following pages will highlight
some of the insights and challenges to the dominant autism discourses that are relevant to the
current project.
Cure Culture: Erasing Autism
One of the primary targets for autism self-advocates, the neurodiversity movement, and critical
autism studies is the mainstream focus on cure. The central criticisms leveled at what has been
called “cure culture” are the implicit messages of social control and the devaluing of autistic
subjectivity.
As pointed out by these three fields, one first has to ask who is the cure for? Although it
is difficult to trace precisely, much of the current push to uncover the cause of autism, its genetic
variance, and potential psycho-pharmaceutical cures is a push started by the parents of autistic
children desperate for answers (see Silberman 2015). This understandable push by parents to
help their children was then taken up by political, medical, and psychological institutions that
benefit socially and financially from emphasizing pathology and deficits in functioning. As
such, we have seen a dramatic increase in research on autism and proliferation of explanations,
treatments, and drugs aimed at eliminating the disorder or ameliorating what are considered its
most problematic symptoms. This focus on “cure” is problematic in that it positions autistic
individuals as somehow damaged.
For individuals interested in questions of autistic advocacy, “cure culture” also brings up
questions surrounding social control and the need to for individuals to conform to social
stereotypes and norms. We can read ABA as an expression of this discourse of social conformity
or control - the treatment is explicitly aimed at normalization. Its goal is to produce a citizen
whose autism or autistic tendencies are reduced to an imperceptible level. The question for
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autism advocates and critical autism scholars then is – what do we lose when we succumb to
these types of discourses? This treatment, while perhaps helpful to some, produces a separation
between normal and abnormal, acceptable and unacceptable, which requires autistic individuals
to conform in order to be considered tolerable.
Of equal importance is the question of financial incentive and the disparities in research
funding. As Nadesan (2013) points out, “The emphasis on inborn susceptibility has implications
for people with autism and their families, as the search for genes may be prioritized over
research and spending related to support, therapy, and accommodation in an economic context of
public-spending cuts” (p. 117). Additionally, research funding in many ways shapes the
discourse of autism by suggesting that certain areas of study are more worthwhile than others.
At present, genetic research into cause and susceptibility receive the most funding with research
into environmental contributions receiving the least. Research into the efficacy of various types
of supports receives little to no attention (p. 121). The flow of the money in many ways shapes
the flow of information and, more importantly, of power. For individuals on the autism
spectrum, this helps reify an environment where a deficit model prevails and uniquely autistic
ways of being are minimized or all together erased.
The Primary Deficits: Theory of Mind and Empathy
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, one of the primary mechanisms through which autism
is understood and defined in the mainstream literature is through the lack(s) of empathy and
theory of mind. Simon Baron-Cohen (1997) was one of the first to talk about these deficits in his
book, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. In that book, he maps out the
ways that human beings evolved non-conscious cognitive mapping systems that allow them to
make sense of and interpret the behavior of others. He argues that theory of mind and later
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(2004) empathy are essentially human characteristics and necessary for the development of
society and of the good of the species. Patrick McDonagh (2013), in his essay on autism and
empathy notes:
Such a formulation positions “autistic people,” broadly understood, as a contrast group,
something less than fully human, who occupy a space outside the empathic society where
their presence assures the majority of their capacity for empathy (just as, at the start of
the twentieth century, the presence of people segregated in institutions for the “feebleminded” assured those outside these institutions of their own status as rational and
intelligent beings. (p. 32)
McDonagh is pointing to a discursive positioning of the autistic subject and the ways that this
discourse of empathy and theory of mind are embedded within a power dynamic that privileges
one side - reducing the other to something less than human. He goes on to talk about the ways
that empathy itself is an ill-defined construct tied to embodiment and intuition in ways that
exclude other methods of making sense of or interpreting the behavior of others.
Melanie Yergeau (2013), an English professor who self-identifies as autistic, questions
these notions of lack as defining of autism, taking the notions to their logical end, where the
autistic subject, lacking the ability to know his/herself, becomes a mindless body. In an autibiography where she describes a forced hospitalization, she writes:
Humans are human because they possess a theory of mind, and autistics are inhuman
because they do not.
As Baron-Cohen postulates (1997, 4): "The gulf between mindreaders and the
mindblind must be vast."
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As I focus on this gulf, this vastness, my lack—I am drawn to the movements of
my body and the office space in which I currently dwell. In these moments, I call to mind
a decades-old Adrienne Rich essay entitled "Notes Toward a Politics of Location"
(1985). In the essay, Rich draws attention to the ways in which locations reflect
ideological standing points, to the ways in which theoretical spaces and the physical
environment abstract certain (raced, gendered, classed, dis/abled) bodies in their very
designs…There is something about the body and theory of mind. Rhetoricians have often
conceived "the physical body as the place where theory is actualized" (Vandenberg,
Hum, and Clary-Lemon 2006, 12). A theory of mind is one of the quintessential abilities
that makes "us" human. Without a theory of mind, then, what is a body? What is an
autistic body? As an autistic person, I am well aware of the ways in which my
"neurological disorder" manifests itself in and through my muscles and sinew, the ways
in which autism rolls off my tongue, transforms my gait into autly bounce, stiffens the
contours of my face as my eyes survey a room. Autism is embodied; my embodiment is
autism. As Jim Sinclair (1993) describes, autism "colors every experience." If the body is
where theory is actualized, and autistics lack a ToM—under whose domain must our
embodiment fall? What of my tic? What of my purpose? What of the humanity of my
flapping fingers?...The body, I argue, brings visibility and materiality to the abstractions
of theory and, most notably, to the abstractions of theory about theory of mind. What
does it mean, in practice, in real life, beyond the pages of a book or medical chart, to
deny the autistic's capacity for empathy, for perspective-taking, for self-reflection? "We"
have abstracted bodies and minds both from real autistic humans and, in the process, have
rendered them inhuman. (Admittance, para. 11-17)
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Here we can see Yergeau draw out the logical absurdity of this deficit understanding of autism
and forcefully assert the existence of the autistic subject as subject – embodied, self-reflective,
and human.
These two authors, two among many, point out that empathy is not (only or even) a
cognitive capacity that a person has or does not have, but it is also a concept, embedded within a
discourse that defines humans as those that have it. Additionally, they point to the ways that this
discourse, focused on mind, forgets to consider the body – both as the site from where empathy
works and as the materiality of the subject – the vehicle through which one interacts with and
comes to know the world. This critique of autism points to the need to consider concepts like
empathy and theory of mind as complex constructs, rather than real things, that rely on a takenfor-granted understanding of embodiment and humanity that don’t allow room for difference.
Autistic Selves: Making Up People
Another important issue brought to light by neurodiversity advocates and critical autism
scholars is the question of identity, or the question of autistic selfhood. As we can see above, the
primary model of understanding autism through deficits, positions autistic individuals in a
problematic subjective space – a non human or less than human position. We hear echos of this
in some of the popular media portrayals of autistic individuals as robots, machines, and aliens or,
on the other end, as animals lacking language and the full cognitive capacities of their human
counterparts. We see similar positionings in the discourse of children “lost” to autism or
“stolen” by autism (Silberman, 2015; Chen, 2011). These go one step further to suggest that
what is “real” – the being of the desired “normal child” – has been removed, suggesting that
what is left is an undesirable, wrong, or worthless shell. In this instance, the autistic individual is
not only non-human, but also unwanted.
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As Yergeau suggests above, this positioning of autism as outside of human, as wrong or
unvaluable, impacts the individuals who are autistic by forcing them to occupy a position
characterized only by what is lacking. Instead, she and many other self-advocates point to the
need to explore autistic experience as it is lived by autistic individuals and to acknowledge the
ways that autism is not a disease, or even merely a collection of deficits, but is instead an aspect
of identity. As Ortega (2013) points out:
…autism-rights activist Jim Sinclair explains the expression “person with autism” –
compared with “autistic person,” where autism is an integral part of personhood –
suggests that autism “is something bad – so bad,” he says, “that it isn’t even consistent
with being a person” (1999). Michelle Dawson comments that characterizing someone as
a “person with autism” is an inadequate as defining a woman as a “person with
femaleness” (quoted in Harmon 2004).” (p. 79)
In this way, autism can be understood as constitutive – it creates a subjective position with its
own unique phenomenology, much in the same way as gender, sexuality, and race. What is at
stake, what the neurodiversity movement is pointing to, is a need to create a discourse on autism
that would allow a space for an autistic subject to come into being – to have agency, experience,
self-awareness, etc. – regardless of how different that way of being may be from what is
currently considered typical.
Ian Hacking, known for his theory of the “looping effect” and ideas about the ways that
historical and emerging discourses create new ways of being and new languages to express
being, takes up autism and the neurodiversity movement as allowing the creation of modes of
autistic being. Hacking (2009a, 2009b) is talking about how the autobiographies of autistics
(including what is published as well as what is shared in online forums) are starting to produce a
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language to describe the lived experience of autism whereas previously there was none. These
descriptions, produced in and through a language not yet equipped to describe autistic
experience, are creating opportunities to constitute the modes of being autistic. Autistic adults
are sharing with each other, and with non-autistics, the experience of autism. In doing so, they
create a new knowledge and discourse, and a new community of subjects that have forged an
existence through shared modes of being.
We can see how this has begun to play out in the emerging discourse of neurotypical
(NT) versus atypical (AT) – a way of describing non-autistic and autistic individuals,
respectively – and in the discourse of neurodiversity as a spectrum. Brownlow and Odell (2013)
describe this movement as situating autism as a type of biological citizenship. They argue that a
discourse of biological citizenship allows autistic subjects a position with respect to the changing
and newly emerging discourses on autism that allows them to creatively constitute, describe, and
understand their identities. They also note the political expediency of some discourses over
others (e.g. the dualism of NT versus AT more easily accommodates arguments of oppression
and demands for accommodations than does the spectrum argument), thus underlining the
multiple facets through which autistic identity can be constructed within the biological frame.
Ortega (2013), on the other hand, cautions that discourses that rely on biology and
neurology dangerously mirror deficit-model understandings of autism and may falsely limit
subjectivity (and the resulting political economy of identity) by equating personhood with the
brain. As Fein (2011) also points out:
Exemplifying this model of the psyche provides the opportunity to lay claim to moral
innocence, a uniquely self-determined identity, and a special relationship with the power
and prestige of technoscience. Such absolution, acceptance, and admiration are often rare
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and precious commodities in the lives of individuals whose behavior is frequently out of
sync with the expectations of others. However, this exemplary status comes with a cost.
In particular, the aspects of their behavior that are most machine-like come to
characterize their entire being, in the eyes of others and sometimes in their own. The
facets of subjectivity – and life experience – that are interpretive, intersubjective, and
socially contingent are at risk of dropping out of this strategic picture. Meanwhile, the
cycle of moral blame for mental disorder is perpetuated in the rhetorical ‘othering’ of
psychiatric conditions, through heightening and highlighting the opposing – and
negatively valenced – characteristics of those so diagnosed. (p. 47)
Both Fein and Ortega are pointing to the tension between the explicit pull of the neurological
discourse and the implicit influence of culture, both of which are in play in the construction and
articulation of autistic identity and change the ways that selfhood is experienced and expressed.
Critical autism scholars, many of whom are interested in emerging discourses of autistic
identity and selfhood, point to the need to further explore, challenge, and critique emerging
discourses of autism from all sources in order to avoid reifying explanations of autism that erase
subjectivity all together.
Autistic Experience
The emerging discourses of autistic selfhood or autistic identity imply a unique subjective
experience. Autistic self-advocates, individuals within the neurodiversity movements, and
critical autism studies scholars talk about autistic identity and point to the notion of the autistic
self as one that comes into being through a uniquely autistic experience of the body, the world,
and the other. Descriptions of autistic experience, however, are all too frequently missing from
the literature. Recently, there is an increasing number of autistic individuals writing
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autobiographies or narrating their experience online through various communities. Prior to that,
autistic individuals were most often written about, by caregivers, siblings, professionals, etc.
Mark Osteen (2013) notes the difficulty in narrating autism and the ways that, all too
often, narratives about autistic experience fall into tropes where the autistic subject gets erased.
He discusses what he sees as the traditional themes of autistic narratives in fiction writing – 1.
The autistic individual must be a savant (but not too disabled), 2. They must serve as a way to
measure the moral growth of NT characters, and 3. They must be cured or have overcome their
disability in some way. For Osteen, these tropes work to organize and articulate autistic
experience for neurotypicals in a way that misses the mark – but yet, he points out, one can still
see something of the autistic experience in the ways the text resists attempts to fully organize it.
In describing the ways that autistic autobiographies both succumb to and resist traditional
narrative forms, Osteen says, “they resort to strategies of bricolage – echolalia, imitation,
fixations, alter egos – to construct a self by assembling spare parts…Perhaps autistic creativity
and identity are paradoxically synthesized through the arduous process of self-effacement…
yielding an emergence that is also a submergence. The authors don’t exactly disappear; instead
they exist on two planes simultaneously – both the autistic and the neurotypical” (p. 274).
Osteen points to something that, although often implicit, is woven into the texts of autism
self-advocates, neurodiversity supporters, and critical autism scholars – the language used to
describe experience is often a neurotypical construction. Because of this, the concepts we have
created to define autism – concepts of deficits in theory of mind and empathy, concepts of
rigidity and inflexibility, concepts of modes of communication – all of these are based on the
experience of a neurotypical subject and may be inadequate to describe a truly different human
position. Dawn Eddings Prince (2013), an autistic anthropologist, speaks to this difficulty:
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For me, language is blended inextricably to context and memory. Even when I was a
child, this melding represented the most important thing in the word, and everything,
from bathrooms to snails to dogs, had language. If a thing existed, it existed as a living
part of language and I had a deep understanding of its place in the vibrations of speech, in
the vibrations of existence. This whole cloth of speech and living things made my world
a magical place.
I learned very early, however, that for most people, language was a kind of
weapon rather than an amorphous mist of the birth waters of reality. It seemed that for
most speaking humans, language could be considered a violent activity, in that it cut up
the world and its use also cut groups of people one from another…In this way, I knew
that language was as important to other people as it was to me, but in a dangerous way.
The silence between their words as just as full of cutting as the silence between my words
was a place of connection. (p. 319-320)
In this description, Prince shares her sense of the ways that her experience is different from the
experience of a non-autistic person. She is speaking of language as a vehicle for a profound type
of connection – different from the more alienating or separating way that we traditionally
understand language. For Prince, language appears to be experienced as living and contextual in
a way that is clearly profoundly important to her, but yet her experience of language as it is used
by others is both violent and alienating. This disparity between her experience of language and
her experience of language in others points to one of the ways that descriptions of autistic
experience may get lost in translation – particularly when taken up by non-autistic audiences.
One could argue that no human experience, NT or AT, is fully captured by language. In
fact, Lacan posits this idea as the basis for his theory of subjective constitution. Language, by its
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nature, separates us from things and organizes lived experience in a way that is alienating at best.
However, language is also the mode through which we develop community and construct
identity. In many ways, it is what allows the production of the self. This production happens in
the intersubjective space – language links us to others. What Mark Osteen is pointing out, and
what is echoed by Dawn Eddings-Prince, is that autistic experience(s) may not be fully conveyed
through the same type of narrative process that we take for granted in everyday communication.
That type of narrative process, or organizing of experience according to a certain type of
grammar, in many ways relies on shared understandings of time, of objects, and of others. In the
context of autism, however, communication practices among individuals on the spectrum vary
widely and frequently also include non-linguistic forms of communication. Although there is a
proliferation of online forums and autobiographies suggesting that at least some autistic
individuals desire to share their experiences and, to some extent, desire to form a community of
sorts, there remains some questions about how and whether it is possible to talk about or describe
“autistic experience” as having any claim to uniformity or as composing a type. Instead, it seems
that what is captured in the difficulty with articulation is the possibility that traditional narrative
forms of communication are perhaps impossible, or at least inefficient, when used to describe or
articulate a specifically autistic experience precisely because that experience may be singular.
If the problem of communication lies in the intersubjective space, whether this be
between NT and AT or AT and AT, this points to a difference at the level of experience – a
difference that traditional language is unable to cover over. For me, this brings up questions
about true difference and what it means to allow a space for subjectivity, for the other, even
when s/he is truly Other. Kristina Chew (2013), in an article describing her attempts to
understand and translate what she experiences as the incoherent sounds of her son’s language
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attempts, points to the demand to translate despite awareness of its necessary failure. She
lovingly describes her realization that her son, rather than failing to speak, is speaking differently
and that she must recognize his speech as other rather than as an inferior form of the same. She
describes her change in relation to her son: “It is, in short, a shift into a position of respect.” (p.
312).
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CHAPTER FIVE: READING AUTISTIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY – METHOD AND RESULTS
Perhaps one of the most valuable and relevant developments in the literature on autism in the
past twenty years has been the increase in autobiographies (e.g. Robinson, 2008; Saperstein,
2010, 2014; Grandin, 2006). Although each is unique, they all attempt to provide a description
of life as it is lived with autism. Most are written by individuals who are considered “higher
functioning” or who would have previously been diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome. Perhaps
most importantly, the majority of the autobiographies are written by adults, thus offering a
window into adult functioning and experience that is largely absent in the scientific and
psychoanalytic literature.
For my study, I made use of published autobiographical material in order to explore the
lived experience of autism as it is articulated by the authors. I chose to use published
autobiographies for my data set as I believe they offer an excellent resource for understanding
autistic experience. Unlike therapy cases, which are implicitly guided by the therapist and in line
with an already established treatment method, autobiographies articulate experiences that the
author believes to be relevant to his or her identity as an autistic adult.
In order for any treatment to be effective, or for any theory about a diagnostic or
structural position to have any credence, the relationship between theory and the patient’s
experience has to be articulated. And this is precisely what is missing in the literature on autism.
While there is an abundance of information of the experience of families, educators, and
treatment providers, there is little research on the lived experience of autistic adults. Published
autobiographies offer a rich description of the world of the autistic adult that is relevant for
psychological theorization of the disorder.
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Research Method
The method consists of three parts. The first is a phenomenological approach that works
to uncover the thematic elements present in the autobiographies. The second is a psychoanalytic
interpretive framework that locates the structural elements of a Lacanian diagnostic category
within the autobiographical material. And the third is a comparative analysis that will seek to
identify commonalities and differences between the phenomenological and psychoanalytic
interpretive approaches. The results of the analyses are explored in detail in the discussion,
which addresses the various elements that emerge in the phenomenological and psychoanalytic
analysis, the implications for treatment within mainstream and psychoanalytic approaches, and
the contribution of critical autism studies and insights from the neurodiversity movement in
further elucidating the lived experience and treatment needs of individuals on the autism
spectrum.
Data
I analyzed four published autobiographies of adults with high-functioning autism spectrum
disorders as my data set. I used the following set of criteria for selection of autobiographical
material. First, I used only autobiographies written by autistic adults. Second, the autobiography
had to be explicitly focused on the experience of autism. And, third, the autobiography had to
include information about both childhood and adult experiences so as to provide an overview of
the history of interpersonal relationships and social functioning.
IPA Analysis
I used a phenomenological approach for the first step of my method. My approach draws largely
from the Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) methodology, although I adapted it to
accommodate my particular data set. While IPA is typically utilized as an approach to interview
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data, its focus on a particular kind of experiential data was relevant to the type of analysis that I
was interested in pursuing. It is an idiographic, hermeneutic approach that seeks to uncover
individual experiences in their meaning-making context. According to Smith, Flowers, and
Larkin (2009), IPA can be used to analyze data other than interview protocols in the event that
the method of data collection allows for the “participants to offer a rich, detailed, first-person
account of their experiences” (p. 56). Rich data is gathered by allowing participants “an
opportunity to tell their stories, to speak freely and reflectively, and to develop their ideas and
express their concerns at some length.” (p. 56). Published autobiographies certainly meet these
criteria, as the texts were created by the authors for the purpose of narrating important life events
and experiences.
There are, however, two differences between using published autobiographies and
interview data that are important to note. First, using published works rather than in-person
interviews means a lack of actual dialogue between the author and the researcher. Smith,
Flowers, and Larkin point out that an interview format allows researchers to clarify issues and
seek additional information, which is an opportunity that is missing with published accounts.
Autobiographies do not allow direct collaboration with the researcher and, as such, foreclose on
the possibility for clarification as well as the possibility for deeper or more nuanced attention to
specific details that may be relevant to the research question. On the other hand, autobiographies
offer a wider view than one could typically acquire from an interview, or even a set of
interviews. Autobiographies often provide information that covers a large span of time and that
focus in on experiences that the author, rather than the researcher, deems important. For this
reason, despite the limitation on potential dialogue, autobiographies are well suited for this
project.
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A second difference between published autobiographies and interview data lies in the
distinct forms of mediation. With interview data it is always the case that the material is
collaborative and, in many ways, constructed between the interviewer and participant throughout
the course of the interview and that the record produced is a transcript of this interaction, rather
than a polished or coherent narrative. The flow of questions, answers, clarification, etc. produces
a text that is obviously and clearly mediated – the text or transcript betrays the presence of the
interviewer as interlocutor. Autobiographical texts are purposefully clean, appearing to represent
only one voice when, in fact, the publishing process itself requires the presence of several
intermediaries- publishers, editors, reviewers, etc., all of whom may also have a voice in the
construction of the narrative. Additionally, one has to consider the ways that the choice to
publish autobiographical material may itself be reflective of important cultural and political
voices that can impact the telling of the author’s story. The question of mediation is an
important and complicated one for this data set and it will be addressed in more detail in the
discussion.
Although my data set may differ some from typical interview data used by IPA
researchers, the IPA process itself is well suited to provide a rich description of the important
themes in the autobiographical works. I followed relatively closely the IPA process for analysis
outlined by Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009, pp. 82-107). The following is a brief outline of
the process of data analysis:
1. I worked with one autobiography at a time and moved on to the next when I was finished
with the entire IPA analysis.
2. I first read through the autobiography several times as a way of “entering the [author’s]
world” (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p.2). This part of the process was about gaining
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familiarity with the material contained in the text and beginning to develop some initial
impressions about the content of the work.
3. I did a loose textual analysis, or “exploratory commenting” (p.90). As Smith and Osborn
(2003) note, this part of the analysis allows the researcher to comment on what is initially
striking in the text. The exploratory commenting may take the form of paraphrases,
noted impressions, linguistic idiosyncrasies, as well as preliminary interpretations (p. 67).
The purpose of this part of the analysis was to produce a commentary on the text that
addresses descriptive, linguistic, and conceptual elements of the narrative that can later be
used to identify themes.
4. I shifted the focus from the text of the autobiography to the exploratory notes, referring
back to the text for specific information or clarification as needed. Using the exploratory
notes, I worked to identify emergent themes, which are meant to capture an
understanding of the aspects of the participant’s experience that were identified as
centrally important.
5. Once I identified and labeled emergent themes, I began to look for the ways that those
themes were connected or the ways that similar themes clustered together. I looked for
patterns and relationships between thematic elements in an attempt to develop a sense of
the ways that themes were interconnected within the author’s experience.
6. I completed steps one through five for each autobiography and then looked for patterns
across cases. During this step, I looked for common themes and connections between
the autobiographies. I compiled a table (see p. 86) for the group that showed common
themes, demonstrating how some themes were nested within or connected to larger
themes.
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7. As a final step, I wrote a descriptive account of the emergent themes across
autobiographies. The descriptive account was written according to thematic headings and
included relevant examples from the autobiographies to illustrate themes.
Psychoanalytic Analysis
Following the IPA analysis, I returned to the autobiographical texts in order to do a Lacanian
psychoanalytic analysis. The purpose of this analysis was to address the question of structural
position in cases of autism. Although I was not following any specific methodological approach
for this portion of the analysis, I was attempting to utilize a psychoanalytic lens, rather than a
phenomenological one, as I read through the autobiographies. Using a ‘psychoanalytic lens’ has
the potential to mean many things and refers just as much to the way of seeing as it does to what
is seen, or even looked for. In the discussion section of the dissertation, I address in more detail
the ethical and practical complexities of utilizing psychoanalysis in its status as both a clinical
position and as a research methodology. However, for the purposes of identifying and discussing
structural elements of a diagnosis, which rely on conceptual and theoretical categories, it was
important to utilize a research approach that was able to explore both experiential and theoretical
elements in the autobiographies. As such, the intent of the psychoanalytic analysis was to pull
out instances in the text that illustrate typical Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts so as to be able
to discuss the whether the accounts of autistic experience meet the Lacanian diagnostic criteria
for psychosis. In order to accomplish the analysis, I followed these steps:
1. I developed a list of Lacanian concepts relevant to issues of diagnosis with accompanying
definitions.
2. I again worked with one autobiographical text at a time and moved to the next when I
completed the psychoanalytic analysis. I read through the text and commented on the
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presence of instances, enactments, conversations, etc. that appeared to be illustrative of a
given concept.
3. Much like in the IPA process, I then shifted my focus to my notes to identify emerging
themes within each concept.
4. Once I identified and organized themes within each concept, I focused on identifying the
relationships between and across concepts, noting both areas of convergence and
divergence. The lines that separate one psychoanalytic concept from another are not
rigid, and although I had to separate them in some way in order to perform the initial
analysis, I made an effort to indicate the ways that the conceptual themes bled into or
implicated each other. In order to make this clearer, the psychoanalytic analysis is
organized by author rather than by theme or conceptual category.
5. I wrote a descriptive account of the conceptual themes within each autobiography. The
descriptive accounts were written according to conceptual headings and provide relevant
examples from the text as illustration. Each account also includes a short summary
discussing the conceptual elements in each case and how they point to a particular
structural position.
6. As a final step, after completing steps one through five for each autobiography, I then
compared concepts across cases. I compiled both a group summary and table (see p. 224)
that summarizes and compares conceptual themes across autobiographies.
Comparative analysis
As a last step to the method, I compared and contrasted the results from the IPA analysis and the
results from the psychoanalytic analysis, noting areas of convergence and divergence.
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The Authors and their Texts
A. Wendy Lawson, Life Behind Glass: A Personal Account of Autism Spectrum Disorder (1998).
Wendy was diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome at the age of 42.
B. John Elder Robison, Look Me in the Eye: My Life with Asperger’s (2007). John was
diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome at the age of 40.
C. Jesse A. Saperstein, Atypical: Life with Asperger’s in 20⅓ Chapters (2010). Jesse was
diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome at the beginning of high school.
D. Jen Birch, Congratulations! It’s Asperger’s Syndrome (2003). Jen was diagnosed with
Asperger’s Syndrome at age 43.
IPA Analysis
Table of Themes
A. Being an Outsider
1. Mistreatment prompts confusion and withdrawal
2. Feeling deeply misunderstood
3. Even therapists don’t “understand”
B. Dealing with Emotions
1. Emotional experiences are not easily symbolized
a. Stress makes everything worse
2. Learning empathy
3. Finding emotional safety through sameness
C. Communication Problems = Relationship Problems
D. Withdrawal from the World
E. Issues of the Self: Identity and Diagnosis
F. The Strengths and Limitations of Asperger’s Syndrome
G. Communicative Style and the Experience of One Neurotypical
Narrative Description
The following is a narrative description of the clustered themes that emerged during the IPA
analysis. For ease of reading and to ensure that each author’s experiences are represented, I have
organized each theme by presenting an overview and interpretation of the theme as it appeared
across narratives, followed by a description of the ways the theme showed up in each author’s
account.
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Being an outsider.
Mistreatment prompts confusion and withdrawal. Each author talked about the
experience of being bullied or rejected in childhood as a result of his or her differences from
other children. The intensity of the mistreatment varied, but not one of the authors escaped
ridicule or mean-spirited rejection during his or her school years. As adults, mistreatment
continued for most but showed up in less direct ways, such as through manipulation and
exclusion. For the women authors, in particular, there was a theme of sexual manipulation and
abuse that played on the social vulnerabilities of the women. For all of the authors, the
experiences of mistreatment and rejection, in childhood and adulthood, had lasting impacts on
their sense of safety and desire to engage with others.
It is difficult to tease out all of the ways that bullying and other forms of mistreatment
impacted the authors as those experiences span decades and are interwoven with issues of self
and the individual wants and needs of each author. It is fair to say, however, that for all of them
being mistreated is experienced in the context of a being unable to fit in or to find a ‘safe’ place.
The authors discuss experiencing others as rejecting, cruel, and distant, while simultaneously
experiencing themselves as outsiders who are helpless, confused, and, sometimes, angry. For
many of the authors, the experiences of mistreatment often prompted partial or complete
withdrawal from social situations and relationships and often had negative psychological
consequences, both in the short and long term.
Wendy experienced extreme bullying at school during childhood and was often the target
of ridicule and pranks from the students in her class. She experienced the interpersonal space in
general as confusing, the intimacy and complexity of relating to others was alien to her in her
insular world. She notes,
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…school was fraught with other problems. The biggest difficulty was relating to the
other students. They soon tired of my repetitive stories and apparent lack of sensitivity to
their needs. Throughout my school life I was spat at, kicked, mocked, and terrorized, and
when I was teased or laughed at, it seemed best to pretend not to notice. I was totally
unaware of the effect I had on other people or of their responses towards me. Intimacy
and genuine care frightened me because I could not understand what they meant.” (p. 56)
Wendy describes her relationship to the other children almost as if she is literally, as the title of
her book suggests, behind glass, watching from somewhere else, disconnected from the
interpersonal sphere of meaning and relating that was at play in the bullying. She notes that the
experiences of bullying left her feeling intimidated and insecure, uncertain of why things were
happening or what would come next.
In addition to the mistreatment at school, as a 9 year old Wendy was raped repeatedly by
an adult man in her town. She describes the scene of going with him to his home as one where
she, as the child, responded to the demand of the adult – she did what she had been taught to do,
what the rules told her was the correct response. Again, she describes a feeling of confusion,
rather than fear, following the assault and a desire to leave that was frustrated by her inability to
put the request into language. Because she lacked the ability to understand the complexity of a
situation that differed from the rule she learned (children do what adults tell them), she became
an easy target for repeated abuse by this man. For Wendy, the interpersonal space is experienced
as somewhat alien or enigmatic. She is confused by the other, uncertain what to expect, and has
recourse only to the few explicit rules of interpersonal communication that she has been taught,
which do not allow her to understand or interpret the implicit aspects of human language.
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As a teenager and an adult, Wendy noted an increased desire to make friends, but again
experienced repeated rejections in her attempts to connect with others. For her, the effect of so
many years of rejection and mistreatment shows up in her characterizations of relationships as
“risks” – risks that take a gamble on the possibility of rejection and emotional pain. It also shows
up in the pull she feels to withdraw into her own world, where she is guaranteed a sense of safety
that is not always available in the world she shares with others.
For John, the experience of rejection began in early childhood and continued throughout
high school, although he notes that the experiences waxed and waned as his social abilities
evolved. He describes his struggles as a young child, desperate to make friends:
All my attempts to make a friend had failed. I was a failure. I began to cry. Alone in the
corner of the playground, I sobbed and smashed the toy truck into the ground again and
again and again, until my hands hurt too much to do it anymore.
At the end of recess, I was still there, sitting by myself. Staring into the dirt. Too
humiliated to face the other kids. Why don’t they like me? What’s wrong with me?
(Robison, 2007, p. 10)
John worked hard to figure out the correct way to interact with the other children in order to
make friends, but his attempts often failed leaving him confused, lonely, and angry. John
equated his struggles to connect with other children with his inability to engage empathetically
with others – he worked on the assumption that other children were like him, would like and
appreciate the same things he did. We see John reaching out, desiring connection, but ultimately
misunderstanding the other. He was frequently both rejected and taunted for his genuine efforts
to connect with others. He interpreted the rejections he experienced at the hands of the other
children as indicating that there was something wrong with him and, this sense was confirmed by
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many of the adults in his life. In a different type of mistreatment, teachers, therapists, and other
adults referred to him as damaged, defective, and a sociopath. This type of name calling and
rejection by both adults and peers led John to feel insecure around others and he talked about
choosing to seek solace in machines – to lose himself in the world of objects, which he was able
to understand, rather than the word of people, which was both confusing and harsh. Unlike
Wendy, however, John talks about the ways that the bullying, rejection, and mistreatment he
experienced ultimately led to an intense anger that prompted some acting out behaviors in his
adolescence and early adulthood. He says, “Any child will tell you that even the kindest and
gentlest of dogs will bite if you yank its ears and pull its tail long enough. There is a dark side to
Asperger’s, and it comes from our childhood dealings with people who do not treat us the way
they would like to be treated” (p. 69). As a result of years of mistreatment, John became skilled
at pranks that placed him in control of events and, often, involved the mistreatment of others.
John describes many instances of his pranks, even admitting that many took on a “nasty edge”
(p. 76), but perhaps most notably in the text is the clear sense of enjoyment and power he feels as
a result of his actions. Throughout his descriptions of his pranks, you get the sense that he is
driven by anger, but also by a desire for revenge and, in some ways, a desire for recognition.
Jesse tells a similar tale of bullying and rejection, withdrawal and anger throughout his
text. For him, bullying also began in early childhood and continued into adulthood. He
describes being ridiculed by his peers, being purposefully excluded, and being physically
assaulted as a result of his differences. In one particularly malicious event, teenagers from his
school staged an elaborate 6-month long online scenario to trick him into believing that he was in
a relationship with a girl he was attracted to. In that instance, as with other instances of
bullying, Jesse’s response to the bullying was to withdraw into isolation, becoming depressed
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and harboring thoughts of hurting himself or others. Similar to John’s experience, Jesse had
many encounters with teachers and other adults who blamed him for causing the bullying,
leaving him feeling unprotected and often uncertain about how to proceed or how to create a
safer social environment.
Jesse’s response to bullying and rejection, like John’s is often a mix of withdrawal and
anger. He notes relying on television and his special interests to “buffer the chronic isolation”
(Saperstein, 2010, p. 31). Jesse’s description of his withdrawal throughout the book, however, is
tinged with depression and a sense of failure. Unlike John and Wendy, he does not seem able to
become completely absorbed in other activities or withdraw completely into a world of sensory
stimulation. Instead, for Jesse, the bullying, rejection, and mistreatment leads towards an
isolation that appears to feel more like a prison than an escape. Although he clearly feels angry
about his mistreatment and, on occasion, fights back, his retaliation most often finds its outlet in
revenge fantasies rather than in action. But, unlike John or Wendy, Jesse talks at length in his
book about his attempts to understand his tormentors and to make sense of the actions of the
bullies and others who mistreat or reject him. His attempts to understand seem to be one way that
he works to make sense of his experiences of mistreatment but they also come across as an
attempt to find connection and commonality with others – even others that are purposefully
hurtful.
Jen’s experience with bullying in childhood is less easy to explore as she devotes little
time to descriptions of those experiences in her book. She notes early on in the book that she has
“been bullied and taken advantage of by various persons during my life” (Birch, 2003, p. 68), but
she does not elaborate much on that statement. What is clear from her recounting of her school
years is that her apparent lack of social relationships and interactions made her an easy target for
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aggressive and/or manipulative friendships, but that she was otherwise largely isolated. She
described herself as someone who “involuntarily attracted” “bullying and manipulative types”
who would later try to “dominate” her” (p. 74), and it was attempts at domination that were the
primary vehicle for her experiences of mistreatment throughout adulthood. This type of bullying
occurred for her in friendships, romantic relationships, with therapists, and at work. She often
stayed in these relationships for extended periods of time, suffering from escalating abuse and
mistreatment.
For example, after going to visit a man she met through a personal ad, she finds herself
trapped in his home, forced to sleep on the floor with his dogs, and manipulated into giving him
all of her money. Additionally, he was sexually abusive towards her. Jen’s experience with this
man is an extreme example, but one similar in tone to many of her other romantic encounters
where she is taken advantage of, feels trapped, but lacks the skills to leave or make meaningful
changes to her situation. Jen seems to experience these events foremost in terms of confusion –
she does not understand both what is happening and what is supposed to happen. Her difficulty
in making sense of the situation leaves her feeling helpless to change it. She says:
The problem was, and is, not simply one of being too cowardly to stick up for my own
rights: I sometimes did protest, and did try to break free, but the more dominant
individual knew how to thwart my attempts, how to “run rings around me.”…my timidity
was only part of the issue. The other part was that I genuinely did not have the social
know-how to understand what was going on and what to do about it.” (p. 73)
For Jen, in the instances where she is bullied or mistreated, she largely describes her experience
as one of confusion and anxiety. In some instances, she becomes overwhelmed by a sense of
being unable to change the situation and acts out by punching or otherwise hurting herself. In
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those moments, Jen’s description of her internal state suggests that her acts of self-aggression are
the only way she feels able to control the feelings of being overwhelmed by the other. For Jen,
the long term effect of the experiences of bullying and rejection is a felt sense that being bullied
is “normal relating” leading her to a pervasive and continuous sense of confusion and
helplessness in a variety of social situations.
Feeling deeply misunderstood. Linked with experiences of being mistreated, each
author discussed a sense of being misunderstood by others. For most of them, the experience of
being misunderstood occurred in several situations and relationships and reinforced a feeling of
being different from others. In some cases, it confirmed a sense by the author that there was
something wrong with him or her. The sense of being misunderstood, coupled with the
mistreatment described above was a major contributor to the isolation and loneliness that each
author experienced.
In my reading of the autobiographies the theme of feeling misunderstood wove its way
through each narrative and, even when not explicitly addressed, served as a background to a
profound array of negative and devaluing experiences with others. For all of the authors, being
misunderstood is experienced in the context of being identified as different or defective in some
way. Each of the authors experienced others as judging them, often harshly, and as rejecting
them from participation in the social world. For most of the authors, the experience of being
misunderstood contributed to a sense of being different and to isolation and loneliness that
became very difficult to overcome, sometimes leading to depression and suicidality. For many
of the authors, the experience of being misunderstood changed how they experienced themselves
– leading to, as Jen called them, “existential issues” in adulthood.
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For Wendy, feeling misunderstood occurred both in situations where she unsuccessfully
tried to convey her lived experiences and in situations where her behavior was taken to mean
something she did not intend. She links her struggles to make her internal experiences known to
others with her own struggles to understand herself. She said, “Throughout my life I have been
unable to identify, understand and express my emotions, and so have always felt misunderstood
and alienated from those around me” (Lawson, 1998, p. i). She goes on later to describe the ways
that her sensory landscape, which is deeply captivating and emotionally rich for her, often leads
her to intensely focus on an experience that “most people” would ignore or, at least find less
captivating. Wendy’s sense of living in a different world comprised of a distinct sensory
landscape is intimately linked to her feeling of being misunderstood and isolated. Her sensory
experience, which is for her profoundly important in the construction of her sense of self, is not
something she is able to share with others. Her captivation by the sensual world is often
experienced by others as strange or non-sensical. For Wendy, the inability to share these
experiences coupled with her awareness that people find her engagement with the world
abnormal produce and maintain her sense of being misunderstood.
For John, the first experience of being misunderstood occurs in childhood when he is
criticized for not looking people in the eye when they are speaking. He describes his reasoning
for looking away – so as to better hear what is said to him without distraction – and his confusion
when his behavior is interpreted negatively. Following the confusion, he notes a profound sense
of hurt at people’s assumption that he was ‘defective’ without ever trying to figure out, or ask
him, the reasons for his behavior. He notes the effects of those experiences of being
misunderstood:
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I came to believe what people said about me, because so many said the same thing, and
the realization that I was defective hurt. I became shyer, more withdrawn. I began to
read about deviant personalities and wonder if I would one day “go bad.” Would I grow
up to be a killer? I had read that they were shifty and didn’t look people in the eye.
(Robison, 2007, p. 2)
For John, the experience of being misunderstood repeats itself throughout childhood and early
adulthood in his relationships with his parents, teachers, peers, and acquaintances. Like Wendy,
he notes a feeling of not understanding his own behavior when he was younger, leading him to
accept what others told him about himself. Also like Wendy, his sense of being misunderstood,
and labeled “defective,” leads him to withdraw, increasing his sense of isolation and loneliness.
For Jesse, the feeling of being misunderstood pervades his autobiography via his constant
pleas to the neurotypical public to give him, and others like him, “the “radical” courtesy of a
chance” (Saperstein, 2010, p. 50). For him, the experience of being misunderstood is
characterized by a sense that the other makes assumptions about his character based only on his
initial behavior. In other words, Jesse feels trapped in a perpetually negative first impression.
For Jesse, the experience seems to be linked to his sense that while some of his behaviors may be
annoying or difficult, his intentions should be considered and appreciated. Being judged based
only on negatively interpreted behaviors, prompts feelings of failure, isolation, and, ultimately,
anger. Like John, he feels not just misunderstood, but judged as defective in some way. He said,
“My bitterness towards the neurotypical public derives from a lifetime of constant rejections and
lack of chances. Their contempt for me comes from misjudging the AS as a character flaw to be
corrected” (p. 4). Jesse’s contempt for neurotypicals appears in the context of feeling chronically

95

misunderstood, which for him leads to a sense of forced isolation and a feeling that his ability to
participate in the social world is limited by forces outside his control.
For Jen, the experience of being misunderstood begins as a child in school and continues
in various ways throughout her adult life. Included in her autobiography is a short story she
wrote as a young adult, which she states is reflective of some of her experiences in childhood.
The story tells the tale of a young boy living with an Aunt and Uncle and describes a series of
events where he is repeatedly misunderstood, misjudged, and then punished, often severely. She
describes in rich detail his thinking processes and the intentions behind his actions, but in the
story he is unable to convey these to his family – in part because the rich, lived, sensory
experience is not fully captured by linguistic descriptions but also in part because his family is
uninterested in listening. For Jen, this experience of being misunderstood, and the combination
of difficulty describing her experience and the lack of interest in hearing it by the other, is
repeated many times throughout adulthood in relationships with friends, colleagues, and mental
health professionals. The sense of being misunderstood, for her, was also linked to a sense of the
precariousness of her sense of self. She describes the consequences of being misunderstood by
the therapists during an inpatient stay:
Entering the ward, as I had, with differences in cognitive processing, communication, and
many other areas, I soon realised that I was at the bottom of the world’s hierarchy. I felt
more and more powerless, and mentioned this in a group meeting. I did not want power
in order to dominate others; I wanted it simply so that I would be able to hold my own
space. I felt so annihilated in such a place that I could not achieve the feeling of simply
“being.” This rekindled existential issues as to whether, for instance, I was even actually
alive, or living in the same dimension as other people. (Birch, 2003, p. 116)
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For her, the sense of being misunderstood contributed both to a sense of isolation and to a series
of experiences of depression and mental health problems, exacerbating a pre-existing struggle
with identity and self-worth.
Even therapists don’t understand. All of the authors had experiences with mental health
professionals before they were diagnosed. Few of those interactions were considered helpful and
some, even, were experienced as harmful. For most of authors the initial interactions with
mental heath professionals led to incorrect diagnoses and, also perpetuated negative self-image.
At the times of their experiences all of the authors seemed to have accepted the views of
the professionals and came to understand themselves as flawed in some way – John as a
sociopath, Jesse as full of “negative energy,” Wendy as psychotic, and Jen as “attentionseeking.” They also all, to varying degrees, continued to identify ongoing mental health or
emotional issues that were then incorporated into the already negative self-view – perpetuating a
problematic cycle where every issue or problem faced by the author can be explained by a
personal flaw, rather than contextualized and explored. For all of the authors, the later learning
of the diagnosis led to the ability to better understand their particular struggles and their
emotional consequences (which I discuss in greater detail below). However, the initial
interactions with therapists remain critical to their stories as important to the ways that each
developed a sense of themselves prior to the diagnosis.
For all of the authors, interactions with mental health professionals prior to diagnosis
were experienced as largely negative and led to increased, rather than decreased mental health
issues. What was most striking, and consistent across narratives, was the sense of being
invalidated and labeled as flawed in the context of asking for help. Although consistent with
other experiences of being misunderstood that the authors discussed above, which led to ongoing
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problems with self-perception and isolation, being misunderstood by those with the power to
provide help not only exacerbated issues with self-perception, but resulted in the absence of any
real assistance and, often-times, the minimization or erasure of the emotional conflicts the
authors were experiencing. It is not surprising, then, that most of the authors noted a largely
negative view of psychology, psychiatry, and other helping professions16.
For Wendy, interactions with mental health professionals began as a young adult when
she suffered a breakdown resulting from stress at school. According to her description, she
became overwhelmed by fear about not being able to keep up with the demands of her nursing
program and she began suffering from hallucinations. She was hospitalized on an inpatient ward
and medicated to relieve her symptoms. She was hospitalized again, a few years later, after a
suicide attempt stemming from a depression over the status of her marriage and the loss of a
good friend. The specifics of her presenting concerns and symptoms are not completely clear
from Wendy’s writing, but she was diagnosed at least once with schizophrenia and she talks
about her depression as though it, too, was officially diagnosed. Wendy has additional
involvement with mental health professionals following the birth of her son when she was
diagnosed with post-natal depression and required to attend group therapy. Her interactions with
the mental health system are complex and varied; however, preceding every intervention is a
period of heightened stress that she feels ill-equipped to manage. In all of her descriptions of
treatment experiences, it is worth noting that Wendy does not mention ever talking about or
telling anyone how she is feeling or what her experiences have been. Instead, she discusses the

The exception to this is Wendy, who does not ever say anything either explicitly positive or
negative about her psychiatric experiences. One gets the sense from her descriptions of her
experiences in the inpatient wards and her insistence at never returning, however, that her view
of the experiences was less than positive.
16
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experiences in terms of what she was told about herself and what she was required to do. She
describes her second hospital admission:
Unfortunately, I did not know then how to find help or even what kind of help to look for.
After 14 months of marriage, I entered the institution for the second time. I was
considered to be having “another schizophrenic episode”. Completely withdrawn and
feeling I had fallen into a bottomless pit, I was placed on a program of medication. The
ward life continued around me and without me. Sucking the roof of my mouth and
rocking myself kept me sane. (Lawson, 1998, p. 76)
Wendy does not speak at length about the ways that the hospital experiences affected her, but it
seems clear from her descriptions that her interactions with the mental health system had little
impact on her day-to-day experience or her ability to manage increasing levels of stress.
Additionally, Wendy seems to feel somewhat alienated by the experience, resorting to selfstimulating activities in order to maintain her “sanity” and sense of self. For example, Wendy
tells herself after her last hospital admission, “Never again, never again will this happen to me. If
they think I am mad, then I must prove them wrong” (p. 77).
For John, experiences with therapists began in early childhood, during a time when his
mother became concerned about his “inappropriate [facial] expressions” (Robison, 2007, p. 29).
John’s initial interactions with mental health professionals were largely invalidating and hurtful.
He notes, “Mostly, they made me feel worse than I already did, dwelling on my so-called evil
and sociopathic thoughts” (p. 30); “[r]ather than take a close and sympathetic look at me, it
proved easier and less controversial for professionals to say I was just lazy, or angry, or defiant.
But none of those words led to a solution for my problems” (p. 90). His experiences in therapy,
rather than helping him, seemed to confirm some of the negative characterizations of his teachers
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and peers. As with many other people in his life, John’s interactions with mental health
professionals led to a sense of being misunderstood as well as contributing to a sense of himself
as “defective” or broken in some way.
For Jesse, early experiences with psychotherapists followed a similar pattern where he
was assumed to have characterological problems. Jesse devotes an entire chapter to his thoughts
on and experiences in therapy. As the chapter title, “Psychobabble,” suggests, his experience of
the helping professionals was often less than helpful, although there is an important tension in his
descriptions between psychology as useless and potentially harmful and psychologists as
sometimes both helpful and necessary.17 For Jesse, much like for John, his initial interactions
with therapy lead to characterizations of his behaviors as personality defects. It seems from his
description that Jesse only met with one therapist during childhood, a psychologist, but
continued to see him for several years. Jesse notes that his therapist characterized his behavior as
related to “negative energy.” It is unclear if the therapist made any specific interventions or used
any specific techniques in the treatment, and Jesse largely suggests that he was not inclined to
make any behavioral changes as the result of his therapy. However Jesse does indicate some
benefit from the therapy. He notes, “I visited the psychologist almost every Tuesday for five
years, and the anemic office plants are etched in my memory. These visits were extremely
necessary during transitional periods, when the dark side of Asperger’s erupted with a
vengeance” (Saperstein, 2010, p. 99). Again, however, Jesse provides little information about

Although not directly relevant to Jesse’s lived experience of therapy, his ambivalence towards
the helping professions and professionals apparent in this chapter is very nicely captured in his
pronouncement, “I have never actually believed in psychotherapy and am convinced the majority
of professionals need a couple dozen sessions themselves” (p. 95). While suggesting that
psychotherapy is not worth believing in and that psychotherapists themselves are crazy, he is
simultaneously suggesting that psychotherapy would be a beneficial treatment for the therapists.
17
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what made therapy necessary during transitional periods and in what way it was helpful for him.
He does suggest that therapy was necessary during one transitional period where he was
struggling with self-injury and inappropriate sexual behavior, leading us to believe that the
therapy was perhaps somewhat helpful to Jesse in terms of behavioral changes (although how is
completely unknown).
Jesse’ thoughts about therapy, which he spends much more time discussing in this
chapter, suggest that it should focus largely on teaching compromise and acceptance. His
thoughts perhaps betray something of his experience, as he seems to understand therapy as
devoted to forcing changes rather than acknowledging unique struggles and finding reasonable
workarounds and solutions.
For Jen, like the other authors, therapy was largely a negative and devaluing experience.
Jen describes several experiences of seeking mental health care during periods when she was
feeling emotionally overwhelmed. She sought outpatient treatment several times, with varying
success, and was hospitalized on an inpatient ward on three occasions. She described those
experiences as largely unhelpful because it felt like no one was interested in listening to her or
she was made to feel that her personal experience wasn’t worth understanding. Her attempts at
explaining her needs and limitations were taken as “attention-seeking” behavior and routinely
punished. She describes her longest inpatient stay:
Feeling hounded, every day, because I was communicating differently from others – and,
moreover, because my differences were responded to as though they were wrong and
undesirable – I misguidedly put all my efforts into learning to speak as other people did
(Birch, 2003, p. 128)
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Jen’s experiences with the “helping” profession were, overall, largely experienced as
invalidating and, in some instances, harmful. She describes the outcome of her inpatient
admission, “As I could not, therefore, obtain the understanding and help which I needed, I was
on a downhill slide into depression and other mental health problems, perpetuated and
compounded by my “farm ward” admission” (p. 129-130). Jen’s other experiences when
attempting to get help are all similar, leading her to feel ongoing despair and, in at least one
instance, worsening depression that lead to suicidality. Additionally, Jen notes that being
exposed to that type of mistreatment during what was meant to be therapy led her to develop the
belief that being bullied and “overpowered” was “normal relating” (p. 128) – leading to
increased difficulties developing and maintaining desirable relationships.
Dealing with emotions.
Emotional experiences are not easily symbolized. Learning to acknowledge and manage
felt emotion showed up as a struggle for all of the authors, although the extent and type of the
perceived difficulty varied widely between individuals. For some authors, the process of
learning how to speak about emotions, or translate a felt sensation into meaningful language, was
by far the biggest hurdle. For others emotional struggles showed up in the form of
overwhelming physical sensations that led to acting out behaviors. While still for others, the
absence of expressed emotion is linked to both physical and interpersonal problems.
For all of the authors, the emotional world is difficult to manage. For Wendy and Jen,
emotions are often experienced as overwhelming and unclear, leading to an experience of
themselves as “unable to cope.” For John and Jesse, anger serves as the primary and most
comfortable vehicle of emotional expression, while other parts of emotional life provoke
detachment. For all of the authors, emotional life seems to border on overwhelming in both a
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mental and physical way and with many of the authors we see this lived out through the eruption
of acting out behaviors. As is often the case with acting out, one can assume that these behaviors
occur in the context of the absence of other coping skills – particularly, for these authors, an
inability to participate in the meaning-making aspects of emotional expression.
Wendy’s struggles with emotions and emotional management seem to be the most
profound. The language that Wendy uses to talk about emotions betrays a sometimes
overwhelming and undifferentiated experience. Early in her book she says:
I find emotions interchangeable and confusing. Growing up, I was not able to distinguish
between anger, fear, anxiety, frustration, or disappointment…Emotions are not concrete
structures that can be seen, held, and organised. They can be likened to being locked in a
maze that has no exit: all paths look the same and lead to the same place. (Lawson, 1998,
p. 8)
For Wendy, for most of her life, it seems that emotions were experienced almost exclusively in
the body and lacked symbolization and meaning in language. She described emotions as either
“comfortable” or “uncomfortable,” rather than as differentiated into distinctive states
representing different meanings. This lack of meaning-making related to her emotional
experiences seems to have contributed to both her general sense of confusion about the world
and her tendency towards avoidance and fear based responses. It also makes it difficult for her to
understand and relate to the emotions of others.
Rather than symbolize her emotions via language, which would produce meaning that
could be shared with others, Wendy links her emotional experiences to objects and sensory
stimuli in the environment. For her, sensory experiences, particularly color and sound, are
profoundly emotional, helping her to “connect” to “life and to feelings” (p. 2). And, objects help
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her to hold on to a sense of constancy during emotionally difficult situations – they contain the
emotion for her in a similar way that naming does for others. Through her own unique method,
she is able to manage the sometimes overwhelming physical experience of emotion, but she is
unable to participate fully in the shared meaning-making process of managing emotions
symbolically. Although, on the one hand, Wendy’s personal process for managing emotions
seems to work for her most of the time, it separates her in some important ways from connecting
to others with whom she does not share a common emotional language.
In his book, John talks directly about emotions. However, he rarely describes his
emotional states with any detail, he merely names them and moves on. What is evident in the
women’s autobiographies that is largely lacking in both John’s and Jesse’s is an overt struggle to
manage emotions, to name them, and to make sense of them. For John, there is less of an
explicit issue with emotional management in his text. For him we see, instead, a learned
detachment that, although helpful to him in the short-term, seems to underlie some difficulties
with emotional connection that he alludes to later in the book. In sharing an experience of
wanting to fit in with co-workers, he describes his emotional withdrawal, “I watched it all with
the same detachment I had learned to feel when I was excluded from playing with kid packs
when I was five. No one made fun of me, but I still could not integrate myself into the groups
around me. I wanted to make friends, but I didn’t want to engage in the activities I saw them
doing. So I just watched” (Robison, 2007, p. 175). It seems that, for John, the ability to
emotionally detach allows him the potential to manage negative feelings such as loneliness and
isolation. And it is those types of negative feelings – sadness, hurt, loneliness, etc. – that John
tends to avoid exploring in his book.
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However, in John’s story, there is a strong thread of anger, largely anger at being
mistreated and misunderstood, that he does not shy away from and that drives a number of
behaviors. The sadness and shame he mentions early on in relation to his social isolation turns
into anger in his adolescence and leads to a number of acting out behaviors, largely in terms of
pranks he plays on unsuspecting children and adults. For him, the pranks seem to function as a
way for him to express his anger through actions rather than through words. It is unclear if he
was able to make the link between his acting out behaviors and his anger at the time, but he does
make the link in the book, suggesting a learned awareness of his emotional states and the effects
of emotions on his behavior. And, he does note later in the book that his ability to talk about and
deal with emotions has evolved over the course of his life, suggesting that he did struggle with
emotional expression previously. He says, “Papers I wrote back then are flat and devoid of
inflection or emotion. I didn’t write about my feelings because I didn’t understand them. Today,
my greater insight into my emotional life has allowed me to express it, both verbally and on
paper” (p. 209). And John is able to see some clear benefit to his improved emotional facility:
No one would have looked at me thirty years ago and foreseen that I’d have the social
skills I have today, or the ability to express the emotions, thoughts, and feelings you read
in this book. I would never have predicted it either…My life today is immeasurably
happier, richer, and fuller as a result of my brain’s continuing development. (p. 209-210)
Similar to John’s, Jesse’s narrative is strong on anger (and a felt sense of injustice) and
light on exploration of other aspects of his emotional life. In Jesse’s narrative there is a lack of
discussion or sharing of emotions or emotional life not related to his Asperger’s diagnosis.
However, he does seem comfortable sharing the emotions he feels in connection to his diagnosis
– being frustrated by limitations, being angry at the bullying and isolation, and feeling ashamed
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about social blunders. He seems to be largely aware of these feelings and able to identify them.
That said, particularly when it comes to anger, one gets the sense that his experience of the
emotion sometimes exceeds his capacity to make sense of or deal with it. There is an
undercurrent of anger and resentment throughout his autobiography that, even though he
acknowledges these feelings, borders on overwhelming. Because of the overwhelming aspects
of the emotion, we see in Jesse a tendency towards acting out, depression, and, in at least one
case, suicidality, as a result of his difficulty working through emotionally fraught situations and
transitions. In one example, Jesse describes his behavioral choices while trying to manage an
emotionally and physically taxing work environment:
Some nights were tolerable because I listened to a five-disk collection of classic Disney
while the 720 minutes melted away. Other nights were miserable….causing me to spout
a dissonance of gibberish and obscenities. (“Fricking, gimlet-eyed, Scotchguard,
motherfucking douche bag!”). My coworkers sometimes caught me hitting myself,
jumping up and down, or mumbling nonsense. Most of the time, they even gave me an
undeserved break when I neglected bathing during the precious hour and a half of free
time between sleeping and rushing back to work. Not only did I smell like rancid Stilton
cheese, but I also neglected to change my clothes 90 percent of the time. (Saperstein,
2010, p. 148)
In this example, Jesse acts out his dissatisfaction, anger, and frustration, which is a theme for him
throughout his autobiography. The acting out seems to allow him some release from the emotion,
at least in the immediate experience, but what he lacks is the ability to handle to emotion in a
way that feels productive to him.
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Linked to his acting out, Jesse’s talks about difficulties with “letting go” of emotions and
resentments and it seems that this particular difficulty in letting go impacts his emotional
experience in some significant ways. Specifically, Jesse seems to understand “letting go” as
giving up or giving in – and he spends some time in his text sharing his anger at people who have
suggested that he “let go.” This points to what seems to be Jesse’s biggest emotional hurdle –
once an emotional state becomes overwhelming, it sticks around, even after the acting out
episodes have ceased. What Jesse doesn’t address, and what seems to underlie some of his
perceived problems with emotional management, is an idea of being able to let something go
after having worked through it. In other words, he seems to lack a vehicle for managing
emotions that would allow him to move on from them.
Like Wendy, Jen’s struggle with emotions seems to be largely related to managing
emotions that quickly become overwhelming and, in some instances, interpreting the cause of
negative emotions. Jen’s several interactions with the mental health system betray her difficulty
with emotional management and a tendency towards becoming overwhelmed and “unable to
cope” (Birch, 2003, p. 123). For her it seems that fear and anxiety play a large role in her
emotional life and are often at play for her during times when she feels unable to cope. Like
Jesse, she notes a struggle to ‘let go’ of emotions once they occur. She says, “Once a feeling (e.g.
pain or fear) is in the mind, it is an extremely long and difficult process to get it out again. It gets
stuck in there, replaying over and over, sometimes for life” (p. 207.)
Like many of the other authors, once an emotional experience becomes overwhelming,
Jen sometimes resort to acting-out behaviors as a primary coping mechanism. For Jen, these
behaviors include tantrums, self-injury, and quitting (e.g. quitting school, swimming lessons, etc.
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as a way to manage fear/anxiety). Like Wendy, her acting-out behaviors serve as a message that
indicates ‘too much!’ in the absence of an ability to identify and find a resolution to the situation.
Stress makes everything worse. Because emotional management is already a source of
difficulty for the authors, periods of stress tend to exacerbate both emotional struggles and other
symptoms related to AS. The problems faced by the authors vary by individual; however, there
is a clear theme of stress as a precursor for increased difficulties with functioning. For all of the
authors, stress exacerbates already existing struggles with emotional management leading to
additional physical and mental health problems. For John and Jen, stress situations are lived as
‘sickening’- literally causing them to suffer from physical distress. For Wendy and Jesse,
stressful situations are lived as a kind of mental overload, leading to a loss control over one’s
self. For Wendy, Jesse, and Jen, the stressful world is lived as an overload without outlet or
solution.
Like many of the authors, Wendy’s felt difficulty understanding and containing her
emotions make it difficult for her to cope during times of high or chronic stress. For Wendy,
especially during early adulthood, her inpatient and outpatient psychiatric admissions were
always precipitated by periods of stress. For Wendy stress is experienced as situations of intense
confusion, heightened or overwhelming emotion, and a felt sense of threat and resulting
helplessness. For her, stress is the result of those situations in which she lacks the skills to
adequately deal with or resolve. For example, prior to her first hospitalization, during a time of
family discord, she was also struggling with a shift in her nursing education from a student
position to a position with more authority. Her felt lack of skills to manage both her emotional
life and the pragmatics associated with a role change, left her in a state of psychological distress
and unable to cope. She describes that experience:
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In spite of the family discord, for the first few months I seemed to succeed with the
demands of the student nursing course. Then responsibility loomed. My success had
been in my ability to enter into the routine of ward life – this was something I could do
well. Of course, this didn’t last – decisions were required to be made and I was required
to make them! I found myself forgetting the instructions I was given, or getting them
confused. I still didn’t sleep well and in the darkness lived all sorts of monsters.
I was afraid: afraid to be around people, afraid of not being able to keep up the
performance. I crashed! (Lawson, 1998, p. 66)
Wendy’s crash under the stress resulting from fear and a felt sense of helplessness foreshadowed
other crashes she would experience when faced with stresses related to role changes and
relationship issues. Largely, Wendy seems to experience the stressful situations as unresolvable,
or herself as confused and unable to resolve them, leading quickly to psychological distress.
Although less severe than Wendy, John too experiencing difficulty coping during times
of stress. For John, like Wendy, stress appears in the context of situations where he feels
helpless. For John, however, the majority of the stressful situations that he describes involve an
experience of increasing frustration at how he is treated and, particularly in childhood, a sense of
being ineffective in changing either himself or his situation. One of the reasons he notes for
dropping out of high school was the exacerbation of some of his motor symptoms resulting from
the combination of stress from an abusive home environment and from feeling harassed at school
– both situations where he was treated unfairly and felt unable to make lasting changes. Later,
John explicitly talks about the effects of stress on his physical health and notes that, during a
particularly stressful time in his career, he was diagnosed with asthma:
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I had come to accept what my annual performance reviews said. I was not a team-player.
I had trouble communicating with people. I was inconsiderate. I was rude. I was smart
and creative, yes, but I was a misfit.
I was thoroughly sick of all the criticism. I was sick of life. Literally. I had come
down with asthma, and attacks were sending me to the emergency room every few
months. I hated to get up and face another day at work. I knew what I needed to do. I
needed to stop forcing myself to fit into something I could never be a part of. A big
company. A group. A team. (Robison, 2007, p. 205)
Although John clearly experiences stress-related illness, what is also clear from this passage is
that he also seems equipped to eventually realize the impact of stress and make choices to lessen
it. So that, while there is clear exacerbation with stress, John does not seem to suffer from the
types of acting out behaviors that some of the other authors struggle with.
For Jesse, periods of stress can lead to significant emotional distress. For Jesse, stress is
experienced both in the context of unpredictability and in the context of loss. In situations where
stress is acute and with a clear trigger, he suffers from acting out episodes that occasionally lead
to self harm. He describes a situation during college when he thought he had lost his DVD
collection:
…I was in uncontrollable hysterics.
I ran through the house slapping the staircase wall and even hitting myself a couple of
times. My neck muscles emitted a crackling snap like my grandfather’s arthritic knees
when rising from an orthopedic chair. For the next week I would pay a terrible price
when the simple act of checking my blind spot while driving would produce sharp pain.
My temper tantrum escalated as my parents frantically searched for the DVD collection.
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Nothing else could diffuse the escalating tantrum other than a possible fainting spell.
(Saperstein, 2010, p. 27)
In this situation, Jesse describes an experience of becoming so overwhelmed that he loses control
over his behavior. The stress, in this situation, is linked to sudden loss. He talks about the
experience in terms of it feeling like “the end of the world” – a profound loss that he clearly
experiences as taking over both his mental and physical processes. He never names an emotion
or talks about what the loss meant for him emotionally– he frames it entirely in terms of a
“temper tantrum,” leading to a description of his behavior rather than his emotional state. For
Jesse, the stress of the unpredictable is an assault on his ability to cope.
In stressful situations where the stressor is less direct, Jesse also struggles with emotional
management, although less with “temper tantrums” and more with issues of depression, although
self-injury still plays a role. For Jesse, it seems that the transitional spaces – spaces that follow
the ending of something or the achievement of a milestone – are the most emotionally fraught
and lead to the type of stress he finds most difficult to manage. One such situation was the
transition after completing his Appalachian Trail Hike, which also coincided with the end of
college and the need to transition into “adulthood.” Jesse notes a three-year long period of
increasing anger, frustration, and depression during a time when he seemed unable to move
forward and find a life path that would acknowledge his strengths and accommodate his
identified struggles. He describes:
For at least three years after my hike ended, I was filled with such rage that I walked
around with an occasional black eye from punching myself during spasms of frustration.
Staring into a mirror had the effect of resurrecting painful memories followed by brief fits
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of self-abuse. My “weirdness” was no longer an asset I could use to justify myself,
unlike when I was on the publicized 2,174-mile hike. (p. 144)
Jesse goes on to describe a spiral into a depressive state where he stopped bathing, spent
countless hours watching TV, and endlessly contemplated his life’s failures. As with the
example of a “tempter tantrum” above, in this instance Jesse describes his behaviors rather than
his emotions. We know he is depressed, and he names that, but he never delves into why,
explores what he wants, or considers any of the other potential emotional issues at stake in his
depression. He stays acquainted with his anger – at both himself and at others – but his
experience of what he calls the depression remains largely unsymbolized.
For Jen, increasing stress seems largely to translate into increasing emotional turmoil and
physical illness. Jen’s experience of stress is most often linked to interpersonal conflicts, sudden
changes, or to a sense of failing at work or at school. When she experiences these situations, she
becomes increasingly anxious, prompting a feeling of being overwhelmed and unable to cope
effectively. Jen suffers from a number of physical health problems, which seem to be linked to
ongoing anxiety and, perhaps a tendency towards somatization. It is important to note that she
does not make a direct correlation between her health problems and her emotional experiences,
however in her writing periods of high anxiety and stress often appear hand in hand with
physical health problems. For example, she describes a highly stressful working environment:
Every morning when I arrived at work on the train, I made straight for the public phone
in the foyer, and, in tears from high anxiety, phoned my Mum. This was a necessary
ritual in order for me to get enough courage to enter the office. By now I was suffering
from severe bilious attacks every second Monday: the combination of a painful right eye,
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avoidance of light, great desire to lie down, diarrhea (and sometimes vomiting) marked
these out as a form of migraine…(Birch, 2003, p. 142)
In another example, she describes increasing anxiety about a proposed class trip:
Again, I tried to adapt to the situation, but felt anxiety about the change of plans, as well
as about the trip and the pet-minding implications.
Over these years I was developing irritable bowel syndrome, which entails having
extremely temperamental “guts,” and frequent discomfort…(p. 151-152)
In both of these examples, Jen links (through proximity rather than cause) in the writing an
experience of stress, a sense of being overwhelmed, and a physical illness. For her, the physical
symptoms seem to express some of the emotional turmoil she feels in times of stress.
Learning empathy. All of the authors explicitly talked about difficulties with empathy
and/or learning to recognize and interpret the emotional landscape of others. For most of them,
empathy was characterized as a learned behavior rather than a felt sense and at least two authors
referred to their style of empathy as “logical.” For all of the authors, although the felt sense of
joining with the other was sometimes elusive, they experienced moments of caring and
compassion that allowed them to feel connected to others. The experiences of compassion and
caring described by many of the authors are explicitly linked to empathy and rely on the author’s
own embodied experiences.
For all of the authors, empathy is taken up either as a logical evaluation of the other’s
behavior in order to identify the other’s emotions or as an experience of compassion for the other
with respect to situations that the authors have experienced themselves. For Wendy, John, and
Jesse, there is a clear experience of feeling required to respond in the context of emotional events
and also feeling ill-equipped to respond appropriately. Additionally, many of the authors also
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seem to experience being judged harshly for their apparent lack of empathy, leading them to
work towards what John calls a “logical empathy.” This “logical empathy” is a behavioral
response, though, rather than a felt experience, and betrays its use as a vehicle to fit in.
The desire to fit in by feigning empathy, though, coincides with a sense of being accused
of insensitivity or not “caring” about others, which many of the authors noted. For John and Jen,
this helps explain why they define empathy as caring about others. Although none of the authors
talk about experiencing empathy as an embodied or intersubjective experience, they all speak of
the ability to experience a sense of connection to others through similar experiences. For many
of them, the writing of their autobiographies is an attempt at connection and caring through
shared experience with others who are diagnosed with Asperger’s or autism spectrum disorder.
Wendy struggles not just to understand her own emotions, but to understand the emotions
of others as well. Particularly because her own emotional experiences are not well symbolized,
it is also difficult for her to understand or recognize the emotional experiences of others. She
talks about learning to make sense of emotions via observational learning:
By studying an individual’s posture, actions, voice tone and facial expression, I can now
usually work out what they are feeling. The hard work of studying the reactions of others
and recognizing that people react differently to different emotions has been very
beneficial to me. I can now feel fairly confident with those who know me. (Lawson,
1998, p. 9)
The process that Wendy describes is a conscious effort focused on reasoning through the
available data set (posture, actions, tone of voice, etc.) to come up with a probable conclusion.
Much different than the type of spontaneous empathy that is often take for granted as a part of
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typical emotional communication, Wendy is describing a process that is much more logical – not
something she feels into but instead something she deduces from external evidence.
Although Wendy often describes a felt inability to recognize other people’s emotional
states, in instances where she has shared a similar experience, she seems well-equipped to
recognize another person’s emotional response. For example, at the end of many of her chapters,
Wendy shares advice about interacting with autistic individuals. In one of these sections, she
discusses her emotional struggles with change and her need for constancy and reliability and
goes on to share:
A mother of an autistic 12 year old boy once asked me why her son screamed when the
railing he had been following and holding onto came to an end. I tried to explain this
same concept: the concept of familiarity and change, of gaining a sense of security and of
self, as perceived through the railings. (p. 109)
Wendy relies on her own emotional experience to make sense of the possible emotional
experience of another – an emotional experience she believes she shares with this young boy.
This is a compassionate response, one that is tied closely to an experience she has had and
assumes she can understand in the other. In this example, Wendy is using her own experience
and history, which is both embodied and intersubjective, in order to understand the other. But
this strategy fails for Wendy when she is faced with experiences in which she has no previous
experience and/or relates differently thus necessitating a reversion to the more logical, or
practiced deduction of the emotional experience of the other.
John talks very little in his book about his attempts to understand other people. He notes
that he often is confused by people’s responses to conversation or events, however even in
discussions of his relationships he rarely mentions the emotions of the other person or identifies

115

any specific problems he has understanding or figuring out the emotional landscape of others.
He notes early on in the book that he has “logical empathy,” meaning that he is able to reason
through why another person may be having an emotion, but in his description of logical
empathy, he does not himself experience what it is he recognizes the other person describing. He
makes it very clear, in fact, that he often finds other people’s empathic responses disingenuous
because he cannot understand how they would feel what someone having the experience would
feel. He says:
I have what you might call “logical empathy” for people I don’t know. That is, I can
understand that it’s a shame that those people died in a plane crash. And I understand
they have families, and they are sad. But I don’t have any physical reaction to the news.
And there’s no reason I should. I don’t know them and the news has no effect on my life.
Yes, it’s sad, but the same day thousands of other people died from murder, accident,
disease, natural disaster, and all manner of other causes. I feel I must put things like this
in perspective and save my worry for things that truly matter to me.
As a logical thinker, I cannot help thinking, based on the evidence that many
people who exhibit dramatic reactions to bad news involving strangers are hypocrites.
That troubles me. People like that hear bad news from across the world, and they burst
into wails and tears as though their own children have just been run over by a bus. To
me, they don’t seem very different from actors and actresses – they are able to burst into
tears on command, but does it really mean anything? (Robison, 2007, p. 32)
John also talks about the ways he thinks that he does experience empathy with people that he
cares about. He makes a distinction between the empathy he had to learn and the true empathy he
experiences:
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Caring – or pretending to care – about other people is a learned behavior. It’s one of
several kinds of empathy, I suppose. I have true empathy for my family and close
friends. If I hear of something bad happening to one of them, I feel tense or nauseous, or
anxious. My neck muscles cramp. I get jumpy. That, to me, is one kind of empathy
that’s “real.” (p. 31)
John equates “real” empathy with caring about someone, and he goes on to describe a situation
with his mother where he “felt a need to help” because he knew she was “in trouble.” In those
descriptions, John seems to be talking less about an empathy that involves knowing the other’s
emotions and more about attachment – it is clear that he cares and has a desire to respond,
despite not understanding the emotions that the other is feeling. However, like Wendy, John does
seem to have some ability to recognize the emotional response of someone when they are
confronted with situations that he has previously experienced. For example, when discussing his
own struggles to avoid withdrawing as a child, he clearly experiences compassion for other
children who may choose to withdraw, despite his sense that he cannot speak for them:
As a functional Aspergian adult, one thing troubles me deeply about those kids who end
up behind the second door. Many descriptions of autism and Asperger’s describe people
like me as “not wanting contact with others” or “preferring to play alone.” I can’t speak
for other kids, but I’d like to be very clear about my own feelings: I did not ever want to
be alone. And all those child psychologists who said “John prefers to play by himself”
were dead wrong. I played by myself because I was a failure at playing with others. I
was alone as a result of my own limitations, and being alone was one of the bitterest
disappointments of my young life. The sting of those early failures followed me long
into adulthood, even after I learned about Asperger’s. (p. 211)
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Like Wendy, John seems able to experience caring and compassion for individuals who are
experiencing situations that he has previously experienced. However, like Wendy, John is forced
to resort to “logic” rather than a more spontaneous empathic experience, when faced with an
other whose experience differs from his own.
Like John, Jesse talks about having to learn about and practice empathy, rather than
feeling it implicitly. He is quick to point out that he does not experience true empathy, but
instead recognizes the importance of displaying empathy in certain social situations. In order to
learn how to act empathetic, he exposed himself to different types of situations and practiced predetermined responses. He says:
The fine art of artificial empathy has been refined over the course of my adult life, as I
have learned to function like a human computer. Like a cerebral Microsoft Word
program, I have stored separate files for funerals, weddings, job interviews, first dates,
etc. These files may be accessed at a moment’s notice and compensate for my
deficiencies with generalization…(Saperstein, 2010, p. 36)
Like both John and Wendy, however, Jesse demonstrates compassion in situations where he has
personal experience. It is most striking in his discussion of his experience of working with
teenagers at Camp Teens Living a Challenge. There he seems to be able to identify with the
campers on the basis of life struggles. He says:
As an adolescent, I viewed my life as a tapestry of nuisances – Hebrew school, Sunday
school, abusive peers, apathetic teachers, acne, impromptu erections, loneliness, severe
sensitivity to the sounds of nail biting and foods containing artificial cheese. Even
character-building rites of passage, such as braces and my Bar Mitzvah studies, were part
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of a conspiracy to create unnecessary misery for me. But, as I would soon discover, my
grievances paled in comparison to the hurdles these kids faced. (p. 120)
Jesse goes on to talk about the struggles faced by the children and the ways that the campers used
their time to bond over shared difficulties and to enjoy the time together despite their diagnoses.
Jesse was able to identify with their emotional pain and also was inspired enough by the
children’s kindness towards each other and towards him that he hiked the Appalachian Trail to
raise money for the charity.
Like John, Jen does not spend any time talking about the emotions of other people in her
book. Nor does she talk about any attempts by her to understand how others were feeling. She
does note, in one section of her book devoted to implications of being diagnosed with Asperger’s
later in life, that some clinicians believe that AS individuals lack empathy, but that she is
different. She says:
There is still one major area in which I differ (perhaps) from the majority of others who
have Asperger Syndrome. (Of course, in order to be sure of that, a very large survey
would have to be done, ensuring that sufficient respondents with the relevant life
experiences were included.) It seems to me that the “known fact” of people with
Asperger Syndrome lacking empathy leads even some autism professionals into
erroneous thinking. This “fact” then lets them believe that people with Asperger
Syndrome do not grieve, or not as much as “normal” people. In other words, this “known
fact” is untrue and even dangerous, because then people with Asperger Syndrome cannot
get the help they need, if major grief hits them. (Birch, 2003, p. 206)
In this example Jen, like John, defines empathy as caring for someone. For her, the experience
of grief relies on the ability to empathize. In Jen’s description of her own experience of grief, it is
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hard to glean the ways that she understands that emotional experience as an example of empathy,
however, like the other authors, Jen does seem to be able to recognize the emotional experience
of others, based on an experience she has had. And we can see this somewhat in the quote
above, she voices concerns for other adults with Asperger’s who may be experiencing grief and
who are not taken seriously or are invalidated by professionals. This has happened to her and so
she is able to imagine how someone else might feel were it to happen to them.
Finding emotional safety through sameness. All of the authors invoke issues related to
safety in their writing and many talk explicitly about desiring a safe place or finding a felt sense
of safety in objects or behaviors. For most of them, feeling unsafe is a common experience and
characterized largely in terms of a felt sense of exposure or lack of belonging. Although it
appears largely to be experienced in the body, the authors seem to be describing issues related to
a felt sense of emotional rather than physical safety. In fact, when talking about safety most of
the authors don’t consider safety in terms related to potential bodily harm and often talk about
entering into dangerous situations without fear.
For all of the authors, safety is lived as an emotional experience of consistency,
familiarity, and freedom from change. The lived experience of safety occurs in the context of a
sense of control and predictability. For many of them, other people are experienced as
threatening and as contributing to a felt sense of vulnerability and lack of safety by the authors,
largely because the behavior of others is often unpredictable. The authors seem to experience
themselves as vulnerable and threatened in the context of an unsafe world where control and
predictability are often elusive
Wendy talks about the importance of feeling safe throughout her autobiography. For her,
safety is tied to her ability to maintain emotional calm and to the ability to cope in her day-to-day
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life. Wendy seems to experience the feeling of safety largely in terms of familiarity and
sameness and the feeling of being safe is also a feeling of being alive and connected to
something. For example, Wendy describes the feeling of safety in terms of her bicycle:
I turned my new bicycle upside down and spun the wheels round and round and round.
The light gleaming from the silver mudguards seemed to go on forever. It was so
intoxicating and I felt so alive….I felt a sense of connection as I watched the shiny
mudguards. I felt safe, almost as if I were a part of the bike. It belonged to me and I to
it. (Lawson, 1998, p. 2)
In that example, Wendy describes an experience that is repeated several times throughout her
text – she finds connection with an object, which allows her to feel related and secure. This
sense of being in relation to an object, or event as she later describes, seems to also be
experienced as an achievement of a coherent self for Wendy. In a later section of the book,
Wendy describes her experience of connection to safety and self through objects as “gaining a
sense of security and of self” (p.109).
This sense of safety, or the type of safety that Wendy seeks out and discusses throughout
her book, seems to be different than what is typically discussed as safety. She’s not talking
about safety as protection from bodily harm and, while apparently tied to emotional safety, it
seems to be more fundamentally about the safety inherent in the establishment of the self.
Wendy’s experience of he object as coherent and secure allows her to sustain a cohesive sense of
self in the moment of the experience. And, for Wendy, that the establishment of the self, as I will
discuss later, is less an internal cohesion that something that must be constantly reproduced from
the outside. She says, “while the event is occurring, I feel part of it, but when it ceases than I
cease to be too” (p. 107)
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John speaks obliquely about safety, but it is also a theme for him. He notes a feeling of
safety around machines because they were “never mean” to him (Robison, 2007, p. 12). He
describes feeling safe when “sleeping in piles” (p. 257) with his wife. And he describes his
decision to be self-employed as one that led to a feeling of safety: “For the next fifteen years, I
built myself a world of machines, a world in which I was securely positioned in the center…I
had finally made myself a place where I could feel safe and secure” (p. 216). It seems that the
experience of safety for John is rooted in both a connection to loved ones and in feeling in
control of his environment. Differing from Wendy, John’s sense of safety does not seem to be
linked as closely to his sense of self, but rather to a sense of control and predictability.
Like Wendy, however, John seems to be speaking largely about emotional safety rather
than physical safety. In fact, throughout John’s narrative there are descriptions of situations
where one would expect some fear for his safety, but, if it is there, he doesn’t mention it. For
example, in a long description of a time when he found a large, highly poisonous snake outside
of his hotel room (pp. 159-162), John walks the reader through his knowledge about snakes in
general and that one, in particular. He includes information about the likelihood of attack, jump
radius of the snake, effects of the poison (including death), and the best way to kill a snake
(including what type of ammunition is most effective). He describes killing the snake, but not
once in this several page long description, where it is clear that he was at risk of severe injury,
does he mention feeling fearful or unsafe. John’s discussion and concerns about safety are
squarely centered on emotional issues related to finding safety in the interpersonal rather than
physical world.
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Like John, Jesse talks about safety in terms of familiarity and sameness. He notes that
change, for himself and for many individuals with Asperger’s, is jarring and difficult to
accommodate. Safety occurs in the spaces that remain the same. He says:
My father has this expression. “The sooner you decide to make friends with change…the
easier your life will become.” But for children with autism, change is a viscous poison
known to provoke temper tantrums and distress. Abrupt deviations in my routine always
felt like phantom limb syndrome for a recent amputee. I would reach down and
immediately become distressed when a jarring absence replaced the comfortable
insulation…that familiarity. With this in mind, my early childhood was stable and
relatively free of earth-shattering changes. I also had one constant that made me feel safe
until I approached early adulthood. Millerton. (Saperstein, 2010, p. 63)
Jesse goes on to talk about the ways that his grandparents’ home, Millerton, was a place of
constants, where nothing ever changed, and life was predictable. Jesse was able to find safety
and security there through the repetition of sameness. He talks about a similar sense of security
when engaged in his special interests. He says, “My special interests have the ability to both
imprison and sustain me. They monopolize time that should be delegated toward friendships,
employment, and other adult priorities. On the other hand, they have given me a predictable
stability that I often haven’t been able to find elsewhere” (p. 12). For Jesse, like John, the feeling
of safety seems to be largely an emotional one, linked to his experiences of familiarity and
sameness.
Jen does not often explicitly talk about safety, however there is an implicit theme of
feeling vulnerable and fearful that betrays a feeling of needing safety and/or security. She does
talk about safety explicitly at one point in the book in terms of the loss of her father:
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My despair was total: I knew from this moment that three-quarters of my soul had been
wrenched away, never to return; and that now I was unprotected and unsafe in a
frightening, dangerous world. I knew that only with my Dad alive could I possibly
remain protected; that my Mum could not, despite her love for me, fulfill this role, and,
therefore, I was henceforth totally vulnerable. (Birch, 2003, p. 38-39)
We see this vulnerability both in expected situations like her treatment at the “farm ward” or her
abusive relationships, and in unexpected ones such as her fears related to the changing schedules
at school (p. 204), fears about being criticized (p. 158), and the fear that she experiences in any
situation in which she feels confused. In most situations, it seems that Jen feels emotionally
vulnerable, unable to protect herself from distressing situations, and experiences herself as
lacking the skills to effectively identify and, subsequently, handle threats when they arise. Like
John, Jen’s fear speaks of a need for safety in the form of predictability and control.
Unlike the other authors, Jen does mention threats to her physical safety, although they
are taken up as an afterthought rather than as lived in the moment. In discussing the ways that
her communication style makes it difficult for her to interpret social cues in dating relationships
she says:
I was also “slow on the uptake” in these matters, and unable to learn what had gone
wrong from one time to the next. I usually had to make the same mistake a number of
times before I could work out that it was a bad idea, which meant that I was getting into
risky situations over and over again. I was lucky to escape most of them relatively
unscathed… (p. 82)
For Jen, like the other authors, her issues related to finding safety and security are located
primarily on the emotional rather than physical plane. Jen equates safety with emotional security
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and lack of safety with emotional vulnerability and distress. Her concerns about physical safety,
while important, do not seem to occupy as central a place in her experience.
Communication problems = relationship problems. For all of the authors, reading
social cues and communicating with others is an area of perceived difficulty. Each author tried
various strategies to help him or her improve communication or the ability to read social cues (or
both), however this part of interpersonal functioning proved enduringly difficult for everyone.
For all of the authors, perceived problems with communication led to isolation and difficulties
establishing and maintaining relationships, despite a strong desire and, often, a dogged
persistence to forge connections with others.
For all of the authors, the non-verbal aspects of language are challenging to recognize
and interpret. The authors experience typical social interactions as confusing and feel illequipped to participate fully. They experience others as opaque and, sometimes, unwelcoming.
Each author devises his or her own strategy to assist in developing conversational skills, however
they each continue to experience themselves as lacking the ability to fully participate in social
interactions. This lack of ability leads to difficulties in establishing relationships and, most
importantly, each author experienced a desire for relatedness that makes these failures in
communication seem at best frustrating and at worst traumatic.
For Wendy, communication with others was a major struggle in childhood and early
adulthood and, although improved, remains difficult for her as an older adult. Wendy notes a
difficulty reading body language and understanding subtext, leaving her to reason through
conversations in order to determine the most appropriate response. She describes her experience:
There are days when just trying to make sense of the rules for social interaction is too
difficult. It is especially so when we take into account that individuals often write their
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own rules! For example, it’s fine to take off your clothes to have a bath, but only a model
takes off her clothes for the photographer; or you can laugh at that story, even though it’s
about the fat lady, because it’s a joke. (Lawson, 1998, p. 98)
As an adult, Wendy notes that courses she took at university in active listening helped her to
improve her communication skills, as did closely observing conversations between strangers in
public. Although Wendy values the skills she learned at university, she also notes the ways that
she continues to rely heavily on conscious deduction rather than intuition, to interpret the more
subtle aspects of language.
Wendy’s struggles with communication are intimately linked to her struggles to make and
maintain relationships. From her account of early childhood, Wendy was largely content being
alone and happy to live mainly in her “own world.” By high school, however, that changed. She
describes her experience:
As I approached my teenage years I began to want friends, to share my life with others. I
realised that people seemed to enjoy company and appeared happier when they were not
on their own. I understood friendship was valuable and I did not want to be different any
more.
However, I lacked social skills and the “know how” of friendship building. Most
people felt uncomfortable with my egocentric and eccentric behavior. I wanted things to
go by the rules – and my rules at that! My clumsy efforts to socialize usually ended in
trauma… (p. 16)
For Wendy, the experience of taking social risks for the first time, choosing to leave her singular
world and join the world of others was negative and, in her words, traumatic. Like many of the
authors, however, Wendy continued to try. Especially as an adult, Wendy made numerous
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attempts at friendship, however, she often met with failure and there is a clear tension in her
writing between her desire to pursue relationships and her desire to withdraw, where she feels
safer.
Although Wendy doesn’t talk about this explicitly, it seemed to me throughout her book
that one of the important ways that her communication style proved problematic was through the
absence of speech– either because she didn’t know what she was feeling (see the section above
on emotional management) or because she lacked the skills to communicate it directly via
language. One clear example of this is Wendy’s attempts to make friends as an adolescent and
into middle adulthood. Many times in the book she talks about being drawn to a woman and
wanting a relationship. But rather than asking for friendship, she communicates literally by
acting out her intention. She describes her attempts at friendship as “attaching [her]self to
certain women” (p. 91) and becoming someone’s “shadow” (p. 63). These attempts, not
surprisingly, often ended in failure for Wendy and additional confusion about how to participate
in the interpersonal world.
Wendy’s return to school following her divorce allowed her to take a course in active
listening, which Wendy credits with helping her to improve her communication skills and help
her to better understand other people. Towards the end of the book, Wendy talks about how she
has improved her communication skills and, especially, how that has helped her to make and
maintain friendships, talk about her emotions, and enjoy professional success. She notes that she
continues to struggle in some important ways – specifically in understanding humor and
remembering to consider the needs of others – but she has developed strategies to help her
manage, for example by asking her friends to be very concrete with her about their wants and
needs in order to accommodate her difficulty with inferring or reading subtle nonverbal cues.
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Like many of the authors, John experiences the complexities of human communication as
somewhat mysterious. In one of the early scenes in his book, John describes trying to befriend a
girl on the playground at school (Robison, 2007, pp. 8-10). He first tries to pat her on the head –
she hits him. He next tries to pat her on the head with a stick (so that he’s far enough away if she
tries to hit him again) – he gets in trouble with the teacher. He next tries to show her how to play
with trains by taking hers away from her – she cries and tells on him. And then, after failing
three times, he tries talking to her about things he knows about dinosaurs, at which point she is
presumably frustrated, and she ignores him. John is confused and upset by her reactions to him,
and doesn’t understand what he did wrong.
There are many stories in John’s book about his failed attempts to make friends as a child
and his felt inability to understand how to participate in ‘normal’ interactions with others. His
attempts at communication, both verbal and non-verbal, often end in failure and he notes the
long lasting effects of the rejection he experienced and his utter confusion about how to
effectively interact with his peers. John notes later in his book:
Many descriptions of autism and Asperger’s describe people like me as “not wanting
contact with others” or “preferring to play alone.” I can’t speak for other kids, but I’d like
to be very clear about my own feelings: I did not ever want to be alone. And all those
child psychologists who said “John prefers to play by himself” were dead wrong. I
played by myself because I was a failure at playing with others. I was alone as a result of
my own limitations, and being alone was one of the bitterest disappointments of my
young life. The sting of those early failures followed me long into adulthood, even after I
learned about Asperger’s. (p. 211)
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Like the other authors, John’s experiences of rejection caused some measure of retreat from
relationships. For John, he noted that for some time he “stopped trying” (p. 11) to make friends
because of the hurt associated with rejection and instead retreated to the solace of machines. His
relationships with machines were void of the rejection he experienced with other children and
allowed him to feel in control of his environment. Communication with machines avoids the
confusing subtleties of human communication.
John’s notes that, although it would have been easier for him to retreat into a world of
machines, his desire for human relationships remained very strong and pushed him to try harder
to learn how to communicate with others. He developed some skills over the course of his life
that allowed him to avoid many of the mistakes that he made as a child, however he continues to
lack a full understanding of the more intuitive aspects of language. As an adult, he likens
himself to a computer – learning how to communicate using logic to figure out the appropriate
response – however even this strategy fails sometimes as people are often looking for an
emotional, rather than logical, reaction. He explains:
It’s clear to me that regular people have conversational capabilities far beyond mine, and
their responses often have nothing at all to do with logic. I suspect normal people are
hardwired to develop the ability to read social cues in a way that I am not.
Small talk – or any kind of talk that goes beyond a simple exchange of
information – has always been a challenge for me. When I was young, I learned that
people would not like it when I uttered the first thought that entered my mind when they
approached. Since making that discovery, I have slowly taught myself how to succeed at
conversation – most of the time. I have learned to begin conversations with a question,
like “How are you?” I have learned a range of questions that are socially acceptable. But
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my inventory of questions is limited, and it seems other people are a lot more flexible. (p.
191-192)
John realizes that his particular struggles with communication could to lead to isolation and to
people labeling him as “weird.” He experiences some conversations as a trap – there does not
seem to be any appropriate logical response – and it is in those moments when his
communication style appears to him as impairing and when he begins to fear being judged
negatively by others. John works very hard to learn strategies to ease his communication
handicaps – largely because he wants so desperately to fit in. He says:
Thinking about conversations like the one I had with Laurie make me mad. People
approach me, uninvited, and make unsolicited statements. When they don’t get the
response they expect, they become indignant. If I offer no response at all, they become
indignant at that. So there is no way for me to win.
Given that line of reasoning, why talk to people at all? Well, many autistic people
don’t, possibly for that very reason. I want the Lauries of the world to like me. To not
think I am weird. I can be eccentric, but I don’t want to be weird. So I persist. I try to
say things like a normal person would say. (p. 192)
For John, communication problems are explicitly linked to difficulties in forming and
maintaining relationships and he experiences himself as ill-equipped or lacking in some way.
Like Wendy, he notes a gradual improvement in his communication skills over the course of his
life as he learns from previous mistakes and refines his conversational abilities. However, like
Wendy, John’s communication struggles persist, particularly with respect to the nonverbal
aspects of social interactions, and sometimes interfere with his ability to relate to others.
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For Jesse, perceived problems with communication form the backdrop for much of his
story, but he does not often directly address or describe these explicitly in his book. He makes
clear from his writing that his “weirdness,” shows up for others through his various ways of
communicating and that his struggles with dating and social interactions often have to do with
failed first impressions, which are also linked to his communication style. Like both Wendy and
John, Jesse seems to struggle most with the nonverbal aspects of communication. In describing
his experiences in grade school he says, “Like an incompetent anthropologist, I would
lethargically pick up the social graces relevant to each new environment during transitional
periods. By the time I finally “got it,” the damage was usually irreversible because too many
doomed first, second, and fifteenth impressions had already transpired” (Saperstein, 2010, p. 46).
Jesse mentions that letter writing is one form of communication that he uses frequently
and his letter writing seems to capture well his struggles with communication as well as the
effects of those struggles on his ability to form relationships. Jesse described writing letters
inside of birthday cards to women he was interested in during college:
My contact with female acquaintances was also initiated by delivering birthday cards
containing three pages of nonsensical ramblings. And if she were God-forbid-not-home,
that supposedly gave me the right to plant my ass next to her door like a demented
groupie until the young woman hopefully returned by midnight. One of my birthday
targets later admitted, “What you did on my birthday really creeped me out. Nobody
sends long cards to people they hardly know. You talked about weird things in your card,
too. I did not need to hear about how our ‘final exams will engulf us like a demon until
we expunge them from our souls!’”
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I replied, “Exactly! That was the whole point! And if you don’t like strangers
sending three-page birthday cards, you should have told me before I did it.” (p. 90)
Jesse writes similar letters in his Christmas cards each year. In his descriptions of his letter
writing, Jesse seems to be aiming for connection with others and for recognition of his effort and
the care with which he crafts each unique communication. However, he seems to lack an
understanding of what is typically expected in a card or a letter. He considers what he wants to
say (and one gets the impression that a lot of what he wants to say is said in a effort to sound
impressive in some way) but fails to consider how he may be perceived or what the other person
may want or need in a communication. Like John, he misses the intuitive piece and is frustrated
when his attempts at communication fail. Like John, Jesse notes a trajectory of failures and
learned lessons that helped him improve his communication skills, however he continues to
struggle with the non-verbal aspects. As a compromise, Jesse now includes a disclosure in his
letters, “I have something called Asperger’s syndrome and this is how I choose to communicate
with people. If you do not wish to receive future cards, please give me the courtesy of telling me
this yourself” (p. 90).
In Jesse’s descriptions of his struggles with communication and establishing relationships
there is a clear tension between his desire to relate to others and his frustration that there seems
to be little room for the types of communication that he is able and willing to participate in.
Unlike John and Wendy, who are both explicitly working towards developing “normal”
communication skills, Jesse is working towards understanding how to be non-offensive in his
communications, however he is also seeking the freedom to communicate in ways that others
may experience as “weird.” In other words, although Jesse makes a good deal of effort to learn
more typical ways of communicating (and learning when not to communicate) in order to
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improve his ability to form relationships, he is also asking ‘neurotypicals’ to “give him a chance”
and try to look beyond his differences in communication.
Like the other authors, Jen speaks to her difficulties in understanding the complexities of
communication. Jen talks about having to learn to speak “English as a foreign language” (Birch,
2003, p. 73), despite the fact that she grew up as a native speaker. In her experience, her
communication difficulties were the result of her struggles to understand social skills coupled
with tendency to think in pictures rather than words, thus slowing her processing speed. Her need
to learn English as a “foreign language” indicates her attempts to memorize phrases and patterns
of the language in order to make up for the felt deficits in spontaneous communication – namely
the inability to read non-verbal cues or assume non-literal meaning.
Jen’s struggles with communication impact her ability to develop and maintain intimate
relationships as well as her ability to manage relationships with co-workers, therapists, and
acquaintances such as classmates. Jen portrays herself as less desperate for companionship than
some of the other authors, emphasizing instead the tension between her desire to be alone and
her desire to belong. She does note several times in her text, however, her experience of
loneliness and isolation and how, at least in one instance, led to feelings of suicidality:
Now…alone for most of the time outside work hours – my mood was more often down
than up. I felt desperate for friends and for other people, but I knew that I could not cope
with people when I had them. This caused me to feel that there was no solution to the
loneliness I felt; and my failure at relationships of various kids had caused my selfesteem to plummet. I arrived at the space where I did not want to live any more and I had
thoughts of ending my life. (p. 53)
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Like the other authors, Jen’s desire for connection propels her to continue seeking relationships,
however, also like the other authors, her struggles with communication often leave her illequipped to handle the more subtle aspects of non-verbal cues. In one particularly sad
description, Jen describes a moment when she is ostracized from a friend group after choosing to
go out with a friend’s ex-girlfriend:
A few weeks later, there was trouble in my flat. The house-owner, Vanessa, was angry
that I was going out with Jessica. She now let it be known that it wasn’t true that “I’ve
finished with her – I don’t want her.” Another of the flatmates remarked to me, “People
don’t always say what they mean, you know! You shouldn’t have assumed she meant it.”
I felt confused, as well as upset; because if people could mean the opposite of what they
said, how could I be expected to know that they really meant?
Relations in the household now took a downward turn; at least where I was
concerned, for I was the one who had misbehaved. (p. 51-52)
These communication concerns are echoed in her descriptions of her experiences of her “farm
ward” admission, of her participation in friend relationships (particularly with women), and in
her various work and school environments. Like the other authors, her inability to “decipher the
code” (p. 120) of indirect communication impacted her relationships and her ability to participate
fully in the interpersonal spheres of life.
Unlike the other authors, Jen’s communication struggles did not tend to improve over
time and it was not until she was diagnosed with Asperger’s that she was able to make sense of
her struggles and begin to understand the ways that her difficulty with communication impacted
her relationships. She says:
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My difficulties with relationships – tending to worsen as I progressed through adult life –
had a lot to do with Asperger Syndrome, especially undiagnosed Asperger Syndrome. I
had problems with recognising people’s faces, if I had met them only once or a few
times; let alone working out their facial expressions as well, which was a further obstacle.
As I did not even know that I had difficulty reading facial expressions and body language
(except for the most blatant ones: smiles and frowns); as I did not know that I often could
not detect sarcasm, double meanings, hidden agendas, and deceptions; and as I did not
know that I could not pick up social cues (understand what was going on with other
people) most of the time, I could not do anything to assist myself. If you know that you
have a cut finger, you can put a band-aid on; but if you are unaware of the cut, you can’t
do anything about it. (p. 205)
Withdrawal from the world. Although it showed up in different ways, three of the
authors talk about withdrawing or retreating into their own world as an important part of their
experience18. Some of the authors talk about withdrawal into an ‘inner world,’ while others talk
about withdrawing into special interests or other non-interpersonal experiences. For some,
withdrawal is experienced as a form of self-preservation in the face of overwhelming social
demands, while for others it is preferred as a method for dealing with social isolation.
It seems that for all three authors the experience of choosing withdrawal appears in the
context of interpersonal situations that are experienced as overwhelming or impossible to solve.
Jesse does not talk about withdrawal into his own world in his text. Jesse talks some about
involving himself in singular activities in order to handle social isolation, however he does not
describe it as a withdrawal, but rather as a “buffer” (p. 31). In the face of social rejections and
social confusion, Jesse seems to do the opposite of the other authors and instead seeks out
attention in any form. From negative attention through acting out and clowning in class, to
theater performances and public speaking, Jesse seems to be actively avoiding the withdrawal
that the other authors talk about.
18
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They experience themselves as already somehow separate from the world, or having their ‘own
world’ and withdrawal is understood by them as a retreat into that more comfortable world of
their own. Although comforting, for all three authors, the choice to withdraw also has the
potential to further feelings of isolation, in essence reinforcing the distinction already felt by
them between their worlds and the worlds of others.
Wendy talks about withdrawal throughout her autobiography as a method she uses to
avoid situations that are uncomfortable or confusing. Wendy already experiences herself as
separate from the world and unable to participate in some important ways – hence the title of her
book, “Life Behind Glass” – however her withdrawal is an additional layer of purposeful retreat
into her own world. Wendy withdraws when social situations are difficult, when she is confused
by her surroundings or by other people’s expectations, and when she is afraid. While Wendy
talks about ‘withdrawing into her own world’ many times in her book, she provides little
description of her inner experience during these times. Oftentimes, it seems that when she is
talking about withdrawing, she is referring to withdrawal from the interpersonal sphere and a
hyperfocused engagement on sensory experiences. She provides one description from early
childhood, that seems to capture her experience well. In this passage, she is describing her
withdrawal into the world of “dots” in her visual field as the result of being cross-eyed at birth:
My blurred vision enhanced my first views of the world. I enjoyed having double vision
and seeing dots dancing in front of my eyes. The dots became very familiar and were a
constant source of comfort to me – if I squinted my eyes, I could even make them change
shape and colour. As a toddler, I used this as a retreat into my own world, until at age
three I was encouraged to wear glasses.
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I don’t remember my eyes troubling me but they must have been a source of
concern for my parents. The prescription glasses helped correct both my squint and long
vision. It was great to be able to see more clearly but also very confusing. I had enjoyed
playing with the round dots dancing before my eyes. I could lose myself with them and
feel content as colours and sparkles merged into each other before me. (Lawson, 1998, p.
20).
For Wendy, often withdrawal into her own world seems to center on an immersion into a sensory
experience that excludes awareness of other things and people.
When Wendy talks about withdrawal into her own world, she couches it in terms of a
choice she is making, but also in terms of its inevitability for her. For example, she describes
withdrawing following a medical procedure:
Maybe the doctors had tried to explain the procedure to me, or perhaps they thought it
was too complicated a task and decided to take each even as it happened? What I am sure
of is that I did not understand what was happening, and felt lied to and cheated. I decided
those doctors and nurses could not be trusted and withdrawal into my own world again
was my only option. (p. 47)
Wendy’s withdrawal seems to be experienced as something like a forced choice, although one
that provides an extreme relief from fear and discomfort in the outside world. She talks about
withdrawal as the “only option,” throughout the book, but notes that as an adult she has been
better able to avoid withdrawing completely. She notes an awareness that withdrawal, while in
many ways experienced as the safest option, also exacerbates her sense of isolation and
depression over time.
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For John, withdrawal also tends to occur in the context of difficult social situations. John
talks about playing by himself because he failed at forming friendships and that, in some ways,
his withdrawal into computers and machines was an attempt to avoid interpersonal struggles. His
withdrawal tends to be into isolation and into special interests (engineering, etc.) rather than to
the ‘inner’ world of sensory experiences described by Wendy. Like Wendy, however, John
couches withdrawal as a choice. He notes that he made a choice to engage rather than withdraw
as the result of his family situation:
Even at 16 years of age, it would have been easy for me to retreat from dealing with
humans and move into the world within my own mind. Looking back, I can see a path
that might have led somewhere far away, perhaps to autism, perhaps to the place where
the savants who can multiply ten-digit numbers in their minds live. After all, I got along
well with my circuits, and they never ridiculed me. They presented me with tough
problems to solve but they were never mean. Around the time I dropped out of school, it
was almost as though I stood in front of Door Number One and Door Number Two, as
perplexed as any game-show contestant and with much more at stake, and was forced to
make a choice.
My crazy family situation and my need to run away from home and join the
working world in order to survive kept me from making that choice. So, I chose Door
Number One, and in doing so moved farther away from the world of machines and
circuits – a comfortable world of muted colors, soft light, and mechanical perfection –
and closer to the anxiety-filled, bright, and disorderly world of people. As I consider that
choice thirty years later, I think the kids who choose Door Number Two may not end up
able to function in society. (Robison, 2007, pp.210-211)
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John’s experience of withdrawal seems to be largely about navigating the competing desires of
wanting to be connected to others and wanting to feel safe and in control. For him, life
circumstances pushed him towards one choice, but it seems to be a literal and conscious choice.
For Jen, withdrawing seems to occur both in the context of getting involved in her special
interest and in the context of avoiding interpersonal interactions that she finds difficult to
manage. Jen experiences a tension between ‘her world’ and the world of others and often seems
to feel as though the two worlds are incompatible. Although Jen doesn’t ever use the word
“withdrawal” directly, she describes moments of retreat from difficult interpersonal situations
that are similar to those described by John and Wendy and also describes her special interests as
a comfortable retreat from the ‘normal world.’
In most of the job settings that Jen describes throughout her book, she feels ill-equipped
to manage the social environment and the negative experiences with interpersonal relationships
and interactions with co-workers eventually compel her to leave. Although this type of
withdrawal is a more literal version of what is described by John and Wendy, there seems to be a
similar experience of becoming overwhelmed by what seem to be impossible situations and
eventually fleeing. For example, Jen describes one situation at a relatively new job where she
felt punished after asking for additional work. She describes:
The next thing I knew, my boss – Stanley – told me that I should not have done that, as it
made out department look bad. Stanley started to show me some of this own work, to
teach me extra skills. Before this could progress far, the other assistant took me aside and
flew into a fury – I was not supposed to be learning Stanley’s job, etc., etc.; I was
supposed to be learning my own job – which, I now realise, I probably was not learning
adequately. The fact that this assistant obviously disliked me, and, therefore, did not
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spend the necessary time teaching me, did not help my learning process. This situation
created stress and dislike of my job, and I began to succumb to nausea attacks. It was a
great disappointment, for a bookroom would ordinarily be my ideal place. The fact that
my job was going wrong added to my other concerns about fitting in to the world – where
could I be successful, where could I make friends. Again, I dealt with the problem I the
only way I knew, by handing in my notice after one year. (Birch, 2003, p. 62)
For Jen, the discomfort and the questions about fitting in build over time, often leading to
physical illness, and resulting in a feeling that the only solution is to quit, or withdraw from the
situation. Jen’s special interests, poultry raising and books, in particular, seem to provide her a
space to withdraw when life in the ‘normal world’ becomes overwhelming. Like John, she notes
that her special interests provide a feeling of comfort that helps her to manage overtly stressful
situations. She says, “if I did exactly what I wanted to all day (indulging in my special interests),
I would only ever mess around with my poultry and go to the library! Anything else which I do
is an acknowledgement by me, that I have to live in the “normal” world” (p. 257).
Issues of the self: Identity and diagnosis. For all of the authors issues of identity show
up as a theme. Issues of identity range in felt severity and include questions about the
construction of a self, the continuity of the self through time, and issues of where the individual
fits in a world of others. For many of the authors, issues of identity seem to be linked to
struggles with emotional expression and vulnerability as well as with issues of isolation and the
negative feedback received from others.
For all of the authors, issues around the “self” and around identity intersect with the
diagnosis in important ways. For John, Wendy, and Jen, the diagnosis seems to have offered both
a name and an explanation that fit well with their lived experiences. All of them, in various
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ways, experienced life as confusing in the context of a lack of adequate explanation for their
lived experience. The diagnosis offered a new opportunity to make sense of their lived
experience, both historically and in the present. For those authors, too, the diagnosis seemed to
change their experience of others and helped them better understand how they were viewed by
others – leading to insight about past and future relationships. For Jesse, issues of identity also
intersected with is diagnosis, but in a different way. For him, the diagnosis seems to have overorganized his experience, leaving little room for individual identity. In the context of his
diagnosis, Jesse experiences frustration at the limitations he feels with respect to his abilities and
to other people’s perceptions of him. For all of the authors, the work of the diagnosis (whether
containing or restricting), points to an underlying difficulty with self-definition and selfunderstanding and a striking discrepancy between the lived experience of themselves and the
descriptions of themselves given to them by others.
In her text, Wendy both discusses her struggles to establish a coherent sense of self and
also demonstrates those struggles through her stories. As discussed above, we see this identity
struggle initially in her discussion of safety and consistency – that her very being is tied up with
objects and events that exist outside of the confines of her body. She describes her experience:
It’s very hard to learn the lesson that things don’t and can’t last forever. Something that
has taken me a long time to grasp is the idea of mortality. I am always surprised when
something comes to an end. This is true in relation to special outings, holidays, shop
leases, friendships, semesters at school, seasons of the year, blossoms on the fruit trees or
just a wet windy day.
Sometimes my surprise can turn into sadness or even terror. While the event is
occurring I feel part of it, but when it ceases then I cease to be too.
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When I was a child of two, I sat under our round living room table during a storm.
I did this because the floor was beneath my body and the table over it. This gave me a
sense of myself as being separate from the thunder and I felt safe. If I left the safety of
the table, then I feared the thunder would scoop me up and I might be lost in its roar.
(Lawson, 1998, p. 107)
In this example, Wendy describes a self that feels almost permeable, and one that is contingent
on the objects and events that occur outside of it.
We also see Wendy’s struggles to construct a coherent identity or “self” in her lack of
self-awareness, especially in childhood and early adulthood. Her lack of knowledge about
herself – her strengths, limitations, desires, etc. – often left her feeling confused and unable to
make decisions. Her position is often a passive one – acted upon rather than acting. This
passivity is clear in the situations she describes in her text - such as getting married because
‘people do it’, rather than because she wanted to. Or, in this sentence from the first page of her
book, “According to the impressions of those around me, my experience of living with autism is
like being a written sentence that is incomplete.” Even her own experience of living is defined
according to the impressions of others. In fact, throughout much of the book, you get the sense
that Wendy is drifting through life, confused, and unable to make sense of herself, and of the
world and the people around her. She often takes no active role and finds it difficult to articulate
to others what she wants. But she is driven by a need for connection through constancy in order
to feel alive. Her “self” is achieved through the objects and events, and later the people, with
which she forges a connection. A poem she included towards the end of the book captures some
of the struggles to maintain a sense of self in the face of change:
Change, change and more change
Of context, place and time.
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Why is it that life’s transient stage
Play’s havoc with my mind?
You said, “We’ll go to McDonald’s”
But this was just a thought.
I was set for hours,
But the plan then came to naught.
My tears and confused frustration,
At plans that do not appear,
Are painful beyond recognition
And push me deeper into fear.
How can life be so determined?
How can change be so complete?
With continuity there is no end.
Security and trust are sweet.
So, who said that change would not hurt me?
Who said my “being” could not be safe?
Change said, “You need continuity
In order to find your place.”
For change makes all things different.
They no longer are the same.
Was that what you really meant?
All I feel is the pain. (pp. 106-107)
Towards the end of the book, Wendy talks about the ways that writing has helped her to make
sense of her experiences and to begin to integrate them into a bigger picture. She says:
The written word has a form all its own. The pen between my fingers feels solid and
tangible. It moves with me and allows the symbols of my pain or ecstasy to reveal
themselves. Words express my distress through the pen and onto the paper and back to
my mind. I can see them on the paper; they talk to me and help me to make sense of my
life. (p. 97)
Wendy’s desire to learn more about herself was prompted by the end of her marriage and led her
to begin researching her mental health diagnoses – again looking outside for information about
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herself. For Wendy, the late diagnosis of Asperger’s disorder helped her to make sense of her
experience and to begin to articulate a more organized sense of self, and her autobiography in
large part seems to be a way for her to organize her experiences around Asperger’s as an identity.
However, although her autism diagnosis provided her with a way to make sense of experiences
and her writing allowed her to create a symbolic articulation of them, Wendy’s lived day-to-day
experience of herself continues to appear as organized externally. In other words, while she has
been able to begin to achieve a sense of identity through the label of Asperger’s and the writing
of her experience, she continues to live a self that relies on external events for cohesion and
constancy. For Wendy the object, or the thing, rather than the other, presents itself as stable and
constant. It is almost as though, through her literal attachment to the thing, she is able to make
use of that stability, the inertia of the non-living thing, to supplement or sustain a feeling of
being. For Wendy, although the diagnosis provides some important supplementation for her in
terms of symbolic identity, her lived experience, her sense of herself as a living being, is
sustained in and through the things around her.
For John, issues of identity are less severe and seem to center largely on self-definition
rather than self-construction. John’s identity conflicts seem to have begun when he was labeled
as “defective” as a small child. Although John doesn’t explicitly focus on issues of identity, his
story meanders through a lifelong struggle to figure out where he fit and why he was different
from other people. He works hard as a child to understand why the other children didn’t want to
befriend him and, as a teenager, tries for a time to inhabit the label of “misfit,” as a way to begin
to understand himself. We see him find some sense of pride in his work as a musical engineer,
but them watch him struggle with the feeling that he is somehow a fraud and undeserving of the
praise he receives for his work. And, throughout the book, he mentions his worries that perhaps
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he really is the sociopath that people assumed him to be in his youth. For John, the issues of
identity center on an experience of feeling unable to find a self-definition that adequately fits
both his experience of himself and others’ experience of him. He doesn’t feel like a sociopath,
but others see him as such, he doesn’t feel defective, but is told he is, etc. The message from the
outside conflicts with his lived experience and, for John like many others, he questions his own
experience of himself first and only later begins to question the labels given to him by others.
He describes his experience:
I came to believe what people said about me, because so many said the same thing, and
the realization that I was defective hurt. I became shyer, more withdrawn. I began to
read about deviant personalities and wonder if I would one day “go bad.” Would I grow
up to be a killer? I had read that they were shifty and didn’t look people in the eyes.
I pondered it endlessly. I didn’t attack people. I didn’t start fires. I didn’t torture
animals. I had no desire to kill anyone. Yet. Maybe that would come later, though. I
spent a lot of time wondering if I would end up in prison. I read about them and
determined that the federal ones were nicer. If I were ever incarcerated, I hoped for a
medium-security federal prison, not a vicious state prison like Attica. (Robison, 2007, p.
2)
Like some of the other authors, John’s sense of identity solidifies upon gaining the
diagnosis of Asperger’s later in life. He notes that it helped him to understand himself and to
make sense of some of his choices and struggles. It also helped him to shed some of the negative
views of himself acquired during childhood and young adult hood. He describes reading the
diagnostic criteria for the first time:

145

It was like a revelation. I realized that all the psychologists and psychiatrists and mental
health workers I had been sent to as a child had completely missed what TR had seen…
The realization was staggering. There are other people like me. So many, in fact,
that they have a name for us….
Just reading those pages was a tremendous relief. All my life, I had felt like I
didn’t fit in. I had always felt like a fraud or, even worse, a sociopath waiting to be found
out. But the book told a different story. I was not a heartless killer waiting to harvest my
first victim. I was normal, for what I am. (pp. 237-238)
For John, the experience of being diagnosed helped him to make sense of his struggles and to
reorganize his history into a meaningful narrative – one that accounted for his developmental
disability in a way that the label “defective” did not. Like Jen, the diagnosis also helped him to
pinpoint some of the particular issues he faced with communication and to work in a more
focused way to overcome them.
John comes to know himself as an “Aspergian” and throughout the book he notes not
only the struggles, but the gifts individuals with Asperger’s possess. John’s experience of
himself was changed by the diagnosis, allowing a more coherent and stable identity to emerge in
the place of confusion about himself. He says, “It took a long while for me to get to this place, to
learn who I am. My days of hiding in the corner or crawling under a rock are over. I am proud
to be an Aspergian” (p. 5).
For Jen, identity issues show up in both her embodied experience of self and in her desire
to understand where she belonged. Jen captures well her identity struggles in her description of
life as a young adult:
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In my teen and young adult days, a popular saying was “Be yourself.” There was a
problem, however, if you could not work out what your “self” was; and an additional
difficulty if your “self” was something which other people found too weird. (Birch, 2003,
p. 49)
Jen explicitly identifies a number of identity issues, which she frames as questions: ‘Am I a boy
or a girl?’, ‘Am I an earthling or an alien?’, and ‘Am I possessed?’ ‘Am I a monster?’ (pp. 4555). Her struggles with identity seem to be complicated not just by questions of who she is, but
by a lived experience of having a body that contained two or more beings. The following
excerpt describes the complexity of her issues with identity and begins following a description of
feeling frightened of the dark and fearing that a monster, that she refers to as “The Unwanted
Possession” was waiting to attack her:
Worn out by the fear, I would beg it to come and do its worst and get it over with. Its
refusal to do so proved to me that it was more interested, for the moment at least, in
intimidation and mental cruelty: in scaring me to death. Its name – after I reached my
(chronologically speaking) adult years – became known to me as Jenny Pierson.
Therefore, if I could kill Jenny Pierson, I – the real me, Aquila – would be set free to
realize my potential…
Added to the identity questions were boundary questions, that is: If I am
possessed by another entity, where does it leave off and I begin? Does Jen exist at all –
apart from providing the convenience of a physical body for something/somebody else?
If somebody else wants to do something to me or with me, where does he/she end and I
begin? I often felt “taken over” by a more powerful individual – and every other
individual had more power than I did. (pp. 47-48)
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For Jen, “The Unwanted Possession” names the fear that she experiences and gives form to her
lived experience of being overly vulnerable and seeking safety. Although she fights the fear, she
also wonders whether it will consume her, taking over both her sense of her “true self” and her
body.
Jen’s embodied struggles with identity play out for her through a constant searching for
an identity that both fits her embodied experience and that would allow her to participate in
interpersonal relationships. In one example, she adopts the identity of lesbian because it seems
to both fit her sense of being different as well as allow her to belong to a group of women with
whom she had developed friendships. After realizing that being gay did not adequately capture
her identity, or explain her differences, Jen becomes increasingly depressed and suicidal over the
concern that her differences and her confusion about her identity could lead to a permanent state
of isolation.
Like Wendy and John, it was the diagnosis of Asperger’s later in life that allowed Jen to
begin to make sense of her experience and to explain her differences in a way that felt true to her
lived experience. The diagnosis brought a sense of understanding as well as some relief. She
says:
To say that this discovery was a bombshell would not be an exaggeration: it was a lifechanging event. It reinterpreted most of my life in a new, understandable, and logical
way. As with everything else in life, I would rather know the truth about things, the
reason why something is happening in a certain way: and now, for the first time, I could
understand why things had happened in certain ways. Even though I still have some of
the difficulties associated with Asperger Syndrome, it helps 100 per cent to know why I
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am different – instead of having to think, as I did before meeting Angela Arnold, that I
was “crazy,” “stupid,” “not able to get it all together.” (p. 199)
For Jen, the diagnosis serves as something like an organizing principle, providing her with an
avenue to begin to make sense of her identity and experiences through the lens of Asperger’s
disorder. Although we do see some minor continued identity struggles in Jen’s story following
her diagnosis (e.g. her trouble recognizing herself on film (p. 226)), the label of Asperger’s
seems largely to have allowed her a name under which to organize and make sense of her
identity. As she says in a description of issues related to late diagnosis:
Another mental health scenario which is possible (and which happened to me) is the
following misdiagnosis – Persons with AS typically process and understand concepts in a
concrete way, for example abstract concepts are typically put into a “visible, tactile” form
so that we can think about them more easily. This is allied to picture thinking and can be
a very original, creative way of thinking. An undiagnosed AS adult can go even further
with this process, until the various parts of his or her own personality are partitioned into
separate personalities, with separate names. Before my own diagnosis, I, too, saw myself
as being inhabited by different entities, both good and bad. Now I understand why this
happened [emphasis added]. (p. 239)
Although the other authors struggled with identity issues that were widely helped by the
diagnosis of Asperger’s, Jesse’s issues around identity seem to instead result from the diagnosis.
Unlike the other authors, Jesse doesn’t have as many issues related to a coherent self – he has
constructed a stable identity that is consistent through time and that through which he is able to
make sense of his life and consider his future. But, in reading Jesse’s text, it seems that his sense
of identity, rather than being saved by the diagnosis, is somewhat restricted as the result of it.
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Jesse’s conversations about himself are framed almost exclusively within the context of his
Asperger’s diagnosis. He understands most of his behaviors, choices, and even interests as
resulting from the diagnosis. He often seems to have a difficult time articulating the ways that he
is a particular individual outside of the context of Asperger’s disorder. For example, Jesse talks
about his “weirdness” throughout the book, sometimes in the language of its problems and
sometimes in the language of its gifts. He is alternatively proud of his weirdness and constrained
by it. But, the weirdness doesn’t really belong to Jesse – it is an artifact of his diagnosis. In a
paragraph describing how he felt following the completion of his Appalachian hike he says:
The Asperger’s syndrome allowed me to succeed where so many others (with or without
a disability) have failed. Therefore, I felt vindicated by the fact that every mile was hiked
with Obsession, Perseveration, Anger, and Weirdness – aspects of my personality that
were once perceived as demons, not assets. Instead of sabotaging my progress, they were
employed as tools to conquer what is arguably the most treacherous footpath in the
world. (Saperstein, 2010, p. 139)
In this quote we can clearly see the slide from the symptoms or traits listed in the diagnosis of
Asperger’s to Jesse’s sense of his own personality, his identity, as defined by those very traits
and symptoms. It seems almost as though Jesse understands himself as Asperger’s syndrome
and his singular subjectivity, the unique personality of Jesse, gets subsumed under the diagnostic
label.
Jesse’s identified struggles in the book such as his difficulties finding a romantic partner,
finding acceptable employment following college, or navigating the transition following his trail
hike are described largely in the language of frustration. His frustration is both with himself,
“[My friends’] successes were in stark contrast with my failures and aimless life” (p. 150) and

150

with others, “I hated women for the simple reason that they constantly reminded me of how
different I was” (p. 151). I interpret some of Jesse’s frustration with a felt inability to figure out
who he is outside of the diagnosis of Asperger’s. He is frustrated with other people largely
because he feels that they don’t give him a “chance,” and instead only see his weirdness or, what
he sees as the negative aspects of his diagnosis. He says, “My bitterness towards the
neurotypical public derives from a lifetime of consistent rejections and lack of chances” (p. 4).
Jesse mentions the “lack of chances” given to him by others repeatedly throughout the book and
also notes several times that, were he to be given a chance, people would see what he had to
offer. However, in the book, most of what Jesse offers the reader about himself – his strengths
and weaknesses – are situated as part of the diagnosis and not specific to him. There is very little
about Jesse as particular human being with a unique set of characteristics, experiences, and
desires. While the other authors struggle to find a way to understand and make sense of who
they are and where they fit, Jesse seems to have an overabundance of self-definition through the
diagnosis that makes it difficult for him to define himself in other ways. And we see more
frustration as a result, evident in his rage after a friend suggests that he limit himself to dating
women with autism. He says, “I knew it was an insult when I knew how much I had to offer
anyone who gave me a chance” (p. 150). For Jesse, the “insult” seems to hit at something
fundamental about his experience of his identity – Asperger’s has become his identity, despite
what appears to be his own desire to offer something more.
The strengths and limitations of Asperger’s syndrome. For each author, their book
was largely dedicated to discussions and descriptions of the problems they have faced due to the
limitations resulting from Asperger’s disorder. For most of the authors, the narrative focused on
adaptive measures that helped them learn to overcome or better manage some of their limitations
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as well as their acceptance that certain struggles may be lifelong. For each author, there is a very
clear theme of feeling limited by the disorder, however each author mentions a sense that some
of their limitations are also, or have the potential to be, strengths that set them apart for
neurotypical individuals.
For example, Wendy notes a sense that AS adults may appreciate sensory experiences
more fully than other people. After being called crazy for standing to watch a cicada shed its
shell on a very hot afternoon, Wendy says, “I think it is they who are crazy. By choosing not to
stand and watch, they missed out on sharing and experience that was so beautiful and
exhilarating. A miracle can be happening all around us and no one is aware of it” (Lawson,
1998, p. 115). Or, as John says, “[I]n recent years I have started to see that we Aspergians are
better than normal! And now it seems as though scientists agree: Recent articles suggest that a
touch of Asperger’s is an essential part of much creative genius” (Robison, 2007, p. 240).
In her book, Jen makes a play on her title, Congratulations! It’s Asperger’s, to introduce
a list of 17 positive attributes of individuals with Asperger’s, which includes things like picturethinking, honesty, commitment, focus, memory, creativity, and the ability to notice details that
others miss (Birch, 2003, pp. 208-209). She makes an explicit plea for individuals diagnosed
with the disorder to recognize that there are strengths that accompany the limitations inherent in
the disorder. Similarly, Jesse points to honesty, directness, and integrity, as some of the many
positive traits of Asperger’s syndrome that should be acknowledged.
For each of the authors, there are aspects of the diagnosis that s/he views as an ability
rather than a limitation. This is clear in the texts of every author, however these asides about
strengths appear in the context of a narrative largely devoted to the exploration of limitations and
difficulties and ways to overcome, adapt, or, as Jesse puts it, “justify [his] weirdness” (p. 61). It
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seems that, for the authors, living with Asperger’s is largely experienced as a series of struggles
or limitations that require the work of adaptation and each seems to experience others as noticing
only the authors’ limitations. Each author, however, seems to experience him or herself as
having some abilities as the result of having Asperger’s disorder and there seems to be a
universal need to have those abilities recognized and appreciated.
Communicative style and the experience of one neurotypical. Although not exactly a
narrative theme, I want to mention a similarity in writing styles that I saw across
autobiographies. While on the one hand writing style speaks to many of the other themes (e.g.
emotional dysregulation, issues with sense of self, difficulties with social cues and interpersonal
interactions, etc.) discussed in this section, my experience of the writing styles of the authors
points to something potentially important about the neurotypical experience and, particularly, of
potential difficulties with non-autistic researchers seeking to understand and reflect on the
experiences of individuals living with Autism Spectrum Disorders. It also brings to the fore the
ways that communication is embedded within a complex and multi-dimensional system of social
expectations that influences the types of interpretations we make about both the content of the
work and about the person identified as the author.
For all of the authors, the method of organization of the narrative and consideration of
audience was different than what is often seen in autobiographical writings. Ranging from highly
idiosyncratically organized in places to largely traditionally organized, with some tangentially
related asides, all of the authors wove the narrative thread(s) differently, and often in a way that
was not clear to me as a reader (one who expected a clear narrative focus organized around
identified themes or topics). For me as a reader, this was often maddening, as it forced me into
an unfamiliar position. Wendy’s autobiography was the most difficult for me to follow as it often
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felt as though it was slipping around in terms of time, content, and trajectory. In some places she
moved from one topic to the next between paragraphs, or occasionally, within and between
individual sentences. Jen’s narrative was crafted in a similar way. She also organized her text
differently than I expected, and I experienced her narrative as largely ‘out of order’ as it
meandered through stories that were not specifically organized by theme or in the context of an
historical account. For Jen, the major organizer of her text was the chapter titles, however as a
reader, it was sometimes difficult to discern how the text of the chapter held together for her
around the theme identified in the title, as many of the stories or information contained within
seemed only tangentially related. For both John and Jesse, the overall organization of the book
was clearer for me, however each tended to introduce information at times that appeared only
loosely related to the theme of the current chapter, which was often disorienting for me.
Additionally, both tended to provide exquisitely detailed descriptions of events, objects, or
fantasies, which often left me feeling bogged down and unable to absorb all of the information
provided.
For all of the authors, it seemed that the organization of the text betrayed something of
their own experience in living with Asperger’s and with the difficulty in trying to convey those
experiences to others. For me, reading the texts was often frustrating, but it was difficult to
pinpoint why. In many respects, each author provided all of the elements of an interesting story.
On reflection, part of the issue was related to my inability to fully empathize with the authors or
to feel that I was able to fully enter into the experiences they were describing. I found it
impossible in some cases to intuit or sense the emotional or sensual content and found myself,
much like the authors themselves describe, trying to logically intuit, based on context and my
own personal experiences. My expectation of what an autobiography should be, too, shaped my
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experience and I found it difficult not to make judgments about the author’s abilities or to
assume impairments when faced with a text that challenged my pre-conceived ideas.
In order to be clear, I believe the difficulty of conveying their experience works two
ways: clearly each author understands voice and audience differently than we would usually
expect of an author and this may point to some of the issues at stake for individuals on the
spectrum. However, as a reader, my annoyance and frustration at the ways that each author’s
narrative sought to make sense in an unfamiliar and different way points to an impairment that
does not just belong to the individual on the spectrum, but instead is one that is co-constituted in
the intersubjective space. It felt to me like an experience of radical difference - similar to trying
to decipher a code without the key (and with the suspicion that a key may not exist). My
reaction to that aspect of the texts may mirror a more fundamental issue faced by the authors in
communicating their experiences – it may not only be difficult to capture and describe the
differences in experience but, more importantly, it may be hard for non-autistic audiences to
acknowledge and accommodate differences that exist at the level of lived experience and to
accept responsibility for the co-constitution of “issues with social communication.”
Psychoanalytic Analysis
Lacanian Concepts and Definitions Used in Analysis19
 Other: for Lacan, the Other is the ‘locus of the signifier’, representative of the Symbolic and
the Law. The Other represents that which is completely different from the subject. In
clinical practice one is interested in whether the Other is barred, or limited in its ability to
take the subject as an object, and to what extent the Other shows up in the subject’s fantasy.
 others: this refers to other people. For Lacan, the relationship to others is largely an
imaginary one – based on identification and the fantasy.

Please see the previous section on Lacanian diagnosis for a fuller description of these
concepts. Additionally, I found Evans (1996) dictionary of Lacanian terms helpful as I was
working to briefly define the complexity of these terms.
19
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 Alienation: this is the first moment in Lacan’s theory of subjective constitution. The subject
is forced into the sphere of language, producing a division between the experiential gestalt
of bodily existence and the world of representation through language.
 Separation: this is the second moment in Lacan’s theory of subjective constitution, occurring
in conjunction with the paternal function, when the subject is forced to contend with the
desire of the Other. In this moment the object a is produced and holds open the space for
desire.
 Paternal function: For Lacan, the paternal function is what bars the Other and secures a
place in the symbolic for the subject. It is linked with the Law and is the operation by which
the Other is both shown to be desiring and prevented from taking the subject as an object to
fill that lack. The handling of the paternal function via either repression, disavowal, or
foreclosure corresponds to the three subjective structures of neurosis, perversion, and
psychosis, respectively.
 Desire: most easily understood as a type of wanting, desire requires a lacking (e.g., you must
not have something in order to desire it) and can never be completely satisfied (e.g. you can
always want more).
 object a: Lacan defines this as the object cause of desire – it is what is produced during the
process of separation around which the subject organizes desire and jouissance. It is not an
actual object however, but a place-holder for desire and, as such, you see it only through the
succession of literal objects in the subject’s discourse.
 Jouissance: this refers to an enjoyment that is outside of symbolization. Jouissance can refer
to an enjoyment that is satisfying in some way, but it also refers to an enjoyment that is “too
much” and becomes painful. Jouissance is linked to Freud’s notion of the drives and
persists in many ways as a leftover of the process of subjective constitution – the little (or
not) piece of bodily enjoyment that circulates but cannot be captured (or controlled) by any
language. Jouissance is highly particular to each subject and cannot be shared – it works but
does not speak.
 Unconscious: For Lacan, the unconscious is produced as an effect of the constitution of the
subject in Language and is the ‘discourse of the Other.’ You see the unconscious in the
return of the repressed (slips, jokes, etc.) and in repetitions.
 Symptom/Phenomena/Act: Lacan talks about the symptom as what brings the subject into
treatment insofar as it causes suffering. For Lacan, symptoms are produced by neurotics as
a sort of opaque message about desire. In psychosis, rather than symptoms, Lacan talks
about language disturbances, delusions, hallucinations etc. as phenomena. Whereas
symptoms are located largely in the symbolic, psychotic phenomena are linked with the
imaginary. Finally, in perversion, Lacan usually refers to the acts of perverts – which are
largely about obtaining jouissance and also producing a limit via the Other. Perverse acts
are most often linked with the Real.
 Symbolic: refers the world of language and symbols – it is the realm in which we locate
meaning. Lacan notes that the Symbolic also refers to structures that exist outside of the
subject, but which the subject is subjected to – e.g. law, culture, religion, etc.
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 Imaginary: is the realm of the specular image and of fantasy. It functions in the Lacanian
paradigm as that which allows us to cover over and manage the gaps between the Real and
the Symbolic
 Real: refers to the materiality of the body, the enjoyment, pain, fragmentation, etc. that is
experienced but not completely caught by language
 Sinthome: a creative construction by the subject that produces subjective consistency in the
absence of or in addition to the paternal function
Organization of Conceptual Analysis
Because each autobiography represents a unique subject, I have chosen to organize the results of
the psychoanalytic analysis by author rather than by concept. First is the psychoanalytic analysis
of each autobiography, which explores each conceptual element in that author’s text and
provides a diagnostic summary for each author. Following that, I have included a table of
conceptual themes that represents similarities and differences across authors for each conceptual
category as well as a summary that briefly explores the commonalities and differences between
the texts.
Analysis
John.
Brief family history. John is the eldest of two children born to middle class parents in the
Midwest. His family history is a difficult one, full of chaos and abuse. John’s father was a
professor who struggled with severe alcoholism and who was physically violent towards both
John, his mother, and his younger brother. John’s impotence with respect to his father’s violence
was an important aspect of his childhood. John’s mother suffered from a psychotic break during
pre-adolescence and engaged in increasingly bizarre and paranoid behavior throughout his highschool years and after he left home. His parent’s marriage was volatile and the home
environment was not predictable for most of his childhood. John speaks some of his resentment
towards his parents in his book, but his anger towards them is clear throughout his text. John had
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a close relationship with one set of grandparents whom he visited in the summer and who
seemed to have been a source of support for him in an otherwise tumultuous home life.
Relation to the Other. John’s relation to the Other is complicated – in his text he
addresses the Other as absolute enigma. He seems to recognize, in some ways, that the Other
desires, which suggests a barred Other, but John experiences the desire as confusing at best and
impossible at worst. In fact, one way to characterize John’s approach to the Other is as an
attempt to avoid dealing with desire completely. We can see one example of this in his focus on
“Logic vs. Small Talk” – the title of a chapter in his book (Robison, 2008, pp. 189-194). In it, he
discusses his frustrations with conversations where he is uncertain what the other person wants
from him. He is aware, and demonstrates in the chapter, how his use of logic to determine the
‘correct response’ to the other person fails, because they want something else from the
communication. The ‘something else’ is what confounds him – and he feels ill-equipped to
provide an adequate response. He considers himself unable to participate in conversations like
“normal” people, but he notes several times that he tries to “say the things a normal person
would say” (p. 192) in order to avoid seeming “weird.” His description of his behavior suggests
that his choice to ‘act like’ normal people is a conscious one, and that he has some success
learning how to communicate by learning certain rules explicitly rather than intuitively.
John’s struggles with language seem to play out in two ways, both of which he is aware
of and describes in his text: he feels unable to read facial expressions and body language, and he
is unable to process the undercurrent of desire that is present in conversation, instead focusing on
more literal interpretations. Overall, though, John’s use of language is pretty unremarkable. He
uses metaphors well throughout the text, which suggests a relation to language that
acknowledges its incompleteness, although it is possible that he also learned these metaphors by
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rote (which would problematize that interpretation.) His descriptions of his life and events are
clear and descriptive, and he demonstrates a good facility with language such that he is able to
bring certain scenes to life for his readers. His overall story telling ability is somewhat
tangential, veering often into descriptions of objects and events that do not always appear as
central to the overall theme of a chapter or of the book in general. This latter tendency appears to
reflect some difficulty in understanding or interpreting the desire of the Other – although he is
aware that the Other desires something from him, he seems constantly at a loss as to what it
could be. We see this most explicitly in his chapter, Logic vs. Small Talk, where he gives voice
to his process of using logic to figure out what is desired in a conversation.
Relation to others. John’s relation to other people is also complicated – largely because
he seems to struggle to identify with others. As a child, his descriptions of his interactions with
others, and his attempted interactions, come across as though he was treating other people as
objects rather than as people. He reiterates repeatedly in the text that the internal states of other
people do not naturally occur to him, and we see over and over in his interactions that, despite
studied effort throughout his life, the other remains relatively opaque to him – and frustratingly
so.
John considers himself ‘different,’ but his struggles to fit in betray a desire to be
included. John’s relationships, and attempts at relationships, in childhood and early adolescence
were often met with ridicule and bullying. Despite that, John’s characterization of other people
does not take on a persecutory tone – he notes the injustice, but does not demonstrate any belief
that people are out to get him, and we do not see a repetition of persecutory figures in his
narrative. His retreat from relationships into objects, during these times, is characterized in
terms of his own failure. The safety of machines is a safety from ridicule.
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One point of interest in term of John’s relationships with others is his description of his
relationship with his second wife. He devotes an entire chapter to that relationship, but it is
organized almost exclusively around what his wife does for him. He attributes the stability of
their marriage to her ability to soothe him and help him navigate social spheres. In this
relationship, in particular, there seems to be something of an attempt to reduce his wife as a
subject to the status of an object – a tool to help John cope. That said, however, we also see in
the chapter his worry about the stability of his own status as beloved. He notes:
...she is patient when I ask the same questions over and over. For example, at noon most
days I phone her and say, “Woof! Do you like your mate?”
“Yes, I like you,” she reassures me.
An hour later, I must have forgotten the last call because I call again and say,
“Woof! Do you like your mate?”
“Yes, I still like you,” she says.
This may go on four or five times in the course of a day. By the fifth time, she
might say, “No, I don’t like you anymore,” but by then I know she is just teasing. She
really does like me. So I feel safe.
I have no idea why I ask the same thing over and over, but I do. If I am made to
stop, I often become very anxious. (p. 255)
In this passage, John is positioning his wife as an other who desires and asking about his place
with regard to her desire. His repetition of the question, and his anxiety when he is unable to ask
enough times, suggests a sense of instability with respect to his position in relation to the other.
Alienation. John’s alienation in language is clear in his ability to question the Other and
to question who he is, with respect to the Symbolic. Although he does not say this explicitly,
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John’s descriptions of his life in the text suggest that he was seeking an answer to the question,
“who am I?” Starting with the labels of misfit, defective, criminal, etc. that he received during
childhood, John spends a lot of time working to figure out where he fits and what type of person
he is. In childhood, we can see the alienation in the symbolic in his questions to the Other –
“Why don’t they like me? What’s wrong with me?” (p. 10). We see a similar type of question
later during his time spent working as an engineer. During that time, he notes a repeated sense of
feeling like a fraud, which can be read as a more sophisticated form of “what’s wrong with me?”
To ask these types of questions requires the experience of a lack in the Symbolic and suggests
alienation.
Separation. There is a question for me about the extent to which separation has occurred
for John. On the one hand, he does seem to be functioning in relation to an Other who is barred –
suggesting an awareness of an Other who desires – but the desire of the Other seems to be
something of a problematic. John is aware to some extent that other people want something, but
he experiences desire as wholly enigmatic and, without a fantasy to support a solution, he is left
rather clueless. John’s solution, in part, is to avoid the question of the desire of the Other, and
we can see this in his retreat into machines and away from people. But we also see a pull towards
people, despite his discomfort, that is suggestive of a split subject faced with the desire of the
Other. He says, “I want the Laurie’s of the world to like me. To not think I am weird. I can be
eccentric, but I don’t want to be weird. So I persist. I try to say things a “normal” person would
say (p. 192). He is describing here a desire to be something – “normal” – for the other, which
suggests at least some awareness of the Other’s desire and some interest in answering to it.
Paternal function. In John’s case, because there seems to be both a split subject and a
barred Other, it would seem that the paternal function was not foreclosed, at least not completely.
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Similarly, John does not demonstrate any behavior suggestive of disavowal – his relation to the
Other does seem to be at least partially mediated by desire. We do, however, see a kind of
perverse jouissance (discussed below) in the tricks that John plays during his adolescence. These
suggest some ability to purposefully arouse emotional turmoil in the other and could be seen as
an attempt to provoke a limit. However, this behavior seems to have been short-lived and John’s
ability to move away from it suggests that it is not a structural component. On the other hand, I
do not see much indication of repression, either, insofar as there is little evidence of an
organizing fantasy that would provide an answer to the desire of the Other.
In terms of what we see in John’s writing, it is the failure of the imaginary coupled with a
largely functioning symbolic, which is most striking (leading to issues with identification, lack of
an organizing fantasy, lack of gestalt of the body). None of the three actions Lacan articulates
for the paternal function can fully explain this configuration.
Desire and the object a. The extent to which John is mobilized by desire is unclear from
his descriptions in the text. One the one hand, we have, throughout his book, expressions of
wanting: “I want the Laurie’s of the world to like me” (p. 192), “I had started imagining a future
for myself in music” (p. 94), “And that’s what I dreamed of being. A craftsman. An artist,
working in automotive steel” (p. 49), “I wanted Cubby [his son] to get along better than I had”
(p. 222). Additionally, we see John make a number of career moves based on his sense of what
it means to be successful, which suggests that, at least to some extent, he is mobilized towards
recognition, which is a way of desiring.
John’s relationships with objects, however, particularly his machines, perhaps are the
most telling with respect to his handling of desire. John is almost aggressively interested in
machines – in the book it is musical instruments, electrical equipment, and cars. He says many
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times in the book that he is attracted to machines because they are safe and will not hurt him,
which suggests that his attraction is about an avoidance of the Other’s desire. However, his
attraction is also about control – learning how to manipulate the machines, creating new sound
effects, or knowing how to fix a complicated engine are all about a “compulsion to know
everything” (p. 214) about the machine in order to control it. Machines do not desire and,
because of that, they are easier to understand and control than are people. John’s wanting, at
least in the ways it shows up the text, appears in some important ways to be a want-to-avoid with
respect to the desire of the Other.
At the same time, John devotes an entire chapter of his book to becoming “one with the
machine” (p. 151). In this chapter he details how he is able to fully control the machines by
acting as their “brain.” In this section of the book, John’s own desire for control, and to some
extent power, becomes clear. In this section he is talking about building and running sound
systems and describes his role as like the Wizard of Oz – invisible but with the power to control
everything. He says:
You’ve taken thousands of lifeless individual parts – light bulbs, reflectors, circuit
breakers, dimmer packs, power cables, clamps, and trusses – and turned them into a
living thing. And you are its master.
You’ve designed it and built it, and now you’ve become a part of it. It’s come
alive. Electricity is its food, and you are its brain. You have become one with the
machine. As long as you remain part of it, it’s alive. Without you, it will revert to its
component parts. (p. 153)
Desire in this instance appears as a desire to create life out of what is lifeless and to be in control
of the life that you have created. This is a theme for John that repeats from early childhood
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through late adulthood, although his creations change form and, as he gets older, become less
complex. Here we can see something like object a in John’s discourse insofar as this desire for
creation and control seems to organize jouissance for John around particular interactions with
machines. However, in Lacanian theory, object a comes from the Other and, in John’s narrative,
it is unclear how the object is linked to the Other in his fantasy. There is a clear thread of
imagining himself as powerful, which is perhaps one clue, but it is a weak thread in his narrative,
making it difficult to discern how the fantasy of power is situated for him.
Jouissance. As mentioned above, John is able to obtain some enjoyment via his
interaction with machines. John also is able to obtain jouissance via his “functional naming”
practice, which I describe below. Both of these experiences of jouissance seem similar in
structure to a neurotic type of enjoyment that is obtained via “the inverse scale of the Law of
desire” (Lacan, 2006c, p. 700).
The most striking instances of jouissance in John’s text, however, occur when he is
“playing tricks.” In what appears largely as a perverse type of enjoyment, John’s “tricks”
usually involve provoking fear and the jouissance he experiences is related to the sense of power
and control he obtains in these moments.
In terms of jouissance that would be associated with psychotic phenomena, John does not
ever describe experiencing anything like a psychotic type of jouissance – which would come
from the outside and be experienced as invasive. Instead, we see something more akin to a
neurotic type of jouissance – somatic symptoms, worry about being a fraud, disgust, etc. – in
addition to the manipulative, or perverse series of acts described below.
Unconscious. John does not mention slips of the tongue in his text and, although he does
mention having bad dreams, he does not provide enough detail about his dream experiences to
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allow exploration. One clue to unconscious phenomena in John’s text is via the repetitions he
describes – his playing tricks, his “trouble with names,” and his repeated failures with social
interactions. Others are his complaints regarding stress-related illness, his worry about
legitimacy at work, and of his feelings of disgust with regard to his father (see below). A third is
John’s discussion of the “negative voices.”
John talks about hearing voices in his head that tell him negative things about himself
such as “You’re no good., You failed at school, and you’ll fail at this., You’re just a screw-up”
(Robison, 2008, p. 271). These types of thoughts are common in neurotic individuals and are
explicit illustrations of Lacan’s notion that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. In
neurotic cases, these thoughts are internalized and are experienced by the individual as coming
from their own mind. In psychotic cases, these types of thoughts also occur, but are experienced
by the individual as coming from the outside. In John’s case, it would seem that he experiences
these voices internally, but he does not ever completely own them. In his text they maintain a
sense of otherness for him and he experiences them as attempting to derail his success. In this
sense, they seem to straddle a space between symbolic and imaginary within the unconscious.
Symptom/Phenomena/Act. In his text John does not demonstrate or allude to anything
that would constitute psychotic phenomena. There is no delusional construct, no hallucinations,
and his experience of jouissance appears to be reasonably mediated. We do see a tendency to try
to ‘act like’ “normal” people, which is sometimes a psychotic strategy (see Verhaeghe, 2008),
however in a psychotic ‘acting like’ one would expect to see a total assimilation where the
individual is not actually “acting” but becomes the other, whereas in John’s case he is purposeful
and aware that he is acting.
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We do see several instances of what we could call perverse acts in John’s story, as
mentioned above. John’s tricks suggest a purposeful attempt to provoke anxiety or fear in the
Other. One gets the sense that he is skilled at producing an encounter with what is impossible to
symbolize and that he then enjoys watching as the other is overwhelmed. In one example, he
convinces his mother that her youngest son, John’s brother, has been kidnapped:
Look Park was a supposedly safe place close to home. She [his mother] went off
to the bathroom, and to get us some snacks. She was gone less than five minutes.
Varmint [his brother] was six, and I was fourteen. I had a sudden flash of inspiration.
“Quick, Varmint, hide in the shed before Mom gets back. We’ll trick her.”
I pointed to a small building where they stored maintenance tools and supplies.
Varmint slipped in and pulled the door shut, but opened it a crack so that he could see
what would happen…
Now ten minutes had passed with no sign of the Varmint. I was proud of him,
staying quiet in the shed all that time. He was doing very well. Our mother was getting
really upset. It was time to spring the trap.
“John Elder, I’m getting worried about your brother.”
Yes, it was definitely time.
“Why are you worried? He’s with your friend Paul. He’s fine.”
My mother did not have a friend Paul. She turned white.
“John Elder!! What are you talking about?”
“Varmint went with Paul. They went to find you and ride the train.”
We had her now. She was panicked.
“I don’t know any Paul. Who is he?”
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“How should I know? He’s your friend.”
That was just the right thing to say. I was getting really good at thinking on my
feet.
“Oh my God. Wait here.”
She ran off.
I decided we might have trouble if she came back with the police and they went
looking for Paul. I motioned Varmint out. (pp. 37-38)
In this example, John is purposefully provoking his mother’s terror, and he is clearly enjoying
the sense of control both over her and over his little brother. For the most part, the tricks that
John describes in his books mirror this type of situation – he figures out what will produce a
response, creates a situation, and enjoys himself while watching it unfold. John continues to
“trick” people into adulthood, however he seems to enjoy it less and less over time. Other than
his tricks, there are no other instances of perverse acts in John’s text.
While John mentions several typically neurotic complaints such as stress related physical
illness and worry about being a fraud, there is one repetition described in the text that seems to
be structured as symptom – his difficulty with naming and his insistence on naming people
himself. John brings up this struggle several times throughout the book, but he never indicates
what the “difficulty” comprises (e.g. does he have trouble remembering or does the
representation fail for some other reason?). What we do know, is that John chooses names for
the people in his life, regardless of their desire with respect to their name. He talks about his
naming practices as “functional naming” (p 12); however, this seems to most often mean that he
replaces the name of the person with the name of an object or animal. He talks about it in terms
of locating a more accurate representation of the person; however, his naming is largely about
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him and his impressions with respect to the individual. John says the following about his naming
practices:
Names have been a source of difficulty for me as long as I can remember because
the names I use [chose] are often not the names that people expect. In some cases, people
object to my use of names, and they occasionally get angry. Complaints like, “I’m not
Chubster! I’m Martha!” are all too familiar to me. But familiar or not, Martha will
always be the Chubster, unless I adopt a different name for some reason, like her order of
appearance among her sisters…To be considerate, I have tried on many occasions to use
a name other than the on I’ve chosen. I just can’t do it. When I try to call the Chubster
Martha, I choke on it. Martha does not work for me. But you can call her Martha if you
want. I won’t mind. I don’t impose my name usage on others. (p. 241)
John re-names most of the people in his life, and in all of the examples he gives in the book, he
re-names them with a word that he considers to be “functional,” which he defines as descriptive
and reasonable, although we can see from the example above that the new, “functional” name
may be experienced by the other as neither descriptive nor reasonable. This strikes me as a
symptom of sorts in that it is a move that both erases and provokes desire in the other. He is,
essentially, reducing the other to an object by refusing to acknowledge his name, while also
provoking the other’s desire for recognition. Additionally, throughout the text, John refers to his
“trouble with names,” which suggests that it causes him some suffering, however he also enjoys
his naming process and feels driven to do it. This two-part process of provoking desire and the
experience of jouissance is suggestive of a neurotic symptom in its structure. However, it is also
an aggressive act, in some ways, and carries a tinge of perverse enjoyment with it as well.
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Finally, there is one description in John’s book that is worth mentioning here as it seems
to illustrate well the ways that much of what John describes in his book fall somewhere between
a neurotic symptom and a perverse act. John discovered post-hole diggers at his grandmother’s
house one summer when he was about thirteen. For a short period, he became obsessed with
digging holes and, according to his book, he spent the entire summer filling his front yard with
holes. At first, he covered the holes with paper to see if he could trap anything, but when that
didn’t work he chose to use the holes to scare neighborhood children during Halloween by
wiring them to explode when the children walked by. There are many ways that the digging of
holes and attempts to trap something can be interpreted as a metaphor for John’s struggles to
understand (or trap) the desire of the Other; however, at some point the holes become something
he can use to frighten or provoke the other, which he experiences as enjoyment. Again we see a
mix of the neurotic and perverse that seems to characterize the landscape of John’s unconscious
experience.
Symbolic. As mentioned above, John’s relation to language is largely unremarkable. He
seems to exist linguistically, although there is always a question of recognition lingering in the
background of his discourse. We see this in his concerns about legitimacy and also in some of
his “tricks” which were, at least in part, an attempt at recognition.
John’s relationship to the Law is less clear. On the one hand, he seems to be drawn to
logic and machines in part because they follow strict rules that he is able to understand and that
make him feel comfortable. On the other hand, some of the aggressive nature of his actions – his
changing of people’s names, his tricks – could be interpreted as an attempt to challenge the Law
or illustrate the failure of the Law in certain moments.
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Imaginary. For John, the ability to make use of fantasy seems to be restricted in some
ways. In particular we can see this in his interactions and relationships with other people, as well
as in the minimal amount of fantasy material throughout his autobiography. Although there are
certainly some elements of the imaginary in John’s narrative, the imaginary does not seem to
function in an organizing way – it does not serve its purpose as propping up an ego that can
handle the Other.
The veritable absence of fantasy material in John’s text is striking. Throughout his book,
John questions the Other – who am I? am I a sociopath? Am I a fraud? – however we see very
little evidence of the development of fantasies around those questions. John occasionally
mentions imagining himself as powerful or in control and those moments seem to point to some
fantasy material for him; however, these fantasies do not seem to function outside of the very
limited situations where they occur. For example, John imagines himself as like the Wizard of
Oz while controlling the lighting system that he built, but that fantasy is fleeting and we do not
see it organizing John’s experience outside of that event. Outside of similar moments of
fantasizing, John does not seem to make use of a fundamental fantasy that situates desire and
constructs an identity for him. What is lacking seems largely to be about an image of himself that
is organizing for him and that allows him to make sense of himself through time. Additionally, in
terms of his relations with others, we can see a failure of the imaginary in John’s struggles to
form identifications, which are, for Lacan, the basis of interpersonal relationships, requiring an
image of self as a starting point.
There is also the absence of fantasies that help him explain other people’s behaviors
towards him – e.g. persecutory fantasies. John, while sometimes angry with others for
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mistreatment or confused about what people want from him, has no fantasy about the Other,
persecutory or not, that would help him to make sense of his experience.
Despite the absence of imaginary dynamics in most of John’s autobiography, there is one
instance where the imaginary comes to the fore in John’s description of a beating he suffered at
the hands of his father:
Whack! The belt would come down… I might sob or I might be quiet. It
depended on how hard he hit me. I thought of the knife my grandfather had given me for
Christmas. Solingen steel. Eight inches long. Sharp. I could roll over and jam it into
him, right to the hilt. Right in the belly. But I was afraid. What if I miss? What if it
doesn’t kill him? I had seen the movies, where they just keep on coming. They didn’t
die like they were supposed to. He might kill me for real, then.
So I never did. But I thought about it. Many nights. (p. 53)
In this example, the fantasy is of an immortal, homicidal father – who desires to annihilate his
son. In this fantasy, John is helpless in the face of his father’s desire to destroy him; although he
has a tool to limit the other, the knife, he does not have faith that it will work. This fantasy, as
John recounts it, seems to mirror his sense of helplessness and uncertainty in the face of the
Other’s desire in other areas of his life and is in some ways an apt metaphor for John’s
interpersonal experiences (the tools he has available to deal with the other do not reliably work).
This fantasy, for John, seems to hold a space that is similar to what we would expect from a
fundamental fantasy in a neurotic subject, however in this fantasy John is not an agent – while
not completely objectified, he maintains his place only by not acting from it. This is suggestive
of a more perverse fantasy than of a neurotic one, but John is also not wholly in the place of the
object, either. In many ways, while this expression of fantasy seems to represent something like
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a fundamental fantasy for John, it fails to provide a fundamental position for him with respect to
the Other.
Real. The Real does not make much of an appearance in John’s narrative, other than
through some of the means of his enjoyment that have been discussed above. He does not speak
much about his body, although we do know that he seems to lack a gestalt or coherent image of
his physical body and is often unaware of his body’s movements. He does not, however, talk of
feeling fragmented in his body or of any invasive physical experiences.
There is one example of the appearance of the Real in John’s brief discussion of thinking
in pictures; although this example also contains some elements of the Symbolic. John describes:
When I saw a wave in a book, it was printed next to an equation with symbols I didn’t
understand. When I saw a wave in my mind, I associated it with a particular sound. If I
concentrated hard, I could almost hear the waves. There were no symbols at all. I could
not figure out how to relate the two. (p. 63)
John is describing an image that he cannot translate into language. This corresponds to Lacan’s
notion of the Real, because John is referring to something that he cannot symbolize and thus
cannot share with others. However, although his experience of thinking in pictures is perhaps
partially experienced as a phenomenon in the Real, he considers it as a different type of language
and his ability to make use of that language in his work, which often involved collaboration,
suggests that it was at least partially symbolizable.
The Real also shows up in a moment of disgust John experiences in childhood. In this
example, John is faced with the Real of his father’s body and is disgusted. He describes:
…my father began to fall apart. First, he got psoriasis: nasty white scabs all over his
body. I had thought the cigarettes were disgusting, but those scales were worse. They
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fell off constantly, clogging the drain in the tub. He left a trail of white flecks wherever
he went. On the floor. On the rugs. On his clothes. The worst concentrations were in his
bathroom and in his bed. I kept well clear of those places.
My mother had to wash our clothes separately, because if any of mine got mixed
up with his, they came out with little white bits of scale on them and I wouldn’t wear
them. It would take three or four washings to get them clean enough to wear again. (p.
54).
For Lacan, affect almost always refers to the symbolic because it signals something with respect
to the subject’s relation to the Other; however, in this instance, John’s disgust is also associated
with a piece of the body that he cannot seem to avoid, which captures something of the Real as
well.
Sinthome. John’s creations and work with machines constitute something like a sinthome
for him. In Lacan’s definition, the sinthome provides a subjective consistency either in addition
to or as a replacement for the paternal function. It is not clear to me the extent to which the
paternal function is installed for John, but he does seem to have some struggles when faced with
the desire of the Other. John’s work with machines and his ability to create within the world of
objects provide him with a space where he is able to mediate the desire of the Other via the
machine. John’s work with machines is done at the request of others – whether in his music
career, his engineering career, or in his most recent career working as a mechanic, he does his
work for other people. He is producing something for the other, but by working through the
machine, he is able to create a space where the desire of the Other is not confusing, enigmatic, or
impossible.
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Summary. In terms of structural diagnosis for John, an argument could be made for both
neurosis and perversion. Although the Other does appear to be barred for him, the barring seems
to be unstable and we see him repeatedly provoking the limit of the Law through his tricks,
which is suggestive of perversion. In other ways, however, John seems to have some relation to
the desire of the Other, however fraught, and some questions with respect to his position in
relation to that desire, which is more in line with a neurotic position.
For John, issues of separation and paternal function seem to be most important in terms
of understanding his subjective constitution. While John seems to have the ability to recognize
that the Other desires, he feels ill-equipped to understand or make sense of that desire.
Typically, we would expect the fantasy to provide an imaginary answer to this riddle that also
creates a space for John in relation to the Other. However, this fantasy is what is missing in
John’s account, which points to a failure of the Imaginary and suggests that repression is not
operating, or not operating fully. What we don’t see in John’s account, however is anything
suggestive of foreclosure, which would appear in the form of an invasive and persecutory Other.
In terms of perversion as a differential structural diagnosis, John clearly experiences
enjoyment by provoking the limit of the Law or, in other words, by pushing people to the point
where they feel exposed or unprotected. He enjoys the power in this position and it allows him a
certain safety with respect to the Other’s desire. Here, we can see how disavowal may be at play
for him insofar as he is refusing to acknowledge castration and is instead assuming a position
motivated by jouissance rather than by desire. For John, however, this position is not consistent
and we see him just as often withdraw from the Other into machines as we see him situate
himself as instrument of jouissance. It is this movement between the perverse and the neurotic
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that seems to characterize John’s unique subject position and also make structural diagnosis
difficult.
John’s relation to machines provides the best way of understanding his subjective
position as well as points to a sinthomatic supplement that allows him to function as a subject in
relation to the Other. For John, the machine seems to offer a space free from the immediate
experience of the Other’s desire, without the need for a mediating fantasy. John makes use of
the logic of the machine as a type of supplementary Law, it provides an organization to his
experience and he is able to assume a place as a subject with respect to the Law of the machine –
and he uses this as a way to mediate his relation to the Other. The logic of the fantasy is replaced
by the logic of the machine. This way of creating and maintaining a subjective position by
making use of a supplement or artifice cannot be understood fully within the confines of the
structural clinic.
Jesse.
Brief family history. Jesse is the eldest of two children born into an upper middle class
Jewish family in the northeast. His describes a fairly stable childhood with no evidence of major
family conflict. His relationship with both parents is described as stable and he seems to feel
secure and loved within the context of his family. He has strong relationships with extended
family, including both sets of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Jesse describes a couple
of times where his younger sister appears frustrated with the amount of leeway Jesse is given
with respect to his behavior, but overall his family is characterized as explicitly supportive and
generous, helping him to make changes to his behavior on some occasions while also being
sensitive to his needs and making space for behaviors and choices that were sometimes
uncomfortable for them.
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Relation to the Other. Like John, Jesse’s experience of the Other is one of mystery or
enigma. However, unlike John, Jesse does not seem to be avoiding exposure to the desire of the
Other, but rather he seems to be making a concerted effort to provoke it, ostensibly in order to
understand it. His book is a testament both to his seemingly inexhaustible need to understand the
Other and to his constant frustration over his inability to embody the object of desire of the
Other. At the beginning of his book, Jesse shares his lifelong experience of “pushing against a
mysterious force.” In my reading, the mysterious force is precisely the desire of the Other – the
enigma against which Jesse situates the questions of his being. We see this in his sense of being
constantly judged by the Other, but continually making attempts to be recognized. In his
childhood, he describes acting out in school as a way to gain attention, his addiction to the thrill
of attention that he received when performing, and his constant demand that he be “given a
chance” by a neurotypical public. Unlike John, Jesse craves the desire of the Other, but feels illequipped to command it consistently, and, as such, experiences the Other overall as harsh,
opaque, and unforgiving.
Jesse’s relation to language, like John’s, is fairly unremarkable on the surface. His
descriptions are rich and he seems to have a good grasp of the use of metaphor – suggesting an
awareness of the lack in language around which desire circulates. But Jesse’s awareness of this
lack does not appear to be wholly functional and he struggles with the nuances of language,
specifically with nonverbal communication. We see this in Jesse’s anger over the use of silence
by “neurotypicals” to make a point. For Jesse, silence seems to represent desire at its most
enigmatic and impossible. He says, “It is mystifying and maddening to watch neurotypicals
communicate by … not communicating” (Saperstein, 2010, p. 6). For Jesse, the silence is
uninterpretable, although he knows that it is saying something. Although Jesse, unlike John,

176

seems to be capable of rich fantasy (see below) it is in the confrontation with the silent Other that
his fantasy fails him. This is also where Jesse’s symptom appears (see below).
Relation to others. For Jesse, the relation to others in his life is complicated and, in many
ways, contradictory. In some ways we see Jesse as capable of identification with others and able
to act as caring and empathetic (e.g. in his work with teenagers living with HIV/AIDS) while in
other ways we see him routinely ignore the desire of the other in order to pursue his own
interests (e.g., his rambling Christmas cards). In both cases, however, Jesse is seeking
recognition and admiration, and his anger towards neurotypicals, mentioned several times in his
text, is related to his sense that they do not recognize his gifts or contributions.
Like John, Jesse indicates a desire to have relationships with others, but unlike John,
Jesse does not really try to “fit in” with the neurotypical world. In a strategy that is somewhat
confusing, he characterizes neurotypical others as persecutory, shortsighted, and rude, while also
chronically seeking out their approval of his differences. Because of this, Jesse often describes
his relation to others as a type of forcing – he “imposes” himself on others in an attempt to force
a relationship of sorts. Unlike John, Jesse does not avoid relationships, but instead compulsively
seeks them out, “imposing” himself on others in the hopes that this will somehow generate the
recognition that he is so desperately craving. He says, “it is often necessary to impose yourself
upon the lives of those who come to knee jerk conclusions about you. Show them who you are
and do not be modest about your accomplishments. It would be naïve to assume the demons
eventually go away, but they may be utilized to one’s advantage” (p. 219). Often, however, these
relationships are based on what the other can provide for Jesse, namely approval and recognition,
rather than what he may provide in terms of reciprocity. Jesse’s tendency to impose himself
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betrays a relation to the other that is in many ways nonreciprocal and, more importantly, points
to Jesse’s uncertainty with respect to his place in the other’s desire.
Alienation. Alienation, for Jesse, appears in the struggle to define himself within the
context of Asperger’s. Unlike John, Jesse does not frame his subjectivity as a question; rather, he
frames it in terms of a fight for recognition. Jesse notes his difference from others – his
“weirdness” – and it is through this difference that he positions himself in the symbolic. Making
use of the label of Asperger’s – a label that comes to him from the Other – he locates a symbolic
space and it is from that space that he is able to speak to others about himself. But, for Jesse, that
symbolic space is alienating insofar as it constantly highlights the ways that his subjectivity is
determined via identification with a definition provided by the Other. We see Jesse in a perpetual
struggle to make use of this identity in a way that is not stifling – he works effortfully to try to
tease out his singularity without letting go of the label that identifies him. We see this in his
willingness to claim the space provided by Asperger’s – even going so far as to call himself
“Aspergian,” while simultaneously chiding the Other for not seeing him as an individual with
unique gifts and abilities (e.g., p. 41).
Separation. Jesse clearly has a relation to the Other and is in a position to question the
desire of the Other. Like John, Jesse seems to experience the lack in the Other as enigmatic;
however, unlike John, Jesse does seem to have a fantasy that he can fulfill it. We see this in his
frequent demand that the Other just “give him a chance.” Jesse seems to have some sense that he
is what the other wants…they just don’t know it yet. This positioning with respect to the Other,
the consistent pleas and the persistent resentment, suggest separation as well as the presence of
what Lacan would call a fundamental fantasy. Jesse is functioning as a split subject in relation to
the desire of the Other.
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Paternal function. The paternal function is operating for Jesse – we see a split subject,
the development of a fundamental fantasy, and a circulation of desire. As such, we know that, at
the very least the paternal function has not been foreclosed. We also do not see any evidence in
Jesse’s narrative of a paternal function that is disavowed. While Jesse may sometimes push the
boundaries in relationships and may be perceived as “creepy” on occasion, he is aware of the
limits of the law and is largely respectful of that. We do see some tendency to push the limit, so
to speak, for example in his “forcing” of relationships, however this seems to be driven more by
frustration (read desire) than about jouissance. And he is not ever, at least in the descriptions he
provides, provoking an encounter with the limit in the Other. Instead, what we tend to see with
Jesse is a much more neurotic style, indicative of repression. He has a fantasy of recognition, of
being seen and desired by the Other. Such a fantasy places him in the position of object for the
Other, pointing to repression of castration that would prohibit such a position. Although Jesse
does not necessarily always behave in the way that we might expect of a neurotic, the presence
of repression suggests the instantiation of the paternal function for him structurally.
Desire and the object a. If we can say nothing else about Jesse, we can say that he is
perpetually frustrated. In the Lacanian frame, frustration comes directly from desire. And, it is
precisely Jesse’s desire that leads him to his continual “pushing against a force,” his “forcing” of
himself into relationships with others, and his demand that people “give him a chance.” Jesse
wants something from the other and we can see throughout his narrative the ways that that desire
animates and propels him. Unlike John, it is clear that Jesse’s desire is organized through a
fantasy that involves the Other and stems from his own lack.
While in John’s narrative we see a clear series of literal objects in machines, Jesse’s
narrative lacks a focus on literal objects and instead focuses on others. For Jesse, as noted above,
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desire seems to be organized around the question of recognition or approval of the other. His
desire to be “given a chance” by the neurotypical public is one example of this. But what we
also see in Jesse’s narrative, is the theme of failure to achieve this recognition, and my sense is
that it is in the push to recognition and its ultimate failure that he is able to organize his
jouissance.
If we take the example of the Christmas cards, we can see on the one hand Jesse’s desire
for recognition and approval. And we can see it in various ways – through the participation in a
social ritual, through the act of personalizing each card, and through his use of “Aspergish” as a
way to impress with his uniqueness. On the other hand, we can see the literal enjoyment in the
“overbearing randomness” of his writing in the cards, a choice that undoes the implicit social
pact of holiday cards, and his awareness, both conscious and unconscious, that he is sending a
message that is both unwanted and unable to be received as intended. He knows he will fail on
some level, but maintains the fantasy that he will succeed and will be recognized for his
creativity and particularity. It is in this push-towards-failure that we can place the object a as it
seems to characterize the circulation of desire and the organization of jouissance for Jesse.
Jouissance. Jesse’s jouissance makes its appearance in the text in a few consistent ways.
First, we see it in his enjoyment with respect to language. Throughout the text, we follow him
through a series of puns and purposeful misspellings that bring out both the materiality and the
polysemy of words, and in a way that allows Jesse to show off his ability to use language beyond
meaning. For example, Jesse purposefully appropriates the words “hypocrite” and “hypocritical”
several times throughout the text: “hyppocwit” (p. 6), “the fantastical Krit from the Land of the
Hippos (gibberish for hypocrite)” (p. 51), “hipochritical” (p. 35), “hypokriticol” (p.92). The
enjoyment that he gets from this control over the spelling is palpable in the text – he does not
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seem to be able to stop himself from both using and changing this word repeatedly, pointing to
an enjoyment that is beyond the production of meaning in the text, what Lacan might call jouisens.
We also see jouissance in Jesse’s “pushing against a force” and “forcing” of himself in
relationships. In those instances, there seems to be jouissance both in the attempts to force as
well as in the failure that results (see above). For Jesse, these experiences of jouissance occur in
relation to the limit of the Other and involve a fantasy of transgressing that limit. In a Lacanian
framework, this is a neurotic type of jouissance. And, for Jesse, the types of jouissance we see in
his text are consistently of a neurotic quality. We do not often see the invasive or overwhelming
jouissance typical of psychosis nor do we see the type of perverse enjoyment that accompanies
attempts to situate oneself as the object of the Other’s enjoyment.
Unconscious. Like John, we do not see instances or descriptions of parapraxes in Jesse’s
text, nor does he share dream images. We do see, however, several elements of repetition that
point to unconscious content. On the one hand we have the repetition of the plea, “give me a
chance,” which could be seen as a plea for love as well as an attempt by Jesse to situate himself
in the place of the other’s desire. We also see repetition in the content of the fantasies that Jesse
describes throughout his book (see below). And finally, we see repetition in the periods of angst
during transitions where Jesse is faced with the question of what to do next, which can be read as
a question regarding his own desire.
Symptom/phenomena/act. For Jesse, we largely see a series of symptom formations,
rather than psychotic phenomena or perversions. Most prominently, the repetition of his
“forcing himself” can be read as a symptom. In a neurotic symptom, we can expect to see an
attempt at resolution of an unconscious conflict. In Jesse’s case, one conflict seems to be
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between wanting and not wanting to be desired by the Other. We see this in his “Christmas Card
Obsession” (p. 29). On the one hand, Jesse has some awareness that his choice to send Christmas
cards “filled with handwritten ramblings” (p. 25) to people that he barely knows is not likely to
make him friends, but he feels compelled to do it, every year, with the fantasy that people will be
delighted with his thoughtfulness. We see this again with his choice to send similarly rambling
birthday cards to female acquaintances as a way to get dates (p. 90). This rises to the level of a
symptom because of the felt insistence of the repetition, which points to the presence of
jouissance, and also because it provides a solution to the conflict – he can imagine himself as
desirable while making it impossible for himself to be actually desired.
Like with John, we do not see any psychotic phenomena in Jesse’s text. His fantasy life is
rich and he certainly entertains some fantasy of being persecuted; however, it seems that the
persecution, for Jesse, is protective rather than invasive. In psychosis, we would expect to see a
delusional construct that explains the persecution via an Other that is not lacking. Jesse imagines
an Other that is persecutory because it is lacking the knowledge of all that Jesse is able to offer.
Similarly, we don’t see much that rises to the level of a perverse act. Jesse does seem to
have experienced some moments when he enjoyed making others feel uncomfortable, and we
can certainly read something like his “Christmas Card Obsession” in that way, but it seems from
his description that the jouissance he experiences via that obsession occurs largely in the writing
of the card rather than in the response of the Other. He finds the response of the other irritating or
frustrating rather than satisfying or enjoyable (e.g. p. 90).
Symbolic. Jesse’s relation to language is suggestive of a neurotic structure. He is able to
make use of language to produce meaning and is also able to make use of language beyond
meaning – to enjoy its materiality, for example in his gleeful misspelling of hypocrite (e.g. p. 6).
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Jesse is also situated in language, both in terms of his proper name as well as in terms of his
diagnosis. Jesse’s relation to the Law is also relatively clear. His pushing or forcing of himself
is, in some ways, as push against the limit of the Law, but it is also recognition of it.
Imaginary. Unlike John, Jesse seems to have an imaginary that functions to situate him
with respect to the Other. Jesse’s text is, in large part, both a narrative about his life and a series
of fantasies told as fictions woven through the text. The fantasy material in Jesse’s narrative is
woven into the text through asides. Jesse begins by telling about an experience, event,
encounter, etc. and somewhere in the middle the reader is taken on a bypass through the fantasy
before the story can be completed. We can see this trajectory in the following example. Jesse is
telling a story about tasting a flavored condom during a sex education class:
Not understanding what she meant by “taste it,” I popped the latex sphere in my mouth as
a little girl clasped her hands on her freckled cheeks like a female version of Macaulay
Culkin on the Home Alone poster. “Oh my God!” she groaned. “He put the entire thing
in his mouth!” As with a stick of fresh bubble gum, I experienced a sharp burst of flavor
and blew a phallic bubble. In a moment of panic, yanked the condom out of my mouth.
What if I propelled it to the back of my mouth and swallowed it? What if it caused me to
choke, lose consciousness, and force the hospital to surgically remove it from my throat?
The doctors would probably save my life, although the oxygen deprivation would result
in a lifelong vegetative state. They would keep me alive at the taxpayers’ expense so I
could inadvertently serve as a morale booster. My tragedy would lift the spirits of new
paraplegics or patients recently diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer. These tragic
souls, forced to come to terms with their grim realities would react with either heaving
sobs or catatonia. The nurses would have a ritual of wheeling melancholy patients past
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my room and pointing. “You think you have it bad! Wait until you hear what happened to
that poor bastard!”
They would abandon all sense of decorum and forget that a soul once occupied
this barely living shell – someone with dreams. They would laugh until tears rolled down
their cheeks…drowning out my respirator’s hum. Their mirth would intertwine with an
excruciating truth – that life (or at least its essence) could potentially be extinguished
forever by accidentally choking on a flavored condom! For a short while, they would
forget they may never walk again or had only four months to live. (pp. 122-123)
In this example, Jesse’s fantasy allows him to imagine himself as desirable in some way, even
when reduced to nothing more than a body. He seems to organize his enjoyment around holding
a position of power through ridicule in some ways. Many of his fantasies are organized in a
similar way – he makes a mistake or chooses to do something unusual, is ridiculed or punished,
but ultimately gains adoration and/or recognition in the end. See for example his description of
the cat shit bag fantasy (pp. 30-31), the fantasy of giving his corpse to the school to display (p.
86), or the fantasy of scaring teenagers straight (pp. 204-205). In all of these examples, the
fantasy is working to answer the question of who I am for the Other in a way that maintains
desire and regulates jouissance.
Real. The Real makes it appearances in Jesse’s text largely through the jouissance that
he appears to experience with respect to failure as well as through his manipulation of language
in the text, as noted above. Jesse does not speak directly about his body much in the text and he
seems to treat his body much the way one would expect from a neurotic. He doesn’t talk about
feeling like his body is fragmented or disjointed. He is aware of his body and seems to take it for
granted, noting when it does not work the way he wants it to, but assuming that he will be able to

184

make use of it as needed. The Real does show up for Jesse in relation to his body in his
descriptions of stimulation (stimming) and in some instances of self-injury.
Lacan talks about the Real as that which is unsymbolizable but that persists in the subject.
It seems that for Jesse, encounters with the Real produce a need to discharge jouissance and we
see this in stimming or in self-injury. For example, Jesse describes a reaction to the perceived
loss of his DVD collection – a loss that was unsymbolizable because he could not language why
he was so drawn to the disks in the first place – where he repeatedly slaps the staircase and hits
himself. In another example, when forced to take a job he hates after his Appalachian hike has
ended, Jesse copes by “hitting myself, jumping up and down, or mumbling nonsense” (p. 149).
In both instances, Jesse is faced with an experience that he is unable to language, an encounter
with the non-sense of the Real. He experiences that non-sense in his body and we can see in his
self-injury and stimming behavior an attempt to discharge that energy.
Sinthome. For Jesse, it seems that desire and jouissance are managed for him via a
symptom rather than a sinthome. His perpetual frustration and plea for a chance, coupled with
the push towards failure suggest a symptomatic formation – which includes a persistent suffering
for the subject. That suffering is present in Jesse’s text and his questions abut his own suffering
take the form of a questions about identity and his relation to others, typical of a neurotic
symptom. Jesse sums this up well in a description from a public speaking engagement:
Regardless of whether my audience is composed of Asperger’s students or neurotypicals,
I usually don a candy cane-colored court jester hat with jingle bells affixed to each fabric
branch. And, of course, the ensemble would not be complete without my Homer
Simpson slippers. The nonsensical costume is meant to prove a point. Individuals with
Asperger’s struggle with flexibility and (in my case) feelings of entitlement. If my
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intentions are good, then I lack empathy for the comfort zones of others and feel entitled
to overstep my bounds. Survival among the neurotypicals requires relentless
compromise, overanalyzing the situation, and making life just a little more complicated in
order to solve the simplest problems.
In my costume, I am pretending to be a gross exaggeration of my inflexible,
egocentric self – someone who always flaunted his flamboyant uniqueness and paid a
horrific price. My character becomes clinically depressed from watching others enjoy the
breaks associated with career advancement and romance. And yet…he continues to fail
miserably. (pp. 183-184)
It is possible that Jesse’s speaking career, which is mentioned towards the end of the book, may
serve as something like a sinthome for him insofar as it allows him to address the other from a
secure position, identified with his diagnosis, and receive recognition while also being allowed to
be as unique or “weird” as he desires. Such a sinthomatic position would allow Jesse to
experience the jouissance of being “weird,” freeing his desire for recognition from the need to
continue to fail.
Summary. In both the structural clinic and the clinic of knots, Jesse falls squarely in the
category of neurotic and, most likely, in the position of hysteric. As any Lacanian hysteric, he
desires the desire of the Other and his jouissance is organized around occupying the place of the
object, but never becoming it.
For Jesse, the question of structural diagnosis is relatively clear. He occupies a symbolic
space, one provided by both his name and by his diagnosis, and is negotiating questions of
identity from within that symbolic space. For Jesse, the Other is barred and the Law functions
well to secure his subjective space – he does not feel threatened by the Other and we do not see
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any concerns about being devoured, destroyed, subsumed, erased, etc. either in his relationships
or in his fantasy. Jesse’s fantasy functions as an imaginary solution to the enigma of the Other’s
desire and is evidence that the paternal function is operating and that repression has occurred.
Jesse’s jouissance is well contained within the symptom formation – the repetition of
failure produces a jouissance that is at least somewhat satisfying for him. Jesse does seem to
struggle with certain elements of his experience that he cannot language and that appear in Real,
prompting a return of jouissance that is sometimes overwhelming. This is not inconsistent with a
neurotic presentation and Jesse has a series of methods, albeit sometimes destructive, that allow
him to negotiate and manage this jouissance when it occurs.
Jesse’s symptom works for him in the way that is typical of a neurotic – it solves an
unconscious conflict while also producing both suffering and satisfaction. The introduction of
his public speaking career may mark a move to a sinthome, or perhaps a move more towards
something like sublimation. Jesse does not need a supplement or a type of artifice to stabilize his
subjective position – his symptom does that work for him - however he does need a way to
minimize suffering. The move to public speaking may allow him to make use of his symptom,
to identify with it, in a way that removes the impetus to fail.
Wendy.
Brief family history. Wendy was the oldest of four children born into a working class
family in rural England. Her description of her early family life suggests that both parents were
frustrated with her challenging behavior and both were inclined either towards ignoring her or
punishing her for her unusual choices. Wendy does not speak much of her mother, other than to
suggest that as an adult she has tried to improve the relationship and talk to her mother more
openly about her diagnosis. Wendy seems to have struggled in the relationship with her father,
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who seems to have been disappointed in her. Wendy wanted his approval, but was unable to
figure out how to get it. She was deeply hurt by his lack of interest in relating with her.
Wendy’s family moved fairly frequently during her childhood and she was often in a new
educational setting. She also suffered from some childhood injuries and illnesses requiring
prolonged hospitalization, during which time she was separated from her family. She does not
talk much about her siblings, although she does mention as a child wanting to take the place of a
brother who died in infancy. Her parents divorced when she was an adult and there is some
suggestion of ongoing conflict in the family during her childhood, although she does not provide
details of this.
Relation to the Other. Wendy says on the first page of her book, “What I cannot do is
fully participate in the complexities of apprehension, interpretation, communication, and
comprehension” (Lawson, 1998, p. 1). The trajectory of her book gives us perhaps the clearest
picture of her relation to the Other. Wendy is speaking about herself, but she is not telling a
story. Her autobiography jumps sometimes incomprehensibly from one experience to the next,
loosely organized by time, but often moving back and forth through the timeline without
explanation. Wendy clearly does not have a sense of her audience – which suggests a blindness
to the desire of the Other. She indicates in the opening that she hopes her book will be valuable
to parents, healthcare workers, and other “interested readers” and there are points in the book
where she is clearly speaking to those individuals. But, she is not providing much by way of
typical knowledge. Instead, she is most often providing only idiosyncratic information, which is
not organized to provide the types of advice that one usually expects from those types of books.
For Wendy, the myriad functions of language really do seem to be outside of her ability
to comprehend and participate, although she makes a lot of effort. Like John, Wendy struggles
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with the non-verbal aspects of language as well as with its polysemy – she is confused as to how
language can mean something other than what it says. For Wendy, however, this seems to point
to an Other that is not lacking, that does not desire. It is an other than is not barred, in the
Lacanian sense, but it is also not an Other that Wendy experiences as invasive. Instead, her
relation to the Other as it appears in her book is largely one of absence. In a relation that is
markedly different from both John and Jesse, Wendy almost seems to forget the Other. She
spends her time in something like a fusion with objects and her experience of the Other appears
only in moments of unwelcomed interruption. We see this begin to shift over the course of her
life. As an older adult, she seems to have been able to develop an awareness of the Other and to
anticipate the interruption; however, her overall relation to the Other seems unchanged.
Relation to others. Wendy’s relation to others changes form over the course of her text.
In her descriptions of childhood and early adulthood, Wendy either treats others as a type of
object or she withdraws and avoids interactions altogether. In her descriptions of her family,
Wendy shares a sense of suspicion and a desire to withdraw. She says, “On reflection, I think
my family tried to include me in things that were happening, but kindness and affection were
emotions I did not understand. I so often felt suspicious and frustrated – Why is this person
talking to me? I would think. Other people seemed to be there just to interrupt and disturb me,
or demand from me. I responded with withdrawal or anger” (p. 15). Wendy shares similar
reactions to other relatives, children at school, and other people who tried to engage her. Her
suspicion suggests some awareness that people may want something from her, while her
withdrawal suggests a position of avoidance with respect to the others’ desire and/or demands. It
is unclear from Wendy’s descriptions of her interactions with and withdrawal from others
whether she developed a fantasy about what people wanted from her, but she gives the
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impression that her discomfort was not about what people wanted, but that they wanted at all –
the experience of being subjected to the desire of the other, whatever it may have been, was to be
avoided and Wendy’s decisions to withdraw into her “own world” allowed her to completely
ignore the interlocution.
There were people with whom Wendy did want to have a relationship; however, she dealt
with those others as though they were objects. She notes, “Sometimes at school, especially
during my early teens, I formed strong attachments to certain girls, following them everywhere
just to be close to them. The tone of someone’s voice or the shape of their smile could lull me.
Sometimes it was simply the length of their hair that attracted me and how it shone when the
light touched it” (p. 40). Wendy is describing here a relation to the other that takes the other as
an object of enjoyment rather than another subject.
This relation to the other as object remains central for Wendy throughout the text;
however, we see emerge something like a desire for love and recognition for a select few. I say
“something like a desire,” because it is unclear if Wendy truly wants these things or if this
articulation of wanting is merely another way to objectify the other. For example, Wendy
describes her experiences with the nurses during a hospitalization at age 10:
In the hospital, the nurses had been different. They tried to reach me and capture my
attention; their acceptance and pleasure were high on my agenda. I became their little
helper, performing a number of minor chores, but if one of them came too close to me
I’d freeze. Sometimes a nurse would try to hug me or tickle me. This just sent me into a
panic attack and I’d madly suck the roof of my mouth or reach for the sheets to wrap
around me.
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I did not understand why I was afraid of touch but now I think it just caused lots
of sensations that were overwhelming for me. It also called for some form of response,
which meant having to make a decision. Decisions were confusing for me and it was
easier to play it safe and stay with what was familiar. (pp. 40-41)
For Wendy, wanting something from the other – recognition, etc. – feels safe enough, until the
other wants something from her. Touch seems to signal that desire for her and you can hear it in
her concerns about having to make a decision when touched, which can be read as a need to
respond to the other. It is at that moment, that Wendy, panicked, withdraws to the safety of her
own world. These interactions suggest that Wendy is able to briefly tolerate the other as subject –
the other can desire, just as long as that desire does not “touch” her. Later in the text, in a
curious reversal, Wendy comes to crave the touch of the other and begins to demand it – again
transforming subject into object of enjoyment (p. 113).
To some extent, Wendy is aware of this tendency, referring to it throughout the book as
her “egocentrism” – and we hear echos of Jesse’s self-professed ‘entitlement’ – suggesting that it
is, in some measure, a choice, albeit an unconscious one. She says about her demands to be held,
“Of course, it’s important to learn how to consider others, but all I could feel was my need. I
still find it very difficult to put myself “in the other person’s shoes”. I can only feel my needs and
myself – everything else is foreign and alien to me” (p. 113). Wendy’s relation to the other,
overall, does seem to be a relation based largely on egocentrism insofar as Wendy is largely
unable to sustain the other in the position of subject for very long. She seems better able to
manage this as she gets older; however, other people still remain things she makes use of, rather
than people with whom she engages.
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Alienation. It is unclear to me the extent to which Wendy has experienced alienation. On
the one hand, she does begin to wonder about herself around the time of her divorce – but that
wondering seems to be more about the accuracy of the labels she had been given rather then a
wondering about who she is, where she fits, etc. And we do not ever hear her ask anything about
who she is for the Other. In fact, Wendy does not wonder about her place or ask many questions
about who she is at all. Instead, Wendy talks about the ways that her body and her physical
experience produced a space of constancy for her that allowed her to be alive. She says, “I
always needed to be on the move. Even when I was made to sit still on a chair, I had to rock it.
If I sat on the floor, I needed to rock myself and suck the roof of my mouth – the rhythm and the
movement meant I was alive and kept the music going. I think I believed that if I ended the
movement, then that would be the end of me” (p. 24). This sense of self-continuity through
physical sensation is the closest that Wendy gets to something we can call a self, but it is not a
self that exists in language. It is not an identity.
Later in the book, Wendy describes her confusion when she realizes that other people
may perceive a difference between her personal and professional self – she says:
The following dichotomy is very interesting to me: There are times when I am in
“professional” mode and the person I am with would probably never believe I was
autistic. They might think I am younger than I am or a little eccentric but otherwise
perfectly “normal.” I felt really mystified by this and so I talked to my friend, Ruth. She
explained to me that we are all different with different people. “Some of us even have
‘telephone voices’ that we employ when we speak over the telephone.” I didn’t get it.
“Well, it’s not that you are different people, but rather that different aspects of
Wendy, the same person, are revealed at different times and with different individuals.”

192

Her response opened another concept for me. My confusion lessened each time
this happened and as Ruth continues with me today, I know I will keep “growing up”.
Becoming more adult and less child-like is quite a challenge and one I am glad I do not
have to attempt alone. (pp. 110-111)
In this example, we see Wendy’s confusion with respect to her “self” – how can she come to
know it if it is always different? Of course, this suggests that Wendy does not already possess a
sense of identity in the way her friend Ruth does, for example. On the other hand, it is important
to note what she says about what makes this less confusing for her – she notes that the repetition
makes it less confusing, but it is that “Ruth continues with me” that allows her to continue to
grow up – read exist in time. Again, we see a need to hang on to something outside in order to
maintain constancy of the self. Had alienation occurred, we should see a space for Wendy – one
that may come under attack or feel insecure to her, but one that should be there for her
nonetheless.
Separation. There is not much evidence of separation in Wendy’s text. Rather than
motivated by desire, she seems most often motivated by jouissance. This is consistent with what
appears to be a poorly circumscribed subjective space. We do not see an abundance of the
invasive type of jouissance – which may be the result of a lack of complete alienation in the
symbolic (see above), but we do see an abundance of jouissance and the relative absence of
desire as a motivating/propelling force.
Paternal function. It seems likely, given Wendy’s description of her life, that the
paternal function is not operating for her. There is clearly no repression – we do not see any
evidence of a neurotic structure through Wendy’s text and she does not take a subjective position
with respect to the desire of the Other. Because of this lack of relation with the Other, we also
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fail to see anything like disavowal in the text. Wendy’s enjoyment is singular and does not rely at
all on prohibition or the Other. There does seem to be something like foreclosure – although my
sense is that it may be even prior to what is understood by foreclosure in psychosis. We do see
some elements of a psychosis emerge in the hallucinations and the voices Wendy describes,
although there does not seem to be a delusional construct. Perhaps the most relevant element is
Wendy’s failure to participate in the social contract, which suggests foreclosure or the absence of
a paternal metaphor completely.
Desire and the object a. For a neurotic, desire takes the shape of a propelling or
motivating force. And, for a neurotic, desire is organized around a lack or an absence. In
Lacanian terms, the object a represents the absence around which desire is organized (and the
series of objects that come to briefly inhabit that space). In a neurotic structure, the lack comes
from subjectivization through alienation and separation – the lack is produced concurrently with
the subject as she comes to occupy her symbolic space. For Wendy, it does not seem as though
the neurotic subjectivization has occurred. Instead, we see her struggle over and over again to
maintain a sense of consistency of existence in the face of change – there is no room there for
desire in the way that we might understand it via neurosis.
Instead of a more neurotic desire, it reads more like a push towards being – Wendy works
hard to find strategies that will help her continue to exist, to stay the same, when faced with
difference. In Lacanian terms, we may say that Wendy exists at the level of the Real, but she has
not fully achieved being at the level of the Symbolic. We can see this in the disorganizing
effects of being faced with a decision, which forces a confrontation with lack. She describes:
For reasons I do not understand, everyday decisions can be very traumatic. As a child,
everyday occurrences could be very frightening.
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To help with these decisions, I had favourite clothes to wear, favourite eating
utensils and a habitual, structured routine. Of course, there were times when this structure
came apart at the seams and bedlam occurred. When this happened, I experienced a
feeling of terror and insecurity. Distress and emotional chaos followed thus. To regain
myself, I would talk out loud, pace up and down, flap my hands and try to focus on
something familiar. At times, I could hum or sing softly to myself. This acted as a
distraction and the fear inside me lessened. (p. 102)
Wendy has to do something in order to “regain herself,” and it is in this process that we can see
the way that the Real allows her to organize her experience. In my sense of the text, although it
is difficult to describe, is that Wendy is dealing with a sense of disorganization via action rather
than sense making. She uses her body, her voice, to regain a sense of security – she does not try
to make sense of the situation, either through fantasy or delusion. Wendy does not look first to
the Symbolic, but rather to the Real, and, as such, we cannot speak about Wendy’s desire or the
relation to the object a, because they are not present.
Because there is no consistency of subjective space for Wendy – she has to reinvent it
over and over – she needs a literal object in order to help her maintain though time and change.
This is different from the object a, which is itself not an object but a place-holder and the cause
of desire. Wendy’s objects are literal and are the condition of her existence, although not the
cause of her desire.
Jouissance. It seems that for Wendy, jouissance largely seems to function by propping
up her existence. It does not appear to be experienced by her as overwhelming or painful, except
when it is contaminated by the Other. The absence of jouissance equals death for Wendy in the
absence of an adequate Symbolic space for her. Jouissance shows up for Wendy primarily in her
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relationship to objects. Wendy enjoys the consistency that objects bring, but she also enjoys the
sensual elements of the objects. She talks about becoming transfixed by the mudguards on her
bicycle:
I turned my new bicycle upside down and spun the wheels round and round and round.
The light gleaming from the silver mudguards seemed to go on forever. It was so
intoxicating and I felt so alive. To have that feeling interrupted by so much as a word or
an action evoked extreme irritation and anger in me. I hated being disturbed or
interrupted when I was involved with some repetitive action that gave me delight. I felt a
sense of connection as I watched the shiny mudguards. I felt safe, almost as if I were part
of the bike. It belonged to me and I to it. (p. 2)
For Wendy, it is jouissance rather than desire that organizes her existence and her relation to
others and objects. She is able to make use of jouissance in order to maintain a sense of self, and
in this way the experience of jouissance for Wendy seems to be different from what we would
expect from a neurotic or psychotic individual. In the text, Wendy often speaks about jouissance
using a language of connection and of satisfaction. However, we can also read her sense of
being overwhelmed by interruptions and by touch as an experience of jouissance that is “too
much.”
In the instances when Wendy becomes overwhelmed, it seems largely linked to the
interruption of her communion with the object where she then experiences an overload of
jouissance and has to act to manage it. For example, she describes her experience if she is not
allowed a break from interaction:
If things become really bad and I suffer what I call sensory overload, then I close out all
the sounds and noises of the world. I could sit somewhere quietly or put my hands over

196

my ears and enjoy the quieter sounds of life. Somehow to just sit and close off gives me
space and time to recover from being anxious. It helps me to calm down. If I cannot find
the room to do this, then the overload can build into an explosion!
In November 1995 I went into overload. I covered my ears, walked around in
circles and then the screams came up from within me. I walked out of the lounge room,
through the corridor and into the bedroom. There was no way out. I simply created one
by attempting to walk through the closed bedroom window. The window cracked along
one side. I just had to get away from expectation. (pp.100-101)
In this description, we can see that Wendy’s experience of jouissance through the object is
markedly different from the type of overwhelming jouissance she experiences as a result of the
interruption by the Other. This overwhelming type of jouissance appears disorganizing for
Wendy, almost as though it threatens her very existence. When overwhelmed by jouissance,
Wendy typically resorts to objects to calm and sustain her – she neutralizes the overwhelming
jouissance with the objects that provide her with a consistency and remind her that she exists.
Unconscious. It is unclear if Wendy has an unconscious in the way that it is typically
understood in psychoanalysis. Because, in order to have an unconscious, one has to achieve
being via the Symbolic and it is unclear the extent to which Wendy has achieved this. Certainly,
by the end of the text we can start to see her begin to ask some questions about herself, which
suggests that she is perhaps working to circumscribe a space in the symbolic that she could
occupy; however, there is no evidence of unconscious phenomena in the text. Wendy does not
make slips, jokes, etc., and the only repetitions that we see are repetitions in her relation to the
object. While, in some ways, we could see her relation to the object as unconscious because it is
outside language, that misses an important point about the work of the unconscious – as a space
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that holds leftovers from the alienation/separation. The unconscious only exists after the fact –
après-coup –and because Wendy has not achieved being in the Symbolic, she has no need for an
unconscious.
Symptom/Phenomena/Act. In Wendy’s description of her life, we see little evidence of
symptom formation. It is possible to argue that Wendy’s chronic depression may constitute
something like a symptom; however, she does not seem to identify with that symptom – in fact
she talks about how the diagnosis does not accurately describe her. Wendy describes a
withdrawal into her own world, an avoidance of the social space, but she experiences that as a
largely satisfying space, rather than one of suffering, which we would expect with a symptom.
Similarly, we do not see any evidence of perverse acts, or even of a perverse type of enjoyment
in Wendy’s text. Wendy’s fascination and enjoyment of objects could arguably be classed as a
perverse type of enjoyment, however it never rises to the level of an act and never involves even
a fantasy of the Other. Her attachment to objects seems to serve a constitutive rather than
jouissance function.
What we do see in Wendy’s texts are a series of phenomena – the hallucinations of “Dark
hooded figures” (p. 66), her decision to imitate characters on television (and the subsequent felt
loss of self) (p. 51), and the presence of paranoia about people’s intentions (pp. 79-80). All of
these could easily be understood as psychotic-like phenomena and we most often see these
phenomena appear for Wendy in the context of a struggle with identity or a loss of self in some
way. There is no delusional construct, however, and there is also the lack of an abundance of
invasive jouissance that we would typically expect to see in a psychotic structure. The
phenomena Wendy describes seem to occur exclusively in the context of a significant sense of
being overwhelmed or feeling “disconnected” (p.66). In those instances, she talks about
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disappearing into herself or into her own world, where she can feel safe. While it is possible to
suggest that Wendy’s lack of secure subjective space and the presence of psychotic phenomena
are indicative of a psychotic structure, I strikes me as strange that we do not see much evidence
of imaginary phenomena, which is typically prevalent in a psychotic presentation.
Symbolic. Wendy’s relation to language is particular and at times fails in its
communicative function. While, on the one hand, she is somewhat able to make use of language
in the service of communication, she struggles with some of the more implicit aspects of
language, such as organization, metaphor, etc. We can see some of this in Wendy’s struggles to
maintain a storyline in her book. She fails to maintain a consistent organizing thread that can
hold the narrative for her – her book jumps confusingly through time and with little clarity about
why certain stories are interjected. It is as though she is speaking to herself rather than
addressing an audience – one gets the sense while reading that the book is speaking, but not to
the reader. This aspect of language, or communication, which is closely linked with the Law,
breaks down for Wendy. It suggests a relation to language and the Symbolic that is ordered
idiosyncratically and that Wendy makes use of to create herself, rather than to communicate to
the Other or to others. At one point in the book, talking about writing, she says, “The written
word has a form all its own. The pen between my fingers feels solid and tangible. It moves with
me and allows the symbols of my pain or ecstasy to reveal themselves. Words express my
distress through the pen and onto the paper and back to my mind. I can see them on the paper,
they talk to me and help me make sense of my life.” (p. 97). This nicely captures what appears
to be Wendy’s relationship to language as idiosyncratic – she is neither speaking, nor spoken, but
creating, and re-creating herself through the act of writing.
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Imaginary. There is very little imaginary content in Wendy’s articulation of her history.
There is no organizing fantasy, as one would expect with a neurotic, nor is there
delusional/paranoid/persecutory content that one would expect with a psychotic. Wendy does
mention hallucinations, “shadow figures” who offered to “relieve [her] of [her] life and
disconnect [her] from the pain” (p. 66). However it is unclear how these figures functioned for
her psychically and it does not appear that they offered her any type of solution with respect to
the self/Other relation. She mentions them only in passing, which makes it difficult to discern
their role in her experience.
There is one instance in the text where Wendy seems to at least be attempting an
imaginary identification, although one that ultimately fails. As a child, she tried to copy the
identity of television characters in order to create an acceptable self. She says:
By becoming an adventure hero I hoped to gain an acceptable identity. With the hero’s
identity, I would perform for people – I dearly wanted to be more popular. I could play
the clown or the beggar, act educated or dumb, always using someone else’s identity and
not my own. The real “me” was kept to myself as it was not acceptable.
Sometimes performing was helpful in my social interaction with others and
enabled me to feel both human and part of “the gang.” There was a cost though: Wendy
went underground and continued to avoid facing the reality of emotional pain and
disability.
I was often confused and my sense of “self” was very muddled and frightening. I
could go to the local shop and then forget why I was there. I got lost easily and even
forgot my own name. Some days it was too difficult to make even the smallest of
decisions, such as whether to eat one sandwich or two. (p. 51)
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As we can see from this passage, Wendy’s imaginary solution ultimately fails, although it is
unclear why. Wendy does not seem able to construct a stable subjective solution through the
imaginary, which requires a sustained relation to the other, in the way that she is able to via the
object.
Real. The Real shows up in Wendy’s text through her body and her relation with objects.
Wendy’s experience as she describes it in her book is bound by physical sensation and
connection with objects rather than with people. Much of her experience appears as
unsymbolizable, particular, and satisfying. What is striking about Wendy’s autobiography is that
she is describing a life lived largely outside of symbolization – a life lived through the Real
rather than through language. The world of language, symbol, law, and others is often disrupting
and disorganizing for her.
Sinthome. We can understand writing as something of a sinthome for Wendy. Although
her writing is sometimes difficult to follow, in many ways it does provide a window into the
world that Wendy’s experiences and, I would argue, serves as something like a construction for
her. It seems to me, after reading the book through several times, that Wendy is writing to make
sense of herself for herself. She is produced as a collection of discrete experiences held together,
albeit loosely, through the text. She articulates herself there. Through the book she is creating a
self with which she can identify and that can endure through time.
Additionally, the poetry in the book is working in a similar way, to create and sustain a
subjective space for her – the poetry helps her to capture her experience and allows her to speak
to others. The poetry also seems to serve an additional function of capturing the Real for her in a
way that her regular narrative does not. The final poem of her book demonstrates the unique
mixture of real/symbolic/jouissance that characterizes her work:
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“You’d think the buses would run on time”
The lady says out loud.
“You mark my words, it will be fine,”
The man yells from the crowd.
I stared at each, in disbelief,
What is it that they mean?
The words we use to speak each day,
Should say the things we need to say.
But when in doubt I’ll leave it out
And choose instead another way. (p. 118)
I find it very hard to articulate how I understand the working of her poetry in the text, but it
seems to be something like the creation of a word-object – something that allows her to use
language in the way that she has previously used objects to hold consistency for her, while
simultaneously allowing her to participate in the world of symbols and others.
Summary. Using Lacan’s structural categories, Wendy appears psychotic. Although
there is the marked absence of a delusional construct and invasive jouissance, the paternal
function seems to be absent and the Other is not barred.
For Wendy, the desire of the Other is experienced as overwhelming and largely
unsymbolizable, which is consistent with a psychotic organization. What we don’t see, however,
is the type of imaginary explanation of this experience that is typically the psychotic solution.
Although she does mention hallucinations at one point in her text, these are transient and do not
seem to be structurally relevant. Wendy’s solution to the desire of the Other seems to be found
through the Real and the object rather than through the imaginary. Wendy first seems to take a
position of indifference or unawareness to the desire of the Other unless it gets too close or
becomes pointed at her in a way that she cannot avoid. Her primary strategy, especially in
childhood, appears to be withdrawal into herself and into the sensory world of her own body.
Her secondary strategy is to make use of the object through a method that reads to me like a
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temporary barring – the object plugs up the lack in the Other thus barring desire or, in cases
where she is dealing directly with another human being, transforming them into an object limits
her experience of their desire.
Wendy’s strategies work well to limit her experience of overwhelming jouissance, or
jouissance that feels disorganizing for her, but do not provide her with a sense of subjective
consistency. This is the primary mechanism of the delusional or other imaginary constructs in
psychosis – they are meant to function similarly to the fundamental fantasy in neurosis, to limit
and organize jouissance and to provide a more stable subjective space. In psychosis, however
the jouissance is experienced as largely coming from outside, from the Other, whereas is
neurosis it is experienced as coming from within. Wendy’s relation to and experience of
jouissance is different and is the point at which she does not quite fit into the structural definition
of psychosis. Wendy is motivated by jouissance (rather than by desire), but her jouissance is
largely satisfying and necessary for her sense of subjective consistency. Her experience of
jouissance seems to be an experience that comes from within but relies on an external object for
production. Her use of the object, which she describes as helping her to maintain through change
as well as that which produces profound sensory enjoyment, seems to be the mechanism through
which she stabilizes her subjective space, while her jouissance is where she locates her
consistency through time. In other words, Wendy does not make sense of her experience, either
through imaginary or symbolic creations, rather she makes use of the Real of her body which,
attached to the object, allows her to continue to be. This method is tenuous, however, constantly
threatened by change and by the Other’s interruption of her relation with the object.
For Wendy, her use of the Real and the object and her relation to jouissance challenges
the traditional notion of psychosis. For Wendy, the imaginary seems to be of little use and does
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not assist her in stabilizing her position or in dealing with the invasion of the Other. Wendy has
her own unique solution, though, and the later Lacanian work on the sinthome and the clinic of
the knot better explains Wendy’s subjective positioning. We could say that Wendy’s struggles
are better represented as the absence of S1s – letters that would constitute and hold her space.
Wendy’s writing, particularly her poetry, seems to be a way of producing herself in the text and,
through her unique style of writing, to produce a Wendy with which she can identify –
constructing a subjective space that can endure through time.
Jen.
Brief family history. Jen was the eldest of two, born into a two-parent household in rural
Australia. She has one younger brother. She was raised on a farm that her parents shared with
her grandparents and she had routine contact with her extended family. She does not describe
strife or regular conflict in her family and she seems to feel secure in the environment during
early childhood. She is able to remember and describe positive relationships with relatives and
seemed to enjoy spending time family, especially when they were willing to indulge some of her
more repetitious play requests. She is closest with her father, although she relies heavily on her
mother to assist her in managing some of her sensory difficulties. Her mother is described as a
patient woman who is extremely supportive of her daughter throughout childhood and adulthood.
Her father is described as patient, strong, and with a soft spot for animals such that he could
sometimes not bring himself to slaughter their hens for food. Jen’s father died suddenly when she
was 10 years old and she experienced this as extremely traumatic. The family did not speak
much about her father’s death and she suffered additionally as a result of the silence and inability
to mourn his death. That loss is the only piece of her family history that comes up continually in
her story.
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Relation to the Other. Compared to some of the other authors, Jen’s relation to the Other
appears more secure, although there is definitely an element of suspicion in her text. Jen asks
questions of the Other, questions about what the Other wants from her, but she also seems to
have at least developed something of a fantasy to help mediate her experience of the Other’s
desire (see below).

In my read of Jen’s account, the Other is barred for her, but that barring

feels somewhat unstable. As such, we see a fair amount of suspicion from her, but nothing that
rises to the level of paranoia or delusion. And, she establishes a fantasy that enables her to make
use of her suspicion in the service of establishing and re-establishing her difference from the
Other. We can see this in the following excerpt. Jen is talking about her experience of not fitting
in with her peers in adolescence and adulthood:
Later on in life, I was again exhorted to “be yourself,” but, paradoxically, this was by
persons who did not respect what my “self” was, and who seemingly wanted me to be
their version of what my “self” should be. So these were empty words uttered by shallow
thinkers. When I hear these words, or similar, nowadays, I season them with a few
pinches of suspicion. Before I take them seriously, I try to observe (over a period of time,
if possible) what kind of a person the speaker is: does he or she really mean those words,
or are they just glibly repeating a common saying? (Birch, 2003, p. 50)
We see Jen, in this example, asking the question: what does the Other really want from me (or,
who am I for the Other) and her awareness that the demand of the Other can mean something
different than what it says. These things together, suggest an Other that is lacking, that can want
something, and that Jen is aware of this lack, but uncertain of her position with respect to it.
Overall, Jen’s language abilities are unremarkable. Although she voices some struggles
with non-verbal skills, there are several portions of the text where she seems highly attuned to
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the implicit messages in language. It is unclear to me the extent to which she finds body
language, facial expression, and tone of voice difficult to determine as her reported lack of skills
in the text are sometimes contradicted by her behavior. She also seems to have a good grasp of
sarcasm and good ability to use metaphor, both of which suggest an awareness of the lack in
language. Jen does struggle in some areas of the text with attending to audience and flow of her
narrative, a problem faced by all of the authors in this sample. Unlike Wendy, however, Jen is
speaking to her audience, and it is clear that she has an intention with respect to her writing.
In terms of the Law, Jen seems largely to accept the limits of the Law and to take some
solace in clearly defined boundaries and rules. Like the other authors, she struggles with sudden
changes and relies on routines in order to manage her day-to day life. Jen, however, seems more
flexible in her ability to manage changes in routine and, if given enough notice, seems to have
little trouble making accommodations. Jen does seem to struggle somewhat with doubt about the
working of the Law to limit the Other, seen in her fears and nightmares of being overpowered or
killed by the Other as well as in her struggles with interpersonal boundaries. She describes: “If
somebody else wants to do something to me or with me, where does he/she end and I begin? I
often felt “taken over” by a more powerful individual – and every other individual had more
power than I did. I wanted power, not so that I could dominate others, but just so that I could
“hold my own space”” (p. 48). For Jen, although the Law works to some extent to allow her the
space from which to fear, it does not seem to afford her a full measure of protection from the
overwhelming experience of the Other’s desire.
Relation to others. Jen’s relationships to others are complicated. On the one hand, she
has a clear ability to empathize and the wants/needs of others often factor into her experiences.
As an example, Jen describes her concerns about her lack of skill in a partnered sports game in
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school: “This caused me to feel bad on behalf of my partner, who could not participate in the
exercise whilst I was off chasing the ball – and, as the other girls appeared to enjoy this exercise,
I was inadvertently spoiling my partner’s fun” (p. 86). In several other instances in the book,
seemingly unprompted, Jen voices a concern for the other (e.g. p.138, p. 141). This requires the
ability to see things from the perspective of the other, suggesting an awareness of difference/lack
as well as an awareness of the other’s desire and an attempt to take a position with respect to it.
On the other hand, Jen frequently positions the other as victimizer, often interpreted as
purposefully hurtful or intentionally demeaning her experience. In this characterization of the
other, my sense is that Jen’s fantasy is organized around a position as victim, one that she needs
to re-establish continuously via the other and which can be understood as an unconscious
repetition (see below) aimed at inscribing difference. As such, Jen’s literal relationships with
others are often conflictual and she struggles to establish and maintain long-term, meaningful
relationships. (The exception to this is with her mother and brother, who are presented in the
book as endlessly supportive, and a relatively new partnership with John, who is presented
similarly).
Jen’s struggles with respect to relations with others are clear in the following excerpt. She
both wants to engage in and wishes to avoid relationships with others due to her chronic sense of
victimization. She describes her experience following a complicated break-up and decision to
move into her own living space:
Now, though, without my flatmates and without Jessica – and alone for most of the time
outside work hours – my mood was more often down than up. I felt desperate for friends
and for other people, but I knew that I could not cope with people when I had them. This
caused me to feel that there was no solution to the loneliness I felt; and my failure at
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relationships of various kinds had caused my self-esteem to plummet. I arrived at the
space where I did not want to live any more, and I had thoughts of ending my life. (p. 53)
This description captures well the complicated pattern of relations with others that characterizes
Jen’s autobiography. She has a genuine desire to have relationships, while also needing the other
to help her articulate and maintain her subjective position. But her constant sense of feeling
misunderstood can be overwhelming, pushing her to withdraw. The back and forth of seeking
out relationships, feeling victimized/misunderstood, and withdrawing characterizes most of the
relationships Jen describes prior to her diagnosis.
Toward the end of the book, after she has received the diagnosis of Asperger’s, Jen’s
position with respect to others seems to shift. Following the diagnosis, Jen has a word to
describe her difference from others and we see her begin to make use of this designator in her
building of relationships, almost all of which revolve around her diagnosis in some way. At this
point, however, Jen begins to address the professional community of clinical providers, pointing
out her differences from others who may share her diagnosis. Again, we see a need to make use
of the other in order to inscribe difference and secure her subjective space. The diagnostic label
seems to have increased her subjective stability somewhat, but we continue to see her make use
of the other as a vehicle to establish difference and maintain her space.
Alienation. Jen’s ability to question the Other suggests alienation. She devotes an entire
section of her book to what she calls “identity issues,” to asking the question, “who am I?” For
Jen, these questions show up in the context of gender, “Am I a boy or a girl, or something in
between?” (p. 46), and also in the context of human-ness, “Am I an earthling or an alien?” (p.
46). Jen’s experience of her “identity issues” is bound up for her in the question of difference
(from others and the Other) and plays out via an internal landscape of anxiety about establishing
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a coherent and stable self. To ask these types of questions suggests an awareness of or
experience of lack, pointing to alienation in the Symbolic.
Jen also seems to have experienced alienation at the level of the image, although her
accounts of her bodily experience are sometimes at odds. She suggests some tendency towards
clumsiness, difficulty with learning motor skills at a young age, but later goes on to talk about
her appreciation for walking/running and she has some good physical ability when it comes to
managing her poultry. What is perhaps more telling with respect to her sense of her body is a
description of her experience watching herself on film:
I watched, with growing horror, as the person they called Jen appeared on the screen.
Yes, I had been filmed boarding the bus, visiting the library, catching the rooster, so I
knew that it had to be me. Without these clues, however, this person was difficult for me
to recognise. I began gripping John’s hand with enough ferocity to risk stopping the
blood supply. For months afterwards, I spent an unprecedented amount of time in front of
the mirror, trying to reconcile the person I saw there with the person on the programme. I
would try to catch out this impostor by surprising it with a mirror confrontation. (p. 226)
Jen’s reaction to her image on the screen – her sense of being startled and asking the question,
who is that? – is as similar to her experiences of attempting to locate an identity. In Jen’s case,
alienation is clear, but the resulting anxiety and distress points to a problem at the level of
separation, seemingly with a failure of the fantasy to stabilize and secure a more permanent
subjective space.
Separation. Jen’s description of her identity issues also includes a description of her
struggles to “hold [her] space,” (p. 68) including chronic nightmares where she is endlessly
chased and fears she will be overpowered by more dominant others, as well as fears that
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something may come to destroy her in the dark. While separation has likely occurred for her, the
fantasy is not fully functioning as a solution to the enigma of the Other’s desire (see below). On
the one hand, Jen appears overwhelmed by the desire of the Other, and this shows up in her
constant fears, nightmares, and interpersonal struggles. Her fears of being overpowered by the
Other are telling of a felt insecurity in terms of her subjective space. On the other hand, Jen
appears to occupy the position of split subject who is able to ask the question of what the Other
wants, and also to desire for herself. Jen’s fear of being devoured requires a separation from the
Other in order to function – without separation there would not be fear; rather, we would see
something like a literal devouring – an invasion by the Other.
Paternal function. Jen’s position as split subject and what appears as a barred Other in
her account suggests the absence of foreclosure. While there are a few instances in the text that
could be read as psychotic phenomena, they do not rise to the level of structural elements. She
struggles with anxiety and a fear of losing her space, but she is able to keep the Other at a
reasonable distance. Similarly, there is no evidence of disavowal in her account. In fact, there is
nothing suggestive of perversion at all. Her ability to acknowledge and accommodate the Law is
clear, and her jouissance, while occasionally overwhelming, is largely regulated. Structurally,
Jen appears to be operating within a neurotic structure, though there does seem to be some
impairment in the role of the imaginary. The Other is barred for her, despite her fears to the
contrary.
Desire and the object a. Desire shows up in Jen’s text in a variety of ways: her passion
for poultry, her pursuit of romantic relationships, her ongoing appeals for help to mental health
professionals, and her persistent academic interests in language and culture. For Jen, desire
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seems to be mobilized, and we see her, despite many failures and challenges, continue to want
more.
For Jen, the loss of her father produced (or perhaps reiterated) a lack around which her
desire was organized. Her passion for poultry, which she shares with her father, can be linked to
that loss, as can her desire for (and struggles to establish) a romantic relationship. For Jen, these
two seemly disparate desires, poultry and romance, seem to converge for her and allow her to
sustain a position as care-taker. Following a break-up, she says, “I got the craving again. In
hindsight, it was probably due to the shock of failing at relationships again, being on my own
again, and wanting the comfort of my special interest – which included the tenderness of looking
after living creatures” (p. 166).
Although I do think that Jen is a desiring subject and that the object a is at play for her, I
am left with some questions about the organization of her subjective structure, the inscription of
lack, and the emergence of the object a for her. Jen seems to need to reproduce lack or loss for
herself, and we see this in the repetition of victimization (see below) and in the fears of
disappearing, which is not typical of a neurotic organization.
Jouissance. There are a couple of ways that Jen consistently describes obtaining
jouissance. The first is in relation to auditory stimuli. This appears to be a consistent source of
enjoyment for her from early childhood and her descriptions of these experiences evoke Lacan’s
discussion of feminine jouissance. Jen describes her experience of the sounds in a library:
The rustling of pages, and the scuffling of people rummaging in their pencil-cases, makes
my hair tingle in the most pleasurable way. I suppose this is how a cat feels when it
purrs…As long as I don’t have any urgent reason to leave, I can just bliss out to these
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sounds. My brain unfocuses and my body goes weak. It’s the best way I know to unwind
from stress! (p. 98).
In this description and others (e.g. p. 17, p. 24), the jouissance Jen experiences is both satisfying
and wholly outside of language. It is also singular. We see a similar experience in her
description of visual stimuli (e.g. p. 14, p. 51), although these are not as frequent. What is worth
noting, in comparison to some of the other authors, is that Jen does not ever speak of the end of
these jouissance experiences as a negative. In fact, she doesn’t speak of the ends at all, seeming
able to accept the cessation of jouissance without issue. This suggests something in terms of the
function of jouissance for Jen, insofar as it appears as supplementary rather than constitutive for
her.
The second is Jen’s description of her occasional bouts of self-harm or, as she calls them
“self damaging acts” (p. 32). In this instance, jouissance appears in two ways: first, it appears as
an overwhelming emotional state which requires some type of release and, second, the action she
takes to provide release contains its own excess of jouissance. She describes this phenomenon:
I still have to watch, though, for the first signs of pulling out eyelashes: once I’ve pulled
one out, the urge becomes stronger and stronger to keep going until they are all out,
which I have done many times. These behaviours seem to be responses to stress, and
sometimes excitement. And when major frustration or upset occurred, I would sometimes
(until recently) bash my legs with my fists until I was covered with bruises; next day, I
would feel pain on walking. This would give me some kind of release, but I am glad that
I seem to have (touch wood) overcome that particular behaviour. The fact that my last
few years have seen major improvements in my life, e.g. having the understanding of
friends and family, has helped very much in this respect. (p. 32-33)
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In this instance, Jen is describing a type of jouissance that we may consider symptomatic, or
contained within the structure of a symptom. Here we can also place Jen’s perpetual anxiety,
which also contains a kernel of jouissance and which is implicated in her symptom, as I will
discuss further below.
Unconscious. Like many of the other authors, Jen does not share parapraxes. She does
describe frequent nightmares, both in childhood and adulthood (p. 46, p. 148), with content
related to being chased, overpowered, and/or killed by an unknown assailant. The nightmare
content is consistent with the other unconscious material that appears in the text in terms of Jen’s
repetitions. Primarily, we see a repetition of the question, who am I? and/or what is wrong with
me? coupled with a repetition of perceived (and occasionally actual) victimization, which I
believe comprises the main components of Jen’s symptom formation. Alongside this, we see a
repetition of Jen’s dissatisfaction with the other and a repetition of the articulation of her
difference – a combination that serves to maintain the separation that feels insecure but that also
points to a desire for recognition.
Symptom/phenomena/act. For Jen, it seems that we are primarily dealing with symptom
formations rather than with psychotic or perverse phenomena, although there are a couple of
instances that do not fit well within the neurotic sphere. In a neurotic symptom, we should see a
repetition that serves as an attempt to resolve an unconscious conflict and to regulate jouissance.
In Jen’s case, I believe the repetition of victimization allows her to negotiate the desire of the
Other by establishing herself within the fantasy as undesirable in some way. I would like to
preface this by saying, however, that I do not want to minimize the ways that Jen was actually
victimized for her differences. Those instances are many, likely more numerous than she
describes in her book, and I am not suggesting that she brought these attacks on herself. Instead,
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I want to point out the way that she constructed a fantasy that resolved an unconscious conflict
for her in that it allowed her to consistently view the Other as a victimizer, which allowed her to
sustain a position in relation to the desire of the Other that did not threaten to destroy her (as in
her nightmares).
This symptom seems to appear for Jen only after the unexpected death of her father,
around age 10. Jen talks about the loss of her father as leaving her “unprotected” and
“vulnerable” and, in my reading of her story, that experience of loss seems to be the traumatic
kernel around which this symptom circulates. There are many descriptions of this symptom in
Jen’s book, of which the following provide merely a sample:


Describing her grief following the death of her father: Therefore – and as it was the
sixties, in rural New Zealand – we were forced to join the conspiracy of silence: the
assumption that if something is not mentioned, it does not exist...Over the months and
years – eventually to become decades – there was no recognition that I might have been
suffering, and no opportunity to be helped. (pp. 39-40)



Describing her experience taking a dance class: The teacher did not seem able to
understand that I was, in fact, trying very hard to learn the dance, and became impatient
with me. Over time, I was unable to cope with the teacher’s frustrated reactions to me,
which were by now causing me stress. Therefore, I ended up leaving the dance group,
feeling sad, disappointed, and with a feeling of having failed again. (p. 90)



Describing her experience of writing her true feelings in a treatment journal (while on an
inpatient ward): From this one written comment, I recall three layers of suffering: first, I
had symptoms which meant that I could not fit in with what was expected of me; second,
these symptoms “caused” other people to react harshly to me, thus inflicting more
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suffering; and, third, I was also “to blame” for all of this, which produced confusion, fear
and misplaced guilt. (p. 119)


Describing her experience seeking mental health care after her inpatient stay: From that
moment on, it would be a case of being treated abruptly, being told that they could not
help me, and being told to go away and stop disturbing the unwell people with my
presence. Due to this happening several times, I can only surmise that something very
negative seems to have been written in my previous hospital records by the “farm ward”
staff; for why else would the appearance of my previous records trigger such a change in
attitude? As I could not, therefore, obtain the understanding and help which I needed, I
was on a downhill slide into depression and other mental health problems, perpetuated
and compounded by my “farm ward” admission. (p. 129)



Again, describing her experience seeking mental health treatment: A Day Clinic of the
Auckland Hospital Board: I described my developmental delay (no crawling, late
walking, slow growing, looking very young for my age as a child, thyroid disorder), and
said I thought there could be something in this; these facts were ignored. At another time,
seeing the same therapist, I said that I thought a girl’s sexual development is affected by
the presence or absence of her father. At this, I was angrily met with “But you don’t have
sex with your father!” Thus, I was invalidated, humiliated, and had my comment turned
into something dirty, which I did not intend. (p. 131)



And, finally, another attempt to get help: Then, in small groups, we had to recall
memories of each parent; the grief burst out and I was sobbing uncontrollably; no one,
including the leader, seemed to know what to do. I maintain that this type of workshop
may sometimes be harmful, as they can stir up a person’s most painful memories, and
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then leave the person stranded without proper support. If a leader is going to have such a
workshop, then they should be careful what they do to participants, and be properly
prepared for what can happen when they rekindle a person’s trauma; otherwise, the leader
is acting irresponsibly. (p. 132)
This repetition, like any symptom, produces a tremendous amount of suffering for Jen, and, in
my reading, the fantasy does not fully provide a solution in the way that we would expect to see
in a neurosis. Later, the diagnosis of Asperger’s seems to allow Jen a way to establish her
difference from the Other while also allowing her a more positive subjective space to occupy.
Although, even following the diagnosis, we see the repetition continue in the context of Jen’s
dissatisfaction with some of the characterizations of Asperger’s adults:
There is still one major area in which I differ (perhaps) from the majority of others who
have Asperger Syndrome. (Of course, in order to be sure of that, a very large survey
would have to be done, ensuring that sufficient respondents with the relevant life
experiences were included.) It seems to me that the “known fact” of people with
Asperger Syndrome lacking empathy leads even some autism professionals into
erroneous thinking. This “fact” then lets them believe that people with Asperger
Syndrome do not grieve, or not as much as “normal” people. In other words, this “known
fact” is untrue and even dangerous, because then people with Asperger Syndrome cannot
get the help they need, if major grief hits them. I am leading into the area of childhood
trauma, caused by the death of my father when I was ten. This double phenomenon
(Autistic Spectrum plus major bereavement in childhood) falls outside even most Autistic
Spectrum experts’ knowledge, and, as such, it seems I am on my own in writing my own
theory about this. (pp. 206-207)
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What appears as different in this iteration of the repetition, is her ability to hold a space of
difference that is not only defined via victimization – here she can also be an expert and
theoretician.
Although the majority of Jen’s description of her experience points to symptom
formation, there are also some phenomena she describes that could be interpreted as psychotic,
although I do not think they necessarily refer to a psychotic structure. Two instances in
particular stand out. The first is Jen’s description of the “Unwanted Possession”:
So it went on into my twenties and thirties. Even after I no longer lived at my mother’s
house, sometimes I had to sleep with the light on – when living alone, no one would need
to ask me why. The nightly sounds of floorboards creaking meant, surely, that an intruder
was approaching my room. I would shut the bedroom door, because then, at least, there
was no dark gaping entrance-way in which someone or something could be lurking, ready
to come in. Since the door would have to be opened first, this would give me an extra
second’s warning. I developed a relationship of sorts with this monster, “The Unwanted
Possession.” Worn out by the fear, I would beg it to come and do its worst and get it over
with. Its refusal to do so proved to me that it was more interested, for the moment at least,
in intimidation and mental cruelty: in scaring me to death. Its name – after I reached my
(chronologically speaking) adult years – became known to me as Jenny Pierson. (pg. 4748).
In her description of the “Unwanted Possession,” it both seems to be part of her as well as
outside of her. It follows her and, on at least one occasion in the text, she seems to refer to it as
though she believes that it is real (p. 48). The “Unwanted Possession” seems to be at least
somewhat related to Jen’s difficulty negotiating her position with respect to the Other’s desire
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and with the nightmares that she describes, but in this instance her description carries a sense of
paranoia that borders on delusional. My thinking is that this phenomena points to the fragility of
the fantasy as a mechanism for Jen to sustain adequate separation from the Other.
The second instance in the text that perhaps points to a more psychotic type of
phenomena is a singular episode of what appears to be something like an hallucination, although
it also seems to contain a metaphor. Jen begins by describing an experience in childhood
following her father’s death. Her grief was extreme at this time and she was tormented by
community members who were speaking ill of her father’s technique of docking cow’s tails by
cutting off circulation to the appendage and letting it ‘fall off’ (hear the echos of castration). Jen
states that, as a child, she was made to feel so anxious and distressed by these stories (and her
anger at her father for taking such “controversial action” and then dying) that “each time, [she]
could feel her stomach and entrails shrivelling up into something the size and shape of a raisin”
(p. 189). As an adult, while telling this story to her boyfriend during a car trip, she describes the
rawness of her emotion and her need to “scream her pain out” during the drive. Upon arriving
home she describes her experience in the bathroom:
To my amazement, out of my body poured a yellow substance like partly-chewed whole
kernel sweetcorn – though I knew I hadn’t eaten any sweetcorn for a long time.
Alternatively, it was like yellow shrivelled raisins – the raisins which, I felt, had taken the
place of my insides so many times…And why did it suddenly decide to come out? – I
could see no triggering factor except for the screaming attack, the clearing of a chunk of
mental suffering, right before the yellow flux; and this seemed to me, on a psychological
and a gut level, to be the correct answer. Perhaps my life was saved by the removal of
this pain, which had been stored inside me as “yellow raisins.” (pp. 189-190)
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In this description, Jen’s psychic pain appears in the Real linked to the signifier of raisins.
While, on the one hand, we could understand this as a type of metaphor, linked to castration, the
presence of the hallucinatory element suggests a more imaginary solution to the Real and
jouissance, again pointing to more psychotic organization of the experience.
Jen’s combination of neurotic symptoms and psychotic phenomena points to a subjective
space that is not completely secure. As indicated previously, it is my formulation that separation
for Jen was somehow incomplete or inadequate, producing a subjective space that feels
threatened. The occasional intrusion of psychotic phenomena can be understood in this vein as
an attempt to regulate the surplus jouissance/anxiety that appears as her fear of being
overpowered or destroyed.
Symbolic. Overall, Jen’s relation to language is suggestive of a neurotic structure, she has
a good a facility with language and seems to be able to grasp well enough the use of metaphor
and to accommodate the polysemy of language. Although her text is somewhat disorganized,
Jen is speaking to an audience about herself. Jen is also situated as a subject within the
Symbolic, although it is here where her struggles with identity become most relevant and it is
unclear the extent to which her name holds the subjective space for her. Later in her life, the
diagnosis seems to secure her position, providing both an individual and a cultural identity.
Imaginary. The function of the imaginary in Jen’s text is somewhat unclear. Jen does
seem to be able to make use of fantasy in her interactions with others, and we can see this in her
interpretation of the others’ intentions (see examples from the Symptom section above) as well
as in her clear ability to empathize, or to imagine herself in the place of the other.
Additionally, Jen does seem to have something like a fundamental fantasy that is at least
attempting to regulate jouissance and to provide a solution to the question of the Other’s desire.
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This fantasy is problematic, however in that the space it provides for Jen is a negative one (e.g.
the place of absence, of ‘not-that’). The fantasy also places the Other in the position of extreme
power and leaves Jen with little opportunity for action other than withdrawal. And, this is where
the fears related to being overpowered or disappearing come into play. This is different, for
example, from the fantasy that we see at play for Jesse, who is also establishing a situation where
he will fail to be the object that the Other desires. For Jesse, however, the enjoyment lies in a
failure that is also a success – his fantasy allows him to be admired precisely because he is a
failure. For Jen, the ability to occupy a space, despite failing, doesn’t seem to exist and the
fantasy does not provide an answer for her.
The death of Jen’s father seems to be at play in the development of much of her fantasy
life and, in particular, in the development of her sense that it is impossible for her to really
understand herself or reach her full potential after sustaining that loss. She says,
the worst thing I could imagine – the death of one of my parents – was not only possible,
but had actually happened. Therefore, my child’s mind reasoned, the worst possible
things can and do happen – anything, no matter how terrible, can happen at any time.
This fact ripped away any vestige of confidence I had about living in the world. The
world – the universe – God – is ready and willing to destroy anybody and anything at any
time. I was to live with this feeling for the rest of my life. (p. 42).
Here we see the development of her fear and profound sense of vulnerability, but Jen goes on to
share her sense that, as a result of the loss of her father, she would be unable to meet
developmental milestones related to sexuality and gender. Somehow, that loss to her meant that
her ability to assume sexual difference was lost as well (pp. 41-42). This trauma seems to have
had an effect on Jen in terms of the production of her fantasy – with her father gone, the question
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of her subjective space became even more tenuous. It is my sense that she was unable to find an
imaginary solution to the Real trauma of the loss of her father.
Real. For Jen, the Real shows up primarily in terms of her anxiety and her experiences of
jouissance. Jen does not talk much about her body. She does note some issues with gross motor
skills; however, she seems largely able to rely on and use her body as needed. She does not talk
about experiencing her body as fragmented or disjointed, although she does seem to struggle to
‘inhabit it’ completely (see for example pp. 91-92) and is often confused by the ease in which
others are able to move their bodies through space.
Although we do not get much by way of description of Jen’s experience of anxiety, this is
what prompts her many demands for help from mental health professionals. This experience
appears as overwhelming for her and beyond symbolization. For Lacan, the encounter with the
Real, or the close encounter, provokes anxiety and, potentially, an abundance of jouissance. We
see this in Jen’ account, particularly in terms of her descriptions of self-injury and of stressinduced illness (pp. 32-33, 142, 151-152).
Sinthome. It is possible that the diagnosis of Asperger’s may serve as a sinthome for
Jen. In the text, there is a clear shift for her following the diagnosis and we see her begin to
inhabit a subjective space that is much more secure. Her relationships become less conflictual
and she is able to pursue interests and social relationships without experiencing the level of
anxiety she encountered previously. There also appears to be a cessation of “asking for help”
following the diagnosis, suggesting that her suffering was somehow contained or reduced. For
Jen, the diagnosis allows her to fully achieve a subjective space, to assume an identity, which
provides her some freedom from the previously symptomatic relation to the Other. She is able to
move from the position of victim to the position of narrator.
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Summary. Using Lacan’s structural model, Jen appears to be neurotically structured.
Her symptom points to felt insufficiency at the level of separation and the construction of a
fundamental-fantasy, however Jen clearly occupies a subjective space that is largely
symbolically secure and from which she is able to desire. Her desire is never in question; she
has the ability to want and we see this play out in her pursuits with poultry, her persistent search
for romantic relationships, and her passion for language and culture. We can also see it in her
frustrations when she is unable to satisfy her desires. This suggests that both alienation and
separation have occurred and that the paternal function is operating to secure the subjective space
from where Jen is able to desire. It suggests that the Other is barred and that a fantasy has
evolved to make sense of the relation to the Other and to regulate jouissance. With Jen’s case,
though, the presence of certain psychotic-like elements points to a failure in the regulatory
mechanism of the fantasy – it does not fully regulate her jouissance and, instead, we see that
enjoyment return in sometimes unbearable or overwhelming ways.
For Jen, although the Other is barred, it seems that the barring is unstable or, at the very
least is experienced as unstable by her, which we can see in her suspicion of the motives of
others as well as in her fears related to the security of her physical and psychic space. The
phenomena of the nightmares and the construction of the “Unwanted Possession” point to a
failure of the Law to fully limit the Other and a return of a jouissance that can be overwhelming.
In the Lacanian structural theory, this points to a failure at the level paternal function, however it
does not appear to be a complete failure and we can see some elements of repression operating
through the repetition. It’s as though repression is incomplete rather than as though foreclosure
or disavowal has occurred. In a typical neurosis, we assume that the paternal function is
operating by presence of a fundamental fantasy that addresses the question of the subject’s lack
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and attempts to reclaim lost jouissance. For Jen, the fantasy is organized around a position as
victim, so although it provides a position for her with respect to the Other it is a position that is
objectified. Her fantasy places her in the position of object rather than subject. The repetition for
her seems to function as a re-production of the moment of separation – where an unsafe
subjective space is produced for her, one that could easily lapse and allow the Other to use her
rather than want her. The repetition produces the fear and suspicion that keeps the Other at bay.
I suspect that, for Jen, this partial failure of the paternal function is linked to the literal loss of her
father and the ways in which she experienced that loss in the Real and understood it to mean the
end of her subjective safety.
What seems to have not been wholly repressed for Jen is a signifier that would establish
sexual difference. And, this is also linked to the loss of her father, who not only kept her safe, but
from whom she imagines she would learn who she was as a woman. The jouissance that returns
for Jen is almost exclusively linked to questions of sexual identity and the establishment of
difference. While on the one hand, the repetition of victimization produces at least a partial
space for her, she is still left without an identity that would allow her to fully assume that space.
The diagnostic label in some ways seems to secure that space for Jen, halting a kind of sliding of
her identity and does seem to be, in many ways, consistent with Lacan’s definition of a
sinthomatic construction. However, even after she adopts the Asperger’s label, she continues to
work to establish her difference. What is different is that the work becomes work to establish
difference at the symbolic level of understanding with the other rather than work at the level of
the Real/Imaginary to establish her own identity.
For Jen, while in many ways structured neurotically, something failed at the level of
separation and the fantasy, which did not allow her to assume a satisfactory position with respect

223

to the other or establish a workable imaginary answer to the question of the Other’s desire and
her own identity. Although some psychotic phenomena are present in her descriptions of her
experience, these phenomena are localized and do not appear to be indicative of a psychotic
structure. With Jen, it seems that while the strictly structural model of Lacan diagnosis does not
fully explain the organization of her psychic experience, there may be a way to understand it
singularly in terms of her methods for managing excess jouissance and the ways that the
diagnosis provided her with a method of identification outside of sexual difference through
which she was able to construct a sustainable identity.
Table of Concepts by Author
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Summary of Conceptual Analysis
To repeat the saying of autistic self-advocates, “if you know about one autistic person, you know
about one autistic person” (Hacking, 2009b, p. 46). The results of the psychoanalytic analysis,
above all else, point to the ways that autism both doesn’t fit well within the structural clinic and
doesn’t seem to hold together well as its own diagnostic category, either.
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For each of the authors, issues of subjective constitution were comprised by different
problems. For Jen and for John, there were clear questions related to the success of separation
and the paternal function, but these questions were aimed in distinct directions. For John, the
question was about whether repression or disavowal was operating and, if neither were, what was
holding the subjective space for him. For Jen, the question was about whether repression was
operating fully and, if not, how psychosis was avoided. For Wendy, the question of foreclosure
was at the fore leading to further questions with respect to her ability to construct a subjective
space without the use of the Imaginary. For Jesse, unlike the other authors, there were few
questions related to subjective structure at all. The ways that the conceptual elements of the
analysis appeared for each author were unique and comprised a particular constellation of
psychic and unconscious phenomena.
One element that did appear across most of the author’s accounts was a failure in the
function of the Imaginary and the construction of fantasy. With the exception of Jesse, all of the
authors seemed to have some type of impairment in the ability to use fantasy as a way to manage
the relation to the Other. For John, Wendy, and Jen, this impairment seems to have led to a need
to construct a supplement that would work in the place of fantasy. For these three authors, the
need for a supplementary construction is shared, although each author’s construction is unique
and makes use of different psychic elements to create the subjective space.
The marked differences in the conceptual analysis of the autobiographies points clearly to
the absence of any one particular structure of autism and to the problems with assuming that the
diagnosis of autism reflects similar patterns of subjective or unconscious experience. At least in
this analysis, there were no conceptual patterns that would point to a structural position shared by
autistic individuals, whether that is understood as a psychotic position or one that is specifically
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autistic. What was evident, instead, was the need to make use of Lacan’s later theory to
understand subjective constitution for most of the authors, which may point to something worth
further exploration in the Lacanian field.
Comparison of IPA and Psychoanalytic Analyses
In conducting both the IPA and the psychoanalytic analyses, I was attempting to gain insight and
understanding about the experience(s) of the authors and their psychological functioning. I chose
this dual approach because phenomenology and psychoanalysis, while both seeking to gain
understanding, ask questions from distinct perspectival positions. Phenomenology, in an attempt
to be as true to the experience as possible, seeks to know the other as it presents itself to be
known. There is an attempt to make explicit and reflect on preconceived ideas and notice what is
before you, without having to grasp or control it. Psychoanalysis, in an attempt to alleviate
suffering, seeks to understand the unconscious context from which the other’s suffering emerges
and is maintained. There is an attempt to grasp the forces at play in the other’s world for the
express purpose of changing the other’s relation to them. Both perspectives offer something
important, in my mind, and there are ways in which what they are able to notice is similar. In
other ways, they diverge, noticing particular things with little overlap. And then there are ways
that they both fail, in similar and dissimilar manners, to truly capture experience, suffering,
difference. I will discuss these issues below.
Commonalities within the Analyses
There are several areas of overlap in the types of phenomena captured by the IPA and the
psychoanalytic analyses. First, both were able to highlight issues of identity and the curative
function of the diagnosis. Through the IPA analysis, it became clear that issues of identity and
understanding oneself were primary for most of the authors and closely linked to struggles with
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communication, difficulties in establishing and maintaining relationships, and problems with
self-awareness. That analysis was also able to elucidate the ways that the diagnostic label
allowed the authors to better understand their own experience and to obtain a more thorough
grasp of their own strengths and limitations and to experience a greater sense of agency. The
psychoanalytic analysis also picked up issues with identity, and similarly to IPA, linked them
largely to issues at the level of the self/Other relationship. In the psychoanalytic analysis, issues
of identity appear either in the absence of a secure Symbolic space for the subject to emerge or in
the absence of adequate separation from the Other. In that read, the diagnostic label creates a
more secure subjective space and, similar to what the IPA analysis showed, the increased
stability of identity allowed the subjects more freedom to engage in relationships, pursue goals,
and understand their own experience. In both analyses, the diagnostic label emerged as that
which shores up an unstable identity or subjective space.
Secondly, both the IPA and the psychoanalytic analysis were able to capture the
importance of objects and predictability for these authors, although they point to different
functions in some cases. In the IPA analysis, the object emerges for most of the authors as that
which provides safety and refuge in a world that often feels harsh or unwelcoming. The IPA
analysis captures the retreat into the world of objects in response to emotional pain and rejection
for many of the authors. It also points to the role of predictability, often obtained through
objects, in the feeling of safety. The psychoanalytic analysis is also able to capture a similar
sense of safety and predictability, although the psychoanalytic read assumes a more fundamental
relationship between the subject and object for some of the authors. Rather than only an
opportunity for refuge, the object also becomes a site for control or for the creation of a needed
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self-consistency. In both analyses, however, the relation to objects emerges as a central theme
implicated in issues of identity and emotional well-being.
Finally, both the IPA and psychoanalytic analysis are at least able to point to or notice the
profound differences in the accounts of these authors and allow a space for reflection on the
singularity of each case. The IPA analysis, in particular, does well at drawing out the similarities
in the lived experience shared by the authors. The IPA analysis, though, also is able to highlight
differences, permutations, or singularities in each authors experience that allow us to see the
individual in the context of his or her own way of being. The psychoanalytic analysis shares this
ability to notice differences within the accounts. Although it is perhaps not as attuned to picking
up elements of lived experience, the psychoanalytic analysis allows us to observe the differences
in enjoyment and in relations with others, in their conscious and unconscious presentations, that
comprise the most intimate elements of being human. Both the IPA and psychoanalytic analyses
allow us to see across sameness and acknowledge differences both within and between accounts.
Divergences with the Analyses
There are also several ways that the psychoanalytic and IPA analysis diverge, capturing different
phenomena or interpreting experiences differently. First, to start with the latter, I was struck by
the ways that the material appeared to me differently when completing the two analyses.
Although the books remained the same, the stories identical, the lens through which I was
exploring the autobiographies shifted and, as a result I saw new, different, and sometimes
contradictory things. One example is in Jen’s text. In the IPA analysis, her stories of being taken
advantage of/misunderstood/victimized came across to me as pure mistreatment and bullying ignorance and lack of empathy on the part of the individuals she was dealing with. In the
psychoanalytic analysis, they appeared to me as a repetition, one in which her desire was also
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implicated, and in which she was involved as (unconscious) agent. Is it both or neither? This is
simultaneously the problem with and the strength of this multi-perspective approach, but it is
helpful to acknowledge the ways that these differences only showed up through the shift in
perspective – neither would be able to capture those things alone.
In terms of the ability to capture divergent phenomena, the IPA analysis provided a better
window into embodiment, the role of empathy, and the ability of the authors to demonstrate love
and compassion. Particularly in terms of the complexities of embodied subjectivity, the IPA
analysis was able to paint a more nuanced picture of the intersection of body, language,
experience, and emotion that was sometimes missed by the psychoanalytic analysis, which
largely takes up language and body as forces typically opposed to one another. For example,
using the IPA analysis, it is clear the ways that Wendy’s experience of the sensual world is a
profound physical and emotional experience, fully embodied, and bound with her sense of
herself and her connection with the world. And it is also evident that that experience resists
translation into language and that Wendy struggles in part because language does not capture her
experience in ways that allow her to share it with others – despite a clear desire to relate. Going
further, we can also see the ways that Wendy’s embodiment finds its limit in the experience of
change and that her ability to maintain her sense of herself, physically and psychologically, is
threatened in those moments. Her relationship to herself, to her body, and to the world of others
is both complex and contradictory. The complexities of the authors’ conscious experiences, the
movements toward and away from the other, and the conflicts both internally and externally, are
revealed through the IPA analysis in a way that allows space for both the consistencies and
contradictions to emerge as valuable.
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Not surprisingly, although the IPA approach was more attuned to the complexities of
conscious experience, the psychoanalytic analysis was able to capture or provide some insight
into the presence of non-conscious or unconscious phenomena and issues of motivation,
enjoyment, and desire that were not as present in the IPA analysis, as for example with the
questions of Jen’s repetition discussed above. The psychoanalytic analysis also captured the
creative aspects of the author’s composition of his or her world – the ways that they made use of
objects, labels, and language as tools to aid in the production of a more stable construction of self
and ability to relate to others. We see this in John’s use of machines, Wendy’s use of writing and
poetry, and Jen’s use of the diagnostic label as ways to situate themselves in the world more
securely. What the psychoanalytic analysis points out is that these acts, while largely
unconscious, comprise a type of freedom, that they are creative, and that they are the profoundly
particular productions for each author.
Another important area of divergence between the analyses, lies in the issue of
translation. There is a distinct difference between the two approaches in terms of the language
used to describe and understand phenomena. In IPA, as with most phenomenological
explanation, the descriptions of lived experience are presented largely within the context of
everyday language, making liberal use of the participants’ own words rather than conceptual or
technical language. Although there is certainly analysis and interpretation within the framework
of results, the language remains accessible to most readers, regardless of background or
specialization.
The psychoanalytic analysis both requires translation and is resistant to it.
Psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian psychoanalysis, relies heavily on a technical language that
has evolved over time. As a result of that evolution, concepts carry with them traces of previous

231

theoretical elaborations and, for each analyst or clinician, theoretical elaborations are linked with
the lived experience of conducting the treatment and with the various constellations of subjective
construction s/he has experienced through clinical work. The intricate relationship between the
praxis of psychoanalysis and the conceptual-theoretical framework is difficult to fully articulate
even among psychoanalysts, especially more so for those not familiar with that theoretical
framework. As such, the psychoanalytic analysis, unlike IPA, requires a fair amount of
translation and/or definition of the conceptual elements and, even then, may prove difficult for
non-specialist audiences.
Where both Analyses Fail
Although both the IPA and the psychoanalytic analyses were able to develop insight about the
experiences and subjective positions of the authors, there were two ways that both failed to
capture something important about the experience of individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorders.
First, both analyses failed to capture the profound and true difference in subjective
experience described by the authors. Both analyses seek to understand something about autistic
experience and, in doing so, attempt to translate what may resist translation, thus missing
something important in the very resistance itself. I do not think this is an error of intent, but
rather a result of the methodological positions themselves. The inherent assumptions about
humanity and subjectivity within both the phenomenological and psychoanalytic position, seem
to preclude the full recognition of difference within the authors writing. For example, the IPA
analysis required a position as reader that relied on the assumption of a shared intersubjective
space. This space, which is largely the space of empathic listening/sharing, requires an ability to
sense into the authors’ experience in some ways. While there are certainly similarities in
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experience that can be shared, part of what is at stake for these authors is a difference at the level
of embodied intersubjective experience. As such, it may not be possible for me to empathize
fully or to make use of that intersubjective space as the exclusive space of shared understanding.
In other words, empathy may reach its limit and, beyond that, certain experiences are lost.
Similarly, psychoanalysis relies on some assumptions about the nature and function of the Real
with respect to the construction of subjectivity. It does this precisely because it takes for granted
that subjectivity is embodied in and through a particular process. As such, like the position in
IPA, the psychoanalytic position makes it difficult to notice the ways that a shift in embodied
experience may impact the development of the subject. Here again, the method reaches a limit.
For both the IPA and the psychoanalytic methodologies, what cannot be reasonably translated is
excluded from the analysis. On the one hand, this is reasonable and, as phenomenologists often
point out, knowledge is always perspectival, situated, and incomplete. On the other hand, in this
particular instance, it seems that the experience of autism resists traditional forms of knowing
and that that resistance – evident within both analysis, but grasped by neither – is worth
acknowledging as an important and confounding element in the research.
Second, neither the IPA nor the psychoanalytic analysis was able to capture or explore
the potential (and likely) impact of the social construction of the diagnosis on the individual.
This came up for me most profoundly in Jesse’s case, as he was diagnosed much younger and
came of age in a time when Asperger’s and Autism Spectrum Disorder was the subject of
increasing social discourse. It seems likely that what is said about the diagnosis, which is
informed by the social discourse on it, would have an impact on the development of the subject’s
identity and relation to others, however neither the IPA nor the psychoanalytic analysis is able to
account for the function of social discourse in that way. As I plan to address in the discussion, it
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is here, at the intersection of discourse and identity development that insights from critical theory
and from the neurodiversity movement may prove most helpful.
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION: AUTISTIC SUBJECTS AND CLINICAL PROFESSIONALS
My goal in this dissertation has been to explore the possibility that autism represents a unique
subjective structure within the Lacanian theoretical framework and the implications for
subjective constitution in that context. In order to better ground my research and claims about
autism in Lacanian psychoanalysis, I sought to understand autism as it is lived by individuals on
the spectrum through phenomenological inquiry from the perspective of autistic autobiography.
Making use of insights from within the autism self-advocacy, neurodiversity, and critical autism
studies communities, I also consider what is at stake in the treatment of autism spectrum
disorders and point to the ways that Lacanian psychoanalysis may be a beneficial treatment
approach for some adults on the spectrum. In the following pages, I will discuss the limitations
of my study and my approach to this project, consider some of the themes that emerged in the
literature and in analysis of the autobiographical data, and draw out what I see as this
implications of this research for individuals on the autism spectrum.
Limitations of the Study
To begin with, it is important to identify limitations to this study as well as limitations implicit in
my approach to the material. The following represent what I see as the primary limitations of
this work.
Sample Size and Characteristics
In this study, I analyzed four published autobiographies. Although in some ways the amount of
data collected across those four published works was immense, it still represents only four points
of view, making it difficult to generalize the findings. Additionally, the autobiographies I chose
were predominately written by adults who were not diagnosed until adulthood, making it
impossible to explore questions related to childhood treatments and their effect on adult
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functioning. This is particularly relevant given trends in the neurodiversity movement
suggesting that some childhood treatments, like ABA, are actually harmful (Devita-Raeburn,
2016). Finally, there is a decided lack of racial and cultural diversity in the autobiographies I
analyzed – all of the authors are white and most identify as heterosexual, are middle class, and
are educated. Two are from the United States, one from England, and one from New Zealand,
countries that, although different, share many similar cultural characteristics. The homogeny of
the data set limits what we can explore about the ways that diverse cultural discourses intersect
with and shape identity construction in autism. Finally, although I intended to study only
individuals diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, since the inception of this project Asperger’s
has been subsumed under the Autism Spectrum Disorder umbrella, meaning that the authors in
my study are now considered to have “high-functioning autism.” Although there are questions
about the utility of the high/low functioning distinction, it is the case that my findings cannot
likely be generalized to all individuals on the spectrum or even to all of those now understood to
have high-functioning ASD.
Mediated Data
I chose to use autobiographical texts for this project, rather than interviews or case studies, as I
believed it would allow a window into the lived experience of autism across the lifespan,
offering an excellent resource for understanding autistic experience. Unlike case studies or
planned interviews, which are explicitly guided by the clinician or interviewer and in line with an
already established theoretical framework, autobiographies articulate experiences that the author
believes to be relevant to his or her identity as an autistic adult. It was, and is, my opinion that
published autobiographies offer a rich description of the world of the autistic adult that is
relevant for psychological theorization of the disorder.
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That said, it is important to recognize that, although autobiographical texts may appear to
be a direct communication from the author to the audience, autobiographies are shaped by a kind
of invisible mediation. If we take interview data as a comparison, with interviews it is always the
case that the material is collaborative and, in many ways, constructed between the interviewer
and subject throughout the course of the interview and that the record produced is a transcript of
this interaction, rather than a polished or coherent narrative. The flow of questions, answers,
clarifications, etc. produces a text that is obviously and clearly mediated – the text or transcript
betrays the presence of the interviewer as interlocutor. Autobiographical texts are purposefully
clean, appearing to represent only one voice when, in fact, the publishing process itself requires
the presence of several intermediaries- publishers, editors, reviewers, etc., all of whom may also
have a voice in the construction of the narrative.
Because issues of narration and questions surrounding communication impairments are a
central theme in autism spectrum disorders, it is even more important to consider the ways that
autobiographical texts may represent a translation or collaboration, rather than a direct
communication from author to audience. Francesca Happé (1991) discusses these concerns in an
article on autistic autobiography and suggests that, given the types of deficits inherent in autism,
we should be careful about assuming that the content of the autobiographical material is a direct
representation of experience. She also cautions researchers to consider the possibility that
autistic authors may require the assistance, sometimes substantial, of editors or co-authors whose
influence may shape the content in ways that are decidedly non-autistic. Happé points out that
“autistic writers may not be interested in, or capable of writing on those subjects which we
should most like to hear their views” (p. 212) and she goes on to encourage researchers to be
suspicious of the content of autistic autobiography when it is in clear contradiction to empirical
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research on autism, for example, when an author demonstrates theory of mind or empathy. She
also notes a need to be critically aware of the ways that writing can mask a tendency for autistic
individuals to parrot, rather than truly understand, which may make certain authors appear more
socially able than they actually are. Happé suggests that one way to manage the issue with
mediation in autistic autobiography is to focus on style rather than, or at least alongside, content.
What she is noting is that rather than placing the emphasis on what the person is talking about, it
may prove more valuable to focus on how s/he goes about talking about it and what is left out of
the narrative. For Happé, making use of style rather than content helps avoid the potential of
drawing questionable research conclusions and offers an approach to using autistic writing that is
able to demonstrate trends across writing in a more reliable way.
Although Happé points to some critically important issues with using autobiographical
texts as data, Happé’s challenging of autistic autobiography rests on the assumption that
someone with autism is unable to construct a readable narrative and must rely heavily on outside
support in order to produce an autobiographical text. Happé’s account has been challenged by
autistic authors and bloggers, all of whom point out that Happé is reading these texts through the
lens of deficit and taking note of the presence of things like empathy and imagination that she
believes should be absent in an autistic subject (Wexler, 2016) rather than attending to the
experience articulated in the text itself.
The tension between the professional and psychological understanding and the point of
view of autistic self-advocates when it comes to autobiography is important to bear in mind with
respect to my research. Although most of the autobiographies I chose were not read widely by
non-autistic audiences, they were all published by independent publishing houses and likely
involved editing and perhaps even ghostwriting. It is important to weigh the possibility of
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external influence with respect to the writing with the value of the story that the author clearly
wanted to tell. However, the question of purity of voice may be a limitation for this study.
Furthermore, the question of mediation via the autobiography brings up important issues
about the social construction of autism and the sociocultural context in which these
autobiographies are produced and distributed. In this project I am analyzing published
autobiography and am assuming that there is a relationship between the text and the author’s
experience. I am not treating the text as only text or as a conversation with the larger public,
which is important to bear in mind when considering the results. In addition to the process of
publication and the mediation involved in that process, there is the larger context of autism as a
discursive production, situated in complex relationships to various political, caregiver, and
professional groups. In many ways, these texts are situated within a broader conversation about
autism that also shapes the author’s choice of material as well as the editor’s input and decisions.
These books are intended to be sold, and in order for that to occur they must contain something
that the readership wants. Although I have made an attempt in this project to entertain the ways
that autism is both a diagnosis and a social discourse embedded in a matrix of power dynamics, I
could not account for this as easily in the actual analysis of the autobiographies themselves. As
Iain Hacking (2009a) has noted, autistic autobiography both articulates autistic experience and
creates new ways of being autistic. The work of these texts is inextricably linked with a cultural
production that is both constituting and constituted. My research, too, is situated in that space.
Using Psychoanalysis as both Praxis and Research Method
For this project, I made use of, along with a phenomenological approach, a Lacanian
psychoanalytic conceptual framework to analyze each autobiography. My intent with this
approach was to find a way to examine the extent to which Lacanian theoretical understandings
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of autism bear out with respect to the articulation of lived experience. Although I align myself
with psychoanalysis as a theoretical perspective and find psychoanalytic clinical work deep and
transformative, I am sometimes skeptical of the case studies I read where the case is presented as
already formulated – it comes pre-interpreted, often with little space for alternative explanations.
Because of this, I fear that a weakness of psychoanalytic approaches to research is that the theory
has the capacity to take on a life of its own, divorced in some ways from the case material that is
supposed to inform it. For those reasons, I wanted to take a different approach to this research,
starting with the case material to see how well the theory aligns. In this way, I could take the
theory and test it against the case, with the expectation that the theory may not be sufficient.
Psychoanalysis has a long and storied history as a clinical practice, but, although it is
often overlooked, it also has a long history as a research method. In fact, one could easily make
the argument, as Fred Wertz and Charles Olbert (2016) do, that Freud was first and primarily a
researcher—developing psychoanalysis as a research method that only later became a
specifically clinical practice. In their article, Wertz and Olbert point out the similarities between
Freud’s approach to psychological phenomena and the development of psychoanalytic praxis and
Husserl’s approach to the natural world and the development of phenomenology. Although
certainly different in some important ways, both start from a position of observation and a desire
for description over pure theory. As Freud, quoted in Wertz and Olbert, states:
One dislikes the thought of abandoning observation for barren theoretical
discussion…[which] would in the first place require as its basis a sharply defined
concept. But I am of the opinion that that is just the difference between a speculative
theory and a science founded upon constructions arrived at empirically. The latter will
not begrudge to speculation its privilege of a smooth, logically unassailable structure, but
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will itself be gladly content with nebulous, scarcely imaginative conceptions which it
hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even
prepared to replace by others. (Freud 1914/1957, 77). (p. 259)
For Freud, psychoanalysis has its roots in a certain orientation towards psychological phenomena
– an orientation that seeks to bracket presuppositions in order to more fully explore
psychological experience as it appears in the context of history, culture, language, etc. Like
phenomenological methods, psychoanalysis began by a return to the foundations of human
experience in order to ground psychoanalytic knowledge in its meaning-making context. The
practice of psychoanalysis for Freud was as much a research method as it was a clinical practice.
That said, psychoanalysis since Freud has moved away from research and is usually
understood as one of many theoretical orientations to clinical practice. In the Lacanian frame,
particularly, it is primarily considered a clinical and ethical praxis relying on an analyst who is
able to leverage his or her desire in the service of the unconscious. It is understood, and perhaps
taken for granted, that one cannot simultaneously conduct psychoanalysis and do research – the
former is interested in particular truth while the latter is interested in academic knowledge. As
such, I want to be clear that while I invoke the theory of psychoanalysis throughout this project
and make use of conceptual elements from within the Lacanian frame, I am not conducting
psychoanalysis. I am doing psychoanalytic research.
What is the difference? In boiling down Lacanian theory to a series of concepts, I
remove those concepts from their contextual and living expression within the space of analysis.
In many ways, as Freud noted above, the concepts are constructions – not real things, but tools
through which the analyst understands what is at stake in an analysis. They are a way of talking
about a practice, rather than a way of describing the truth about a human subject. Lacanians,
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though, diagnose subjects, and in doing so make use of a theoretical and conceptual scaffolding
to categorize human subjects. Understanding those categories, which make a claim to
universality, is not just an issue of praxis, but also an issue of shared (academic) knowledge and,
thus, an issue of power. Although I believe that the psychoanalytic space is in many ways the
space of a profoundly intimate and unique relationship, it is also a space that is produced and
maintained according to a shared theoretical knowledge. My question in this dissertation is
about whether that knowledge bears any relation to the lived experience, to the articulation of
lived experience in cases of autism. In order to explore that question, I have chosen to make use
of psychoanalysis as a theoretical construct rather than as only a clinical praxis. I have tried
throughout the discussions of the cases to balance this blunt divorce of theory from practice, by
exploring and pointing to the ways that conceptual/theoretical categories are woven together
uniquely for each subject. However, one important limitation to this study is the possibility that
the knowledge generated through this type of examination may not fully capture the unconscious
movement and particular temporal patterns that characterizes the analytic space.
Limitations of Perspective
Although I discussed my situated perspective as a researcher and clinician in the introduction, I
want to also note the ways that my particular perspectival position may serve as a limitation of
this study. In some ways, one could make the argument that all research is limited by the
perspective of the researcher, but this may be particularly true with respect to human subject
research. I entered into this project with some ideas about autism, what it meant diagnostically,
what “treatment” should look like. Although I would like to think that I left space for new
perspectives and ideas to emerge during this project, I also know that the shape and scope of the
project was in many ways predetermined by my personal history, theoretical background, and
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clinical interests. This is important to note, particularly because I am not autistic. Although I
may be able to sympathize and think critically about the wants and needs of adults on the
spectrum, I suspect that I, like any non-autistic individual, suffer from an array of blind spots that
limit my ability to see certain aspects of autistic experience and thus encounter limitations to
what my research can contribute. I want to acknowledge that in many ways, my research
represents a problematic trend in autism research where a non-autistic clinician or researcher is
producing knowledge about autistic experience.
Discussion of Results
The Problem of Empathy
There are many issues with the deficit-model of autism, but perhaps the most problematic is
empathy. For all of the authors in my study, the question of empathy comes up, and for each of
them it is a sticking point. They are frustrated that people think they are incapable of empathy.
However, most of them equate empathy either with logic or with affection (or sometimes with
both.) For example, John says, “I have true empathy for my family and close friends. If I hear of
something bad happening to one of them, I feel tense or nauseous, or anxious. My neck muscles
cramp. I get jumpy. That, to me, is one kind of empathy that’s “real” (Robison, 2008, p. 31). Or
Jen describing her struggles to get help to deal with her grief:
It seems to me that the “known fact” of people with Asperger Syndrome lacking empathy
leads even some autism professionals into erroneous thinking. This “fact” then lets them
believe that people with Asperger Syndrome do not grieve, or not as much as “normal”
people. In other words, this “known fact” is untrue and even dangerous, because then
people with Asperger Syndrome cannot get the help they need, if major grief hits them.
(Birch, 2003, p. 206)
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Or Jesse describing his logical empathy:
The fine art of artificial empathy has been refined over the course of my adult life, as I
have learned to function like a human computer. Like a cerebral Microsoft Word
program, I have stored separate files for funerals, weddings, job interviews, first dates,
etc. These files may be accessed at a moment’s notice and compensate for my
deficiencies with generalization. (Saperstein, 2010, p. 36)
These understandings of empathy are distinctly different from how it is usually defined in
the literature. For example, Simon Baron-Cohen, as quoted in MacDonagh (2013), defines
empathy as
…the drive to identify another person’s emotions and thoughts, and to respond to them
with an appropriate emotions. Empathy does not just entail the cold calculation of what
someone else thinks or feels …Empathizing occurs when we feel an appropriate
emotional reaction, an emotion triggered by the other person’s emotion, and it is done in
order to understand another person, to predict their behavior, and to connect or resonate
with them emotionally (2003, 2)…you do it [i.e. empathize] because you can’t help doing
it, because you care about the other person’s thoughts and feelings, because it matters. (p.
34)
Scott Churchill, a phenomenologist, describes the experience of empathy as “I am wondering
what the other is experiencing, and all my powers of perception are driven towards this other
whose first-person experience remains just out of reach, accessible only insofar as I have this
capacity for a deeper “bodily felt” awareness in which the other’s experience takes possession of
me” (p. 92). Both authors go on to link empathy with compassion or with caring and all seem
also to base empathy on a basic capacity for self-awareness. All of these things – empathy,

244

compassion, self-awareness – are often considered absent in autism, by mainstream researchers
and by clinicians diagnosing and treating the disorder (Attwood, 2015). Despite the clear
association of autism with deficits in empathy (and associated phenomena) in the research
literature, the authors in my study largely disagree and bring up the possibility that empathy as a
conceptual category may need redefinition.
There is a clear tension between the professional and autistic perspectives when it comes
to issues of empathy (and theory of mind) in autism, which points to a need to further explore
and ground both how we understand empathy and how we come to know and understand it’s
apparent absence. In my research, there was a clear theme of difficulty with social
communication – all of the authors talk about struggling to read social cues, understanding shifts
in tone of voice, as well as difficulties processing sensory information during interactions. Most
of them talk about issues of identity, of failing to understand themselves or come up with an
explanation for why they are different. And, their descriptions of empathy do tend to be more
like descriptions of caring or compassion, suggesting that the authors may struggle to fully
understand the embodied and intersubjective experience of empathy as it is usually understood.
At the same time, theorists and clinicians (who appear to all identify as non-autistic) who suggest
autistics do not have empathy seem to also be suggesting that they do not have the capacity to
care about others…which is perhaps overstepping, and points to a need to better ground the
definition of empathy20. We need to ask, what is empathy and what is its purpose? Does
empathy require a particular kind of embodiment or ability to relate or can it be achieved via

As an aside, during the time that I was completing this project, I had occasion to administer
several intellectual/cognitive testing batteries. In at least one of the measures, compassion and
empathy are considered synonyms - further evidence that there is some conflation in both the
cultural and professional imagination between caring/compassion and empathy.
20
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alternate ways? And, if it can be achieved through different means, is it still a deficit? Further,
does the ability to love or care about the other rely on the ability to adopt an empathic position?
Most theorists situate empathy as an embodied-intuitive process, a knowing through
sense experience rather than a knowing through language or cognition. For both Baron-Cohen
and Churchill, it is a “human” experience, suggesting, as indicated by Yergeau (2013), that the
autistic adult is then non-human. In this construction of the human/autistic binary, I am struck
by the ways that the otherness of autistic individuals is taken up in a one-sided way – without
much consideration for the experience of otherness by the autistic individual. Thinking through
issues of empathy in this research led me to reflect on my experience with the autistic adults I
have worked with and how, although I am a clinician who relies heavily on my embodied
intuition of the other, I struggled to “read” my autistic patients in the ways I have so easily read
others. In thinking about this, I wonder about the all too common understanding of autistics as
lacking the ability to read or understand social cues, their lacking of a theory of mind, and I
wonder about whether the assumptions underlying theory of mind, empathy, and social
intelligence, are perhaps taking for granted a familiarity with “humanness” that is misguided. Is
it possible to understand empathy differently? And, with respect to autism, do we need to?
Although I do not have any answers, I am interested in several aspects of what appears to
be the problem of empathy in autism, and I believe it is one area where additional research is
needed. First, does empathy rely on an embodied, sensate experience or can empathy instead be
logical, as John suggests? Second, if empathy is in fact an embodied intersubjective experience,
is it culture bound? In other words, whatever this process of “sensing in” is comprised of, it
seems to rely in large part on some kind of resonating intuition about the other, and, I wonder, to
what extent that other needs to be familiar in order for empathy to work, so to speak. Third, I
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wonder, if empathy is culture bound, is it possible that within the communities comprised of
autistics, “Aspergia” for example (Asperger Life, n.d.), empathy is more possible. I am thinking
particularly of some of the autobiographers descriptions of their sense of what another autistic
individual was experiencing. It is possible that one could argue that they are not empathizing,
but sympathizing based on their own experiences, but I wonder about the possibility that it is a
form of empathy that is perhaps missed in research.
Autistic Bodies
Although there is a growing body of research (e.g. Park, 2010; Donnellan, Hill, & Leary, 2010;
Soloman, 2012), questions of the body and of embodiment are not taken up as frequently within
autism research. In my analysis embodiment came up with respect to the experience of objects
and was, for many of the authors, tied into questions of self and identity. It also showed up in
the questions about empathy and in mainstream deficit-model understandings of autism, many of
which point to embodiment, but do not discuss it directly. Like empathy, embodiment is
sometimes difficult to truly define, but in terms of this project, I understand it as the physically
situated experience of human consciousness.
Yergeau (2013) points out that, if one follows Baron-Cohen’s argument about the
structure of empathy to its conclusion, then autistic individuals become a sack of skin – only a
body. In this understanding, embodiment is no longer at stake, as in many ways it seems as
though the body is understood as animal-like, unrestricted by language and social rules, and
subject only to drives. On the one hand, given some of the descriptions of the sensory
landscapes of autistic individuals, including the ones in this study, it is easy to see how the body
could be taken up that way. For example, Wendy talks about feeling mesmerized and caught in
experiences of color and sound, experiences which give to her a sense of her own being through
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connection with the object (Lawson, 1998, p. 4). Similarly, Dawn Eddings Prince (2013), an
anthropologist and autistic self-advocate, also describes a sensory landscape wherein her body
seems to get lost through a kind of joining:
Like most people on the spectrum, I am not one person, a vested persona easily finding
refuge in the walls of this castle, or even one thing: not even a “human being, for that
matter. Like most people on the spectrum, it is my very nature to be a million things in
the moment: the green in the wind, the crackle of thinking people all around me, the
small balm of elusive quiet. The times that I have rocked in the corner, seemingly as
bound and worn as any reliable academic tome, were the times that I was everything I
have ever been. (p. 322)
These descriptions in one way do evoke questions about the experience of bodily limits in autism
– questions that are reflected in theories about autism as psychosis and autism as a non-human
way of being. That said, however, the descriptions also evoke an embodiment that is highly
attuned to the lived world. In these descriptions, you can hear the ways that the connection to the
sensuous world is part of a process of self-constitution. It is this embodied process that warrants
additional study – the autistic body in these descriptions is connected to the world through a
mechanism that escapes or exceeds the language that we typically use to describe embodiment.
However, while on the one hand, we have this implicit notion of the autistic body as lived
in close connection to the sensory world, on the other hand, much more explicitly, we have the
notion of the autistic as overtly logical or rational – an idea that evokes an image of embodied
computers rather than human bodies. For some of my authors, the landscape of the sensual
world was seemingly absent in their descriptions of their life. Rather, mental processes were
emphasized with a focus on logic and organization. This was particularly true for John, who
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devoted many sections of his book to explorations of logical thinking as a primary manifestation
of Asperger’s. In these descriptions of experience as logical, the body is bracketed in a way that
makes it appear absent. We can see how this understanding of autism – as robotic – is
conceptualized as issues with social communication and leads to treatments aimed at humanizing
through teaching body language. In both descriptions, however, there are questions of the status
of the body, how the body is lived by autistic individuals and how that lived experience may be
different from non-autistic or neurotypical experience.
In both the phenomenological and the psychoanalytic analysis, the question of the body
or of embodiment came up, but in distinct ways. In the IPA analysis, there was a clear
distinction between the participants in terms of a primary tendency to resort to physical sensation
or to logic as a primary way to negotiate the lived world. This can most clearly be seen in the
section on dealing with emotions. For John and Jesse, there is a tendency to rely on a more literal
linguistic logic in order to make sense of experience. For John, this shows up readily in his resort
to machines, which allow him an escape where his way of thinking and responding to the
environment makes sense. For Jesse, the embodiment is presented in a more complex way,
however we see a repeated and primary attempt to focus on logic, but with an associated
frustration that is also experienced as physical sensation when logic fails. Neither Jesse nor John
talk about anything similar to the sensual experiences described by Wendy, and, in fact, in both
John and Jesse’s texts discussions of physical sensation in general are minimal. For Wendy, as
discussed above, the physical and sensual world is experienced as primary, with discussions of
logic largely absent. For Jen, there is something of a mix between a focus on the logical and a
connection to the sensory world. We see this in her descriptions of “blissing out” in the sensory
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landscape of the library as well as her descriptions of naiveté (which is the result of a concrete,
logical interpretation) in social situations.
For all of the authors, though, while there may be a tendency towards one type of
experience over the other, there is something like a movement between sensory experience and
logic that is worth noting. I am thinking particularly of Jesse’s descriptions of his difficulty
understanding and interpreting silence in communication, alongside his tendency to become
absorbed and fascinated by his shiny CD collection or to engage in hand flapping as a way to
manage his emotional experiences. What the IPA results point to is that the embodied
experience of autism in some ways is an experience that fluctuates between sensory experience
and logic, or rationality, which may reflect something of the experience of autism as well as
something about the oscillation in the literature of the conflicting tropes of autistic bodies as
robotic and/or animal-like.
In the psychoanalytic analysis, we may get a clearer picture of this movement insofar as
that analysis seems to suggest that, at least for most of the authors, there is a difficulty at the
level of separation and the construction of the fantasy. In the Lacanian paradigm, the process of
separation situates the subject within the symbolic field, creating a more permanent space
linguistically, but a space that is also situated according to the confines of the body – language
produces the body as a container whose borders are not permeable. It is through separation and
the fantasy that the Other is kept at a distance, and for some of the authors fantasy content is
lacking and the Other appears too close for comfort. The oscillation of a being caught between
rationality and sensory connection, in this theoretical frame, may be reflective of the options
available for a subject with impairment at the level of the imaginary, and of the potentially
unstoppable movement that characterizes the failure to chose.
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Autistic Selves: Identity vs. Treatment
Intertwined with questions of embodiment and empathy are questions about the construction of
the self in autistic individuals as well as questions about autism itself as an identity or an illness.
The IPA analysis points specifically to the authors’ issues of identity and questions about
knowing or understanding themselves. For many of them, issues with identity and self-definition
were impacted by (and impacted) relationships with others and struggles to identify goals and
desires.
The issues of identity also show up in the mainstream, Lacanian, and critical autism
studies literature, although in divergent ways. In mainstream literature, we can see the questions
of identity show up in the trope of the lost or stolen child. A primitive form of identity theft is
portrayed – the original child was stolen, begging the question about what remains. Parents and
treatment professionals keep this metaphor alive in the social consciousness. For children on the
spectrum, this is perhaps a difficult position from which to construct a workable sense of self. In
the Lacanian literature, the question is about the relation of the child to the Other, with the
assumption that it is a lack of separation from the Other that is at the root of autism (and other
psychotic disorders). In the Lacanian paradigm, lack of separation points to an issue at the level
of being. We can hear some echoes of this in the texts of the authors, particularly Wendy and
Jen; however, similarly to mainstream theories, this way of thinking understands the autistic
subject as lacking a self completely. Scholars in autism studies and autistic writers, including the
authors in my study, resist this idea that autistic subjects lack selves, lack being, or lack the
ability to have insight. Instead, they argue that, rather than lacking a self, they are selves of a
different kind.
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Many autism self-advocates talk about “autistic identity” and the ways that autism is not
a diagnosis that one has, but instead that autism is what one is. Jim Sinclair is often considered
to be one of the first autistic individuals to speak about one thing like an autistic identity. In a
presentation they gave at the International Conference on Autism in 1993 they said:
Autism isn't something a person has, or a "shell" that a person is trapped inside. There's
no normal child hidden behind the autism. Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it
colors every experience, every sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encounter,
every aspect of existence. It is not possible to separate the autism from the person--and if
it were possible, the person you'd have left would not be the same person you started
with.
This is important, so take a moment to consider it: Autism is a way of being. It is
not possible to separate the person from the autism.
Therefore, when parents say, I wish my child did not have autism, what they're
really saying is, I wish the autistic child I have did not exist, and I had a different (nonautistic) child instead. (n.p.)
For Sinclair, as for many autistic self-advocates, autism is a way of being oriented to the world
that comes with its own strengths and weaknesses. We can see this way of thinking about autism
as identity throughout the IPA analysis and also, for some of the authors, in the psychoanalytic
analysis. For example, Jesse largely understands Asperger’s as what he is rather than what he
has, and while he pushes against the limitations he experiences as a result of the disorder, he also
celebrates some of the traits he believes are positive. For example, in describing his success on
the Appalachian Trail Jesse states, “I felt vindicated by the fact that every mile was hiked with
Obsession, Perseveration, Anger, and Weirdness – aspects of my personality that were once
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perceived as demons, not as assets” (p. 139). Here we see the explicit association of Asperger’s
traits to personality – they are not appendages, as Sinclair (1993, n.p.) would say, they are a part
of who Jesse is.
The tension between diagnosis and identity in autism literature shows up as questions
about whether treatment is necessary if autism is, in fact, just one expression of being and not
reflective of pathology. A recent article in the Atlantic highlights the tension between parents
desperate to help their children and autistic adults stating that the treatment was cruel and
unnecessary (Devita-Raeburn, 2016). In my study, none of the authors was subjected to what is
now the typical treatment for autism – 40+ hours a week of ABA along with supplemental
therapies to target other problems (physical therapy, occupational therapy, diet changes, sensory
integration, etc.). Some of them mention that it would have been helpful to have someone point
out to them why their communications with others so often failed, but none of the authors talk
about wanting to be cured or to be non-autistic. And, all of them talk about the way they
experience the world as vital to who they are.
While many autistic self-advocates talk about the ways that treatment is unnecessary and,
in some cases, even harmful, many cling to the diagnosis as though it confers an identity. We
can see through both the IPA and the psychoanalytic analysis the constitutive function of the
diagnosis for all of the authors in this study. For them, the diagnosis allowed them to understand
themselves and also allowed them to situate themselves in a community. Many of the online
forums and gatherings of ASD individuals make plays on the diagnostic labels in the
development of community spaces – one can be an “aspie” from “Aspergia” for example
(Asperger Life, n.d.). In these ways, the diagnosis is functioning similarly to the ways that
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ethnic labels function, situating autism in the realm of culture rather than the realm of mental
illness.
For parents, treatment providers, and researchers, however, the diagnosis is often aimed
at articulating the organization of a series of symptoms that will then be targeted via some type
of treatment. Whether explicit or not, treatment suggests dysfunction, abnormality, and/or
deficit. It also implies cure. The association of autism with cure and treatment is understandably
problematic for autistic self-advocates who believe they are just acting in accordance with their
nature. (This is very similar to the ways that LGBT individuals talked about mental health
treatment for homosexuality prior to its removal from the DSM). However, many parents rights
groups and professional organizations believe strongly in the notions of cure and habilitation
and, as such, much of the money for autism research is poured into locating genetic markers for
the disorder or for treatments aimed at reducing or eliminating symptoms (Silberman, 2015).
What comes up though, when we look at the claim to identity made by autism self-advocates, is
the difference between treatment and support.
Self-advocates arguing that autism is an identity rather than an illness also note that many
autistic individuals require external supports in order to function in mainstream society, whether
that be assistance with communication, environmental supports, or other individualized
assistance. What they point out is that providing supports, rather than focusing on treatment and
cure, can ameliorate some of the difficulties autistic individuals face, allowing them to more
fully participate in the social sphere. It also points out the ways that autistic suffering is in many
ways produced through the social/cultural environment rather than from within the autistic
individual. This was reflected in the IPA analysis via the tension between Asperger’s as both a
strength and a limitation. The authors in my study all point to the ways that having specific

254

supports available would have been beneficial to them as they were trying to navigate the
neurotypical world. For example, John mentions frequently his wish that someone had tried to
explain to him how he was failing in his communication. Similarly, Jesse needs support around
learning how to interpret silence, while Jen needs more time on tests to collect her thoughts and
navigate to the proper classroom. These are just some examples, and each author I studied talked
at length about challenges that they faced and ways that they tried to manage work-arounds or
locate help on their own so that they could function. Most of them have managed over the
course of their lives to locate the types of support they want and need; however, none of them
talked about seeking out treatment to eliminate or reduce the autism. In fact, Jen shares her
experience of seeking treatment for anxiety and being forced to communicate in such a way that
she lost the ability to think in pictures. She says:
There was a cost attached to this, however: I can no longer think in pictures – this
creative side of my being is gone. Now that, very late in life, I have discovered that
certain other people DO think in pictures, as I did – and that it is, therefore, a valid (as
well as an original and inventive) way of thinking – I feel cheated that I was made to feel
that I had to change my very thought processes in order to become “well,” and “normal.”
(p. 128-129)
Here Jen is implicitly pointing to the tensions between autism as identity and autism as illness as
well as the differences between treatment and support.
As a researcher, I was pulled to consider the ways that my environment is already set up
to support me – the world I live in is equipped and staged for non-autistic or neurotypical
experience and interaction. For someone on the spectrum, this is not often true. I was led to
consider this while reading about an autistic retreat where the environment was manipulated to

255

be friendlier to those on the spectrum (Silberman, 2015, pp. 448-450). There is something
warranting further exploration and research here, at the center of questions about diagnosis,
treatment, support, and identity, regarding the ways that supportive services may ameliorate
some of the difficulties facing those on the spectrum.
Discerning Neurobiology from Environmental/Developmental Effects
One of the things that is most compelling about autism and how it is researched is the tendency
to focus exclusively on neurobiological explanations to the exclusion of environmental influence.
This shows up across all types of writing and research into autism spectrum disorders, including
those by autism self-advocates. In many ways, environment gets eliminated from the
conversation – as though autistic people are somehow immune from environmental impact. Both
the IPA and the psychoanalytic analysis point to the influence of environment in just about every
aspect of the authors’ experiences – from the use of objects in the physical environment for
Wendy, to the physical illnesses resulting from environmental stress suffered by Jen, to the ways
that people’s negative responses shaped Jesse’s later choices about how to interact with others
(and make his forcing less forceful), and to the ways that the labels given to John influenced his
sense of self. All of these, along with many others, point to the profound influence of
environment on the lives and experiences of the authors.
The conflict between environment and biology came up for me initially in the
descriptions by John of the bullying and isolation he experienced as a child, despite his clear
desire to connect and make friends. He talked about the ways that this type of treatment caused
him to withdraw into machines, which he could trust not to hurt him. Withdrawal is absolutely a
common characteristic of autistic individuals, a theme captured well by the IPA analysis, but I
wonder if we can wholly attribute John’s withdrawal to his biology, as I often see it done in the
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literature. Instead, as he himself points out, he was influenced by his experiences – his history
helped to shape him just like it does for other humans. Perhaps, being autistic, John was
predisposed to withdraw, but the expression of withdrawal seemed to require a trigger – if we
want to use the language of neurobiology.
One of the reasons I am interested in psychoanalysis and its utility in autism is precisely
because it is able to explore and consider personal history as influential and to understand it in
terms of the individual. I do not think that psychoanalysis will cure autism or that we can
attribute all of the difficulties faced by ASD individuals to environmental or familial influences;
however, ignoring those things somehow reduces autistic experience to that which lacks meaning
(or perhaps, again, reduces it to that which is non-human). It seems to me that one of the things
most notably absent from the research on autism, as well as from the array of treatments, is the
notion of autistic experience as contextual. Just like all other humans, autistic individuals live in
social, familial situations which exert an influence on experience, choice, behavior, etc. and that
also influence who we come to be. Future autism research would do well to more deeply explore
the ways that autism is lived within the context of personal and social history and the ways that
experience influences and shapes autistic identity.
Diagnosing Autism in the Lacanian Frame
Perhaps the first thing to say about diagnosing autism from within a Lacanian paradigm is that
“autism” in Lacanian terms seems to mean something very different than what is meant by
autism in the DSM. Partially, this is due to the difference in diagnostic paradigm between DSM
and Lacanian theoretical orientations; however, at present, Lacanians are making use of the label
autism, without a solid theoretical grounding. Lacanians are using the DSM label to talk about
cases in which there is already a diagnosis of autism (e.g. Laurent, 2012; Maleval, 2012;
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Jonckheere, 2014a, 2014b), but not discussing where those individuals fall diagnostically within
the Lacanian field.
Perhaps the most important finding from the psychoanalytic analysis is that autistic
subjects do not fall easily or fully within a single structure – they may fall along the range of
Lacanian structural positions, not just within psychosis. The psychoanalytic analysis shows that
only one of the authors would fall into the category of psychosis (where autism is currently
situated) according to the structural categories identified by Lacan. Two of the authors do not fit
into any of the current diagnostic categories, although they tend to lean towards neurosis rather
than psychosis. And one author fits the structural definition of neurosis. All of these authors have
been diagnosed by mainstream clinicians with Asperger’s Syndrome, which has now been
subsumed under the label of autism spectrum disorder. It does not appear that autism, at least
autism as it is diagnosed via the DSM, equals psychosis in the Lacanian diagnostic paradigm.
Autism is something else.
Two questions emerge from this: 1. If DSM diagnosis of autism can fall within the range
of structural diagnoses, is there then something essential about it as a category that is relevant to
clinical theory? and 2. Is DSM diagnosis of autism distinct from the Lacanian understanding of
autism and, if so, what are Lacanians talking about when they talk about autism?
Jean-Claude Maleval (2012) states, “the symptomology of autism presents disorders of
language, of identity and of jouissance belonging to the clinic of the foreclosure of the Name-ofthe-Father (p. 34). The clinic of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father is usually understood
as the clinic of psychosis, however Maleval seems to be suggesting that, while autism and
psychosis may belong to the same clinic, they are distinct. He goes on to discuss the work of
Rosine and Robert Lefort, who situated autism as a fourth diagnostic structure. In his exploration
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of the history of the clinic of autism, he determines that what is at stake in the difference between
autism and psychosis is the stability of the subjective position over time (it is less about a series
of symptoms and more an orientation towards the world) and the method through which the
subject makes use of the object. Maleval seems to suggest, and this is echoed by Eric Laurent
(2012a), that the differences between psychosis and autism lie not in the mechanism of
foreclosure, but in the ways that the subject manages that foreclosure by either a resort to the
imaginary or to the object. For Maleval, autists are those who make use of the object as an
invention that creates a Real barrier between the subject and the Other, whereas traditional
psychotics (schizophrenics and paranoiacs) are those that construct an imaginary barrier (either
through delusion, paranoia, etc.). The importance in terms of the question of structure is that
both need a barrier.
Eric Laurent (2012a, 2012b) takes a similar position, arguing that in autism the question
with respect to structure (which is determined by foreclosure) is less important than questions
pertaining to the subject’s handling of jouissance. In his estimation, in autism jouissance returns
on a “rim.” Laurent defines the rim as the envelope with which the autistic subject encloses
himself. Laurent does not go so far as to provide examples of this return or to fully articulate
what he means with this statement. Instead, he is again making a distinction between the
handling of jouissance in cases of psychosis – where jouissance returns via the body (as
invasive) or via the Other (as paranoia). For Laurent, autism is different, but also the same as
psychosis – it is a failure of the paternal function, handled differently.
Both of these constructions are excessively theoretically laden and rely on distinctions
and comparisons between the Lacanian understanding of psychosis and the phenomena presented
in cases of autism (where it is again unclear in what context autism is diagnosed). The
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conversation starts from psychosis and never moves fully beyond it21. On the one hand, on the
surface there are several aspects of autism that bear some similarity to psychotic phenomena,
such as language disturbance, affective detachment (catatonia), and even sometimes bizarre
behavioral expressions. And, even in the history of mainstream autism theory and diagnosis we
find a problematic and unreflective mixing of autism with childhood psychosis that persisted in
the literature until well into the 1970s (see Silberman, 2015). But on the other hand, there is
something qualitatively and phenomenologically different between autism and psychosis – at
least as it is traditionally understood. What my research seems to suggest is that this difference
is not explained fully by the structural understanding of psychosis and that, instead, Lacanian
psychoanalysis may need to move beyond the attachment to structural explanations and consider
the importance of other models for understanding subjective constitution within the Lacanian
field. The relevance to clinical theory lies in the ability to notice trends within a group and to
think through the ways that those trends may appear (or not) within the particular context of an
individual subject. Lacanian theory already does something similar to this with other DSM
diagnostic categories – bipolar disorder, addiction, etc. These are never assumed to be unique
structural positions, but manifestations of a particular subject’s relationship to the Other and
jouissance. The diagnostic patterns appear via culture and biology as possible options for
symptom formation, similar to the ways that culture and biology influence the development and

In a footnote in his text (2012b, p. 61-62), Laurent notes that the clinic of psychosis is a
starting place for cases of autism, but that each case should ideally be understood in its
particularity. He makes reference to the clinic of knots as a way of orienting treatment in cases
of autism, however he provides little detail or information about what this means in practice.
The use of the footnote, as an aside to a text that is clearly oriented towards understanding autism
in the context of psychosis, betrays both the extent to which autism is inextricably linked with
the structural clinic in the Lacanian literature as well as the ways that it resists that positioning.
21
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specificity of psychotic delusional constructs. I would argue that there is something similar at
stake with autism.
In the psychoanalytic analysis, what appeared most prevalent across cases was the
absence of imaginary phenomena and some difficulties in the moment of separation, but not
necessarily difficulties linked with foreclosure. For example, for both John and Jen, while there
is some evidence of fantasy material, it does not function as a way to fully manage the relation to
the Other and regulate jouissance. Both struggle to keep the Other at a distance while also
securing a space for themselves, and both go about this process differently – John with machines
and Jen with the diagnostic label. There are ways that Maleval and Laurent’s account of autism
as characterized by desire propped up on a rim are applicable here – both John and Jen need
something outside of themselves that can be situated in the space between themselves and the
Other. And for both authors, this use of an object allows a type of identification that secures a
subjective space. John’s machines are like him and through them he can have relationships with
others. Jen’s diagnosis serves a similar function, although it is a linguistic rather than objectfunction.
Although both John and Jen appear to be using objects/labels as psychic mechanisms
aimed at separation, it does not seem necessary to understand that from within the “clinic of
foreclosure” as Laurent suggests. In fact, with Jen, we can also see evidence of repression and
repetition, which points to neurosis, or the clinic of repression. Given the particularity of each
author’s constellation of psychic elements, it seems really only possible to understand the use of
the object from within the constellation of each particular subject. Unlike a delusion, which has a
fairly consistent function across psychotic subjects (although the content may vary widely), the
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function of the object is not consistent across these accounts and appears much more as a type of
manipulation than as a fantasmic production. It is working differently.
When I read the psychoanalytic accounts of autism, what seems apparent is a belief that
the autistic individual is creating a barrier between self and Other in order to keep the Other out.
This appears in phrases like “autistic encapsulation” (Laurent, 2012a, p. 23). The authors in my
study contradict that idea and suggest instead that they want to connect but their attempts are
often ignored or misunderstood. What do we make of the disparity between the theory and the
articulation of lived experience? What may prove helpful to Lacanian theory is a more
phenomenological approach to understanding autism that does not immediately assume a link
between autism and psychosis. For example, what the phenomenological analysis shows us is
that for most of the authors there is an explicit desire for connection with others that often fails.
This failure appears to be related to a felt sense of being unable to relate in the way the other
desires (which is different than not wanting to relate at all). The desire for attachment and
relatedness requires some amount of separation, and the felt sense of not being what the Other
wants, requires an awareness that the Other is lacking and, thus, wants something. Both of these
elements problematize the conceptualization of autism as a variant of psychosis, or as belonging
to the clinic of foreclosure. Foreclosure refers to the paternal function, and to foreclose means
that one has refused to recognize that the Other is barred. This does not appear to be the problem
for most of the authors in my study. Instead, it is that the barring of the Other is not enough to
secure the space of identity construction and that the fantasy does not work well enough to
produce a false answer for the Other’s desire. As a result, we see via these authors an array of
creative and interesting methods to find other ways to secure a subjective position from which
they can relate to others and to the Other.
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Lacan’s later work with knotting and the sinthome offer some novel ways of
understanding these creative alternatives and the ways that subjectivity is constituted, but those
ideas were not fully elaborated by Lacan prior to his death and have not been refined or clarified
well in the literature. At present, what is most often presented with respect to the sinthome is a
notion of its function as supplementary and still bound largely to the structural clinic. The notion
of the sinthome as supplementary positions it most often as something functioning in place of
foreclosure. It is possible that, rather than making use of the clinic of knots as something that
operates in conjunction with the structural clinic, that it may be useful as a conceptual tool alone,
or in place of the structural clinic. Particularly in cases of autism, it may be helpful to make use
of a conceptualization that does not rely on a formulaic (or robotic) set of operations, but one that
instead is really able to imagine and begin to articulate the array of ways that human subjects
make use of language, objects, culture, etc. in order to “make” themselves.
Utility of Lacanian Psychoanalysis
I am perhaps biased about the extent to which Lacanian psychoanalysis can be useful in any
psychotherapy case, but I do think it has some relevance in cases of autism. It is clear from my
research that all of the authors struggled in various ways with sense of self, identity, and with
histories laden with mistreatment, bullying, loss, and, for some, challenging familial
environments. Because I believe that autistic individuals are in fact human, in every sense of the
word, I also cannot believe that they are immune to the effects of their histories or that they are
not influenced by past experiences, relationships, etc. ABA, TEACCH, or any of the other
mainstream treatments for autism (OT, PT, etc.) are not as well equipped to address issues of
emotion, loss, etc. or to address the influence of history on a subject or account for the ways that
subjects are constructed in and through both biology and environment. Psychoanalysis does that,
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and, particularly given the ways that autistic individuals are often situated as non-human, it is a
much needed addition.
What Lacanian psychoanalysis offers that is of particular importance to the treatment of
autism, given the trends within neurodiversity and autism self-advocacy, is that it is not aimed at
a cure that erases autism, but with a cure that helps the autistic individual mobilize desire,
regulate jouissance, and access the freedom to make choices in line with desire. It is not a
treatment that aims to build conformity or adaptation to the norm, but an experience that aims
towards the freedom to be whatever type of human you are.
I also think that psychoanalysis is uniquely situated to address issues of loss, acceptance,
and grief. Jen brings up an issue in her text regarding the tendency of autism researchers and
clinicians to believe that autistic individuals lack the ability to grieve. She is referring to the loss
of her father and what appears to be decades of unresolved grief over that loss. Jen is speaking
about a specific loss, but loss is woven through each authors’ text, and for many of them remains
unresolved. Issues of loss point both to grief and to questions around acceptance, mourning, and
working through. Psychoanalysis is uniquely situated to address these issues, both at the level of
the literal losses of people and objects, but also of the more implicit losses at the heart of
subjectivity.
The potential benefits of a Lacanian approach to autism, however, rely on the ability of
the analyst to elicit, maintain, and make use of the transference. Reworking the theoretical
understanding and diagnosis of autism in the Lacanian frame also points to a need to re-think the
transference and the analyst’s position within it. In Lacanian theory, simply put, the transference
is understood as the transfer of the unconscious of the analysand into the analytic space. Notions
of transference are intimately bound with theoretical understandings of subjective constitution –
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as an analyst, you will experience different types of transference when working with different
structural positions. How one maneuvers in the treatment and the methods of intervention are
linked almost exclusively to diagnosis and the understanding of transference. Rethinking autism
as potentially outside of the structural clinic means also to re-think the transference as neither
neurotic, psychotic, or perverse. This, too, points to a need to reconsider the ways that the analyst
positions him or herself in the treatment.
Conclusion: Moving Beyond the Fathers
In her critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Sophie Robert (2012) points to the rigidity of
psychoanalytic practice and the ways that Lacanian theory misunderstands autism and the needs
of autistic individuals. In many ways, she is right. In my research, it seems clear that the current
Lacanian ideas about autism miss the mark in many cases. What the phenomenological analysis
also shows is that mainstream treatments may make a similar mistake, by focusing only on
certain areas of experience and ignoring alternative methods of relating to others and to the
world. What I appreciate about Sophie Robert’s work is that she is in many ways highlighting
the unconscious of psychoanalysis and the jouissance at stake for psychoanalysis in the treatment
of autism. There is a similar unconscious enjoyment at stake in mainstream treatments and, in
both, a positioning of professional knowledge as logical and immutable, evident to anyone who
desires to know the truth. It is in many ways robotic, resistant to change, and denying the clear
evidence of emotional currents underlying both professional and political choices.
The Wall highlights the ways that autistic individuals get lost in the discourses on
treatment, that their humanity gets swept away by perhaps well-meaning, but unreflective
practitioners, who are no longer able to see the human truth in front of them. For Robert,
however, the answer to the regime of psychoanalysis is a regime of behavioral treatments.
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Making the accusation that psychoanalysis has failed in its paternal function, she attempts to
replace one set of Fathers with another. In my research, it is not the function of the father that
needs to be established in cases of autism, it is that which lies beyond the father that needs
exploration and attention. Although I think that both mainstream and psychoanalytic treatments
have something to offer autistic adults, my question in this project has been specific to Lacanian
psychoanalysis. As outlined above, Lacanian psychoanalysis can offer something important by
way of treatment for those autistic adults who desire some form of treatment. However Lacanian
psychoanalysis needs to make a few changes in order to be of benefit to autistic individuals.
First, it needs to reorient itself to the space of listening first, rather than to the space of theorizing
first. Second, it needs to remember that the space of analysis is a unique space organized around
an ethic of freedom and cannot be compared to other types of treatment. Its difference is what
makes it transformative, and attempting to produce psychoanalysis as an answer in the same way
as ABA, TEACCH, etc. is to limit its ability to be useful. Third, Lacanian psychoanalysis needs
to locate its humility in the face of human suffering – autism in many ways appears in the
psychoanalytic discourse as that which cannot be fully incorporated, understood, or tamed. It
challenges the implicit and perhaps unconscious lineage of analytic Fathers who righteously
situate themselves in the place of knowledge. If anything, this research reminds us that the
knowledge about autism lies with the autistic subject; truth, insofar as psychoanalysis is
concerned with it, can only be located there.
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